There seems to be a perception among some elements in the Amhara Nationalism movement that if the Amhara manage to mobilize into a force more powerful than the Oromo and other ethnic movements in the country, the current ethnic imbalance (against the Amhara) will be corrected, resulting in a beneficial arrangement for the Amhara as well as all of Ethiopia.
The assumption here is that a nation that consists simply of a political balance between ethnic groups is a viable nation. This is of course a basic error. It is an error, by the way, that has been propagated by ethnic nationalists, as we've seen in Ethiopia for over 40 years, that is is possible to create a nation out of inter-ethnic negotiation.
But this is not possible. Ethnic political movements naturally devolve politics into a zero-sum game. They capture all political, economic, and social competitions and force them into this zero-sum game. The result is perpetual conflict.
We know this not only in theory, but in examples around the world, and most importantly, in Ethiopia over the past 27 years. Issues such as political power, border, citizen and group rights, security, etc. have all been sources of conflict and will continue to be so as long as ethnicity is the main political driver.
Around the world, we see that multi-ethnic nations are careful not to as much as possible institutionalize ethnicity. They institutionalize language, culture, regional rights, etc., sometimes in an effort to indirectly achieve ethnic rights, but they never directly institutionalize ethnicity because the resulting conflicts are well known.
So in the case of Ethiopia today, let us assume that the Amhara create a movement stronger than any ethnic movement in Ethiopia. At the negotiating table or the battlefield, this movement will be capable of overpowering others, but at what cost. Will it be able to regain territories such as Welqait by negotiation or force? Will it be able to protect Addis Ababa from Oromo ethnic nationalism by negotiation or force? Will it be able to protect Amharas outside Amhara Region by negotiation or force?
The answer is obviously no. Why? The answer is simple. All the other ethnic movements will obviously demand the same rights (or more rights) as the Amhara movement. Why would they settle for less? So if the Amhara want the return of Welqait, Tigray will resist. No amount of ethnic to ethnic negotiation will work. So the only path will be force. If the Oromo insist on Amharas in Oromia having second class citizenship, what can the Amhara do but do the same to Oromos in Amhara? Will they both be able to agree to treat each others 'citizens' like their own? No, the Oromo nationalists are interested in nation-building, so they will enforce Oromocization. What can the Amharas do except tit-for-tat? Or else resort to force.
So it is a fallacy to assume that a strong Amhara movement will do well at the negotiating table. It will not. It may do well on the battlefield, however. It might be able to, like the TPLF, exert itself on others by force. But I assume we all know that in the long run this will be against the interests of the Amhara and all of Ethiopia.
These examples illustrate clearly that it is impossible to achieve a decent outcome - a viable nationa- with ethnic-to-ethnic negotiation. What is possible to achieve is a perpetual zero-sum game and perpetual conflict. That is why it is impossible to create a nation out of a political negotiation between ethnic groups.
In order to have a viable nation, one needs a centre. Anyone who has read any Ethiopian history and politics knows the concept of centre and periphery as it applies in Ethiopia. The 'centre' is the political constituency that, to put it simply, identifies as Ethiopian first and foremost. Its other identities, such as ethnicity, are secondary. This centre is an integrated political constituency created by and with a centuries old history of integration and assimilation. The 'peripheries' are those constituencies which have been less integrated and therefore have somewhat separate political identities from the centre. The ethnic nationalisms in Ethiopia are such examples.
There is always a tension between the centre and periphery. Many say that one of the reasons the Haile Selassie government eventually fell was that it 'centralized' too much. In other words, it gave to much power to the centre, which resulted in rebellion from the periphery. The Dergue regime continued this mistake, and the resulting revolution brought about a violent backlash that took Ethiopia to the opposite extreme, where all power, in theory, rests in the periphery, with the centre being nothing but a negotiated settlement by the peripheries.
So what Ethiopia needs today is to restore the balance not between ethnic groups, but between the centre and the periphery, the centre being "Ethiopianism", and the periphery being ethnic nationalism. The centre needs to get stronger so that it can resist the centrifugal force of the peripheries pulling at it. This will result in less conflict as well as more representative government, in the sense that not only ethnic rights but all rights will be respected. Human rights will no longer be steamrolled in favour of ethnic rights.
What does this mean for the Amhara? Well, as most Amhara nationalists acknowledge, the interests of Ethiopianism is for the most part aligned with the interests of the Amhara. For example, a citizen-based instead of ethnicity-based constitution is in the interests of both the centre and of the Amhara. Since the interests of the centre and the Amhara are aligned, if the Amhara line up to strengthen the centre vis a vis the periphery, they will by default have defended the interests of the Amhara.
Let me offer some practical examples. One of the interests of the Amhara is enforcing the right of all Ethiopians to live as equals in any region in Ethiopia. In a nation of peripheries, this will never happen, as I explained above. But if the centre is strong, this will happen. Because not only Amharas, but all others who have this in their interests will together demand equality of citizenship. Thus, not only Amharas, who say, are 30% of the population, but vast numbers from other ethnic groups will together, as Ethiopians, demand this right. This will make it impossible for those peripheries who are against this to resist, because the demand is not being made by other ethnic groups, but by the centre.
Recall that the victims of the recent ethnic cleansing around Addis Ababa were from at least three different ethnic groups. With a weak centre, these three ethnic groups would be separately advocating for the rights of their members. But a strong centre would result in a far more powerful united front.
Another example would be the question of Wolqait. Perhaps the most effective route to liberating Wolqait from being part of ethnic Tigray is to restructure federalism away from ethnic into regional federalism. This restructuring can only be done by a strong centre, since there will be no coalition of ethnic groups willing to do this. So again, the Amhara, by reinforcing the centre, will strengthen it to the extent that it will be able to peacefully negotiate such a change with the peripheries.
The centre is a powerful force. This is why throughout Ethiopian history, as we all know, most political forces, even those which started out as peripheral liberators, wanted as the final prize to get a hold of the centre. From ancient history, to the present, this story has repeated itself. Amhara nationalists would do well to review this history. It does not make sense to retreat to the periphery when ones interests are best served by bolstering the centre and ensuring its interests align with yours.
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