የቤተ ክርስቲያን ሚና በፖለቲካ - ጥቂት ሃሳቦች

የኢትዮጵያ ኦርቶዶክስ ቤተ ክርስቲያን እና ምእመናን በሀገራችን ፖለቲካ ምን አይነት ሚና መጫወት አለብን የሚለው ጥያቄ ሰፊና ውስብስብ ነው። ከዚህ ጽሁፍ በዚህ ጉዳይ ላይ አንዳንድ መሰረታዊ የሚመስሉኝን ሃሳቦችን ማቅረብ እወዳለሁ።

1. በእምነታችን እግዚአብሔር ከሁሉም ቦታ በሁሉም ጊዜ በሁሉም ዘመን ይገኛል። እግዚአብሔር የሌለበት ስፍራ የለም። ይህ ማለት ዓለምን በተለምዶ «ዓለማዊ» እና «መንፈሳዊ» ብሎ መለየት አይቻልም። እግዚአብሔር በቤተሰባችን፤ በመስሪያቤታችን፤ በንግዶቻችን፤ በትምሕርትቤቶቻችን፤ በእስርቤቶቻችን፤ በፖለቲካችን፤ በሁሉም ቦታ አለ። ስለዚህ ለእምነታችን off limits የሆነ ቦታ የለም። ሊኖርም አይችልም። ግን ጥያቄው እንዴት ነው እምነታችንን የምናንጸባርቀው ነው! እውነት እምነታችንን እናንጸባርቃለን ወይንም ኑፋቄ፤ ሰላም እናንጸባርቃለን ወይንም አመጽ፤ ደግነት እናንጸባርቃለን ወይንም ክፋት?

2. ክርስቶስ ፍቅርና ሰላም ነውና የክርስትና በፖለቲካ ላይ ያለው አመለካከት ፍቅርና ሰላም መሆን አለበት። መፈለግ ያለብን ሰላምን የሚያሰፍን እና ፍኩ ነገር የማያስደርገን (do no harm) ፖለቲካ ነው። ሁሉ አካሄዳችን በነዚህ ሁለት መርህዎች ስር መሆን አለበት። ሁሉ አቋሞቻችን በነዚህ መርህዎች መፈተሽ አለባቸው። ይህን ወይንም ያንን ፖሊሲ ወይም ፖለቲካዊ ተግባር ይጽደቅ ወይንም ይፈጸም ስንል ይህ ፖሊሲ ወይንም ተግባር ሰላም ያመጣል ወይ እና ክፉ እንዳናደርግ ይከለክለናል ወይ ብለን መጠየቅ አለብን። 

3. በሃይማኖታችን አንድ እውነት አለ፤ ይህ እውነት የኦርቶዶክሳዊ እምነታችን ነው። በዚህ በሃይማኖታችን መደራደር አይቻልም። ግን ከሃይማኖት ውች ሁሉ ነገር አሻሚ ነው። የፖለቲካ አቋም፤ ፖሊሲ፤ አተገባበር ሁሉ ትክክል ሊሆን፤ ሊሳሳት፤ መስተካከል ሊኖረው ይችላል። ፍፁም እውነት የሆነ ፖለቲካ የለም። ፖለቲካ እንደ ማንኛውም ስራ ግብአሩን እና ውጤቱን መርምሮ ገምቶ የሚሰራ ነው። ስተት ሊኖር ይችላል፤ ስተት ይኖራል። ግምቶችም ግቦችም የተሳሳቱ ሊሆኑ ይችላሉ። ስለዚህ ክርስቲያኖች የፖለቲካ አቋምን እንደ ጣኦት እንዳንቆጥር በጣም መጠንቀቅ አለብን። «ሶሽያሊዝም»፤ «ዴሞክራሲ»፤ «ሚክስድ ኤኮኖምይ»፤ «ነጻ ገበያ»፤ «ንጹህ ኤነርጂ» ወዘተ ሁሉም ሊጠቅሙ ላይጠቅሙ ይችላሉ። ከእሴቶቻችን ጋር አወራርድን የሚሆነውን ወስደን የማይሆነውን ትተን መራመድ ነው። እንደ ሁኔታው፤ ጊዜው፤ እና ችግሩ አቋምና ተግባራችንን ማስተካከል። የተለየ አቋም ያለውን አለመውቀስ ልንሳሳትንችላለንና። ፖለቲካ ጣኦት አይደለም!

4. ትህትና (humility) አንዱ የሃይማኖታችን ዋና እሴት ነው። «የተሰበርውንና የተዋረደውን ልብ እግዚአብሔር አይንቅም።» የሃይማኖት አባቶቻችን ከድርሳናቶቻቸው ትህትና ላይ በጣም ያተኩራሉ። ክርስቲያን በማንኛውም ስፍራ ትህትናውን መጠበቅ አለበት በፖለቲካ ስፍራውም እንዲሁ። የፖለቲካ አቋም ስንወስድ ተሳስተን ይሆናል ብለን ማሰብ አለብን። ከላይ እንዳልኩት ፖለቲካ ጣኦት አይደለምና አቋሞቻችንን እንደ ፍፁም አርገን መውሰድ አንችልም። ትህትና የግድ ነው። የትህትና ተቃራኒ እብሪት ክፉ ነው።

5. ንስሐ ከእግዚአብሔር የምንገናኝበት አንዱ ዋና መንገድ ነው። አለ ንስሐ ክስቲያናዊ ኑሮ የለም። እንደምንሳሳት ማመን አለብን። ስንሳሳት ማወቅና ማመን አለብን። ከዛ ንስሐ መግባት አለብን። በፖለቲካው ዓለምም እንዲሁ። ክርስቲያኖች በአቋምም በአፈጻጻምም ልንሳሳት እንችላለን። ይህን መካድ ታላቅ ስህተት ነው ኦርቶዶክሳዊ አይደለም። የንስሐ ፖለቲካ ፍቱን ነው። እኛ ኦርቶዶክሳዊ ኢትዮጵያኖች ትህትና እና ንስሐ በምሳሌ እያሳየን ፖለቲካችንን የሰላምና ፍቅር ማድረግ እንችል ይሆናል።

6. «አንቻቻልም!» መቻቻል አሉታዊ ነው፤ የማንወደውን ግን አማራጭ የሌለንን ነገር ነው የምንችለው። እግዚአብሔር ተቻቻሉ ሳይሆን ተዋደዱ ነው ያለው። ስለዚህ ኦርቶዶክስ ክርስቲያን ሁሉንም ሰው ይወዳል ወይንም መውደድ አለበት። ሁሉንም ሃሳብ አይወድም፤ ሁሉንም ድርጊት አይወድም፤ ግን ሁሉንም ሰው ይወዳል። እንደ ክርስቲያኖች ይህንን የእግዚአብሔርን ፍቅር ማንጸባረቅ አለብን። 

7. ምሳሌ መሆን የክርስቲያን ዋና ተግባር ነው። ሰውን ማስተማር የምንችለው በስብከት ሳይሆን በምሳሌ ነው፤ ይህ መሰረታዊ ትህምሕርታችን ነው። «የመንፈስ ቅዱስን ጸጋ አግኝና ዙርያህ ያሉ በሺዎች የሚቆጠሩ ይድናሉ» የሩሲያው ቅዱስ ሴራፊም እንዳስተማረን።

The Ethiopian Business Class Must Rise As A Political Power

Erring on the side of caution, we should assume that 29 years of institutionalized ethnic politics in Ethiopia has created significant 'facts on the ground'. From the political class down to the masses, ethnic nationalism has a following that cannot be ignored. It has become a political fact of life.

Unfettered ethnic nationalism both in theory and in practice (the institution of ethnic federalism) can be described as a conflict generating machine. In order to have a peaceful and productive political environment, ethnic nationalism must be curtailed and ethnic federalism must be altered to become a more pluralistic multicultural federalism, the type of which there are many successful examples throughout the world.

The task of reducing ethnic nationalist sentiment and moving from ethnic federalism towards multicultural federalism cannot be left to the federal government, the ruling Prosperity Party, and Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed alone. For two reasons: First, there is a significant concentration of ethnic nationalists both in the government, party, and deep state structures. Even with the departure of the TPLF and the arrests of prominent ethnic agitators, the fact is that in towns such as Shashemene, the executive, judiciary, and police are controlled by ethnic nationalists. There is also a strong ethnic nationalist presence in the Oromia wing of the ruling party. Remember the old saying about the OPDO being the OLF in disguise. Secondly, there is a degree of ethnic nationalism amongst the population especially in Oromia that cannot be ignored. The government and Prosperity Party must be careful not to antagonize this constituency. For these two reasons, the extent to which the government and party can act against ethnic nationalism using soft and hard power is limited. 

Given this, a political actor other than the government and ruling party has to step up to the plate in the struggle to reduce ethnic nationalism in Ethiopia. What political actor has the potential to do this? The masses, the intellectual class, and opposition political class have not shown any signs of being capable of political organization and action. They seem to be still weakened by over 45 years of Marxism, political revolution, and terror. This is evidenced by the fact that there has been no opposition political organization of any consequence for decades. There has been no mass political movement Ethiopia to speak of, except perhaps 'qerro', which has a significant ethnic nationalist element. So it is unlikely that the masses or opposition intellectual and political classes will be capable in the near future of creating a political movement that can work towards reducing ethnic nationalism.

There is another social class than in the near term can turn itself into a major political actor, and this social class is the new and rising business class. For two reasons. First, this class has both financial and intellectual resources. Second, and more importantly, it has the powerful invisible hand - its desire for  profit and wealth - as an incentive to work towards a stable and peaceful political environment. The only way the business class can make money and keep its wealth is by reducing ethnic nationalism and thereby bringing about a peaceful political environment. This is a strong incentive that the other social classes, such as the masses, intellectual or political elite cannot make use of. The business class, for the sake of its own survival and to protect its investments, must get politically involved and work towards reducing ethnic nationalism. We can only hope that business leaders understand this and begin the long and steady work of making the business class a political force.

The blueprint for the business class' political involvement is straightforward as it follows the same model used throughout the world from ancient times until today. Traditionally, the business class wields influences politics via soft power generated by money. It exercises influence via lobbying and marketing of various kinds,  by providing direct and indirect incentives to politicians, bureaucrats, civil society, businesses, and most importantly by creating institutions that work for its political aims, etc. The business class aims to become a permanent political influencer, not a single issue and one time lobby.

Let me give a practical example of what the actions of the business class lobby might look like. Let's take the case of Shashemene, which today has many of its government officials arrested as a result of their participation, directly or indirectly, in promoting ethnic violence and murder during the past year. To reduce ethnic nationalism in Shashemene, the entire governing structure would be targeted for influence and lobbying. In addition, influential institutions, such as organizations supporting local culture and traditions, empowering local youth in business activities, etc. would be established to give a safe and peaceful way to channel multiculturalism and economic aspirations without resorting to ethnic nationalism. These institutions would also help crowd out ethnic nationalist institutions and influence. In addition, institutions tertiary to the cause such as schools, hospitals, and businesses would be established to round out an all encompassing influencing structure. In the medium term, this work would result in attracting the populace into a more moderate political mindset, as well as tying the interests of politicians, merchants, students - all sectors of society - with moderate politics. In the long term, it will lead to the birth of a new moderate generation.

It may seem to some that the end of the TPLF means the end of ethnic nationalism and ethnic federalism. This view it seems to me is quite unrealistic. 30 years of institutionalized ethnic politics has created ethnic nationalism on the ground. The strong 'qerro' movement is an example of the result of this ethnic nationalism. This ethnic nationalism cannot be dealt with by the government alone, as the government is constrained by ethnic nationalists in its ranks, as well as ethnic nationalism in Oromia. The government needs the support of other political actors. Politicians, intellectuals, and the masses must tangible support the government to reduce ethnic nationalism. But more importantly, the social class with the most capacity, the business class, must establish itself as a political force and begin to tactfully use its enormous potential soft power in a campaign against ethnic nationalism. In this way, Ethiopia will move towards a less ethnic more peaceful political environment.

A Prudent Strategy for the Ethiopian Centre

I write this now because soon the TPLF will be history, and we will have to proceed with building a peaceful and stable Ethiopian political environment... Before the TPLF's recent acts of terrorism, many Ethiopia politicans and pundits that consider themselves centrists were attacking Prime Minister Abiy's administration for its inability to deal with ever increasing instances of ethnic cleansing, especially anti-Amhara ethnic cleansing, taking place throughout the country. Many of these politicians and pundits are now fully on side with Abiy on the issue of the TPLF insurrection.

A year and a half ago, I tried to makes sense of the (incessant) criticism of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and his government. Much of the criticism has to do with two points:

1. The federal and Addis Ababa government's real or perceived bias in favour of Oromos in handing out services and entitlements such as land, employment, etc.

2. The federal government's not preventing repeated instances of ethnic murder and ethnic cleansing of mostly Amharas but also others in Oromia, Benishangul, and SNNP regions.

Before I continue, I ask you to keep in mind the following quote: “When people realize things are going wrong, there are two questions they can ask. One is, ‘What did we do wrong?’ and the other is, ‘Who did this to us?’ The latter leads to conspiracy theories and paranoia. The first question leads to another line of thinking: ‘How do we put it right?’” Bernard Lewis

Of course, criticism has its place and is sometimes necessary. But the context has to be right. In today's Ethiopian political context, virulent criticism of Abiy to the point of advocating for his ouster (along with ethnic nationalists and the TPLF) simply does not make sense. Let me explain.

Fanning anti-Abiy sentiment can have one of two goals:

1. Creating a situation where Abiy steps down or is ousted from power.

2. Putting Abiy under pressure to do more to get rid of Oromo bias and stop ethnic cleansing.

Let's address the first goal. In a scenario where Abiy is ousted from power, it's of course important to consider who or what will step into the vacuum! Does the centre have any political organization or structure that is ready to take over power? The answer is clearly no. The centre has no party, no organization, no civic society, no deep state network that is ready to take over leadership of the country. In fact, in terms of organization and structure, the ethnic nationalists are much more organized than the centre. Thus, if Abiy is ousted from power, we will have a power vacuum which will be filled with chaos, and the ethnic nationalists will have the advantage over the centre. Clearly Abiy being forced from power goes against the interests of the centre. Those politicians and pundits who don't like his policies or execution of policies must first establish a viable alternative organization and power structure before advocating for Abiy's ouster. Otherwise it will be 1991 again.

The second goal seems more realistic, but it isn't... Undoubtedly, criticism from centre politicians and pundits puts pressure on Abiy. Along with the criticism from the public at large, which feels more and more vulnerable with the increasing incidents of ethnic cleansing. The question is how can he respond to this pressure. Is the pressure enough for Abiy to start doing more about Oromo bias and tackling ethnic cleansing? My answer is no. For two reasons. First, the ethnic extremism embedded in the OPDO has been passed on to the Prosperity Party's Oromia branch. From municipal mayors to police chiefs to rank and file civil servants all the way up to top party officials, there are various degrees of ethnic extremism. If one takes a town like Shashemene, the mayor, police chief, kebele and woreda officials, etc., are all some some shade or another of ethnic extremists. In a situation like this, Abiy cannot simply replace all of these officials. That would be politically dangerous. He has to make due with what he has. The second reason is that the ethnic extremists have organizations that are powerful and capable of troubling the government. They can inflict terror, ethnic cleansing, produce protests, sabotage, etc. Because of this, Abiy's government has to tread carefully in managing ethnic extremism, especially Oromo ethnic extremism. Expecting the government to be able to simply purge all ethnic extremists is unrealistic. For these two reasons, pressure from the centre on the Abiy government to put an end to Oromo bias and ethnic cleansing, though somewhat useful, cannot fix the problem. He simply cannot respond fully to such pressure.

So, if Abiy's ouster from power is not good for the centre, and if putting pressure on him is not that helpful, what can centre politicians and pundits do to bring about the desirable result of ending ethnic cleansing and reducing Oromo bias (the latter is not for me a very big issue - we should accept Oromo bias for the near future)? What centre politicians and pundits can do is start and focus on the difficult work of creating organizations, parties, lobbies, civil societies, and deep state networks that can exert real power in the country and counteract ethnic nationalism. This includes joining current institutions, including the government and the ruling party, and exerting influence from within. This is a critical aspect to the struggle.

It is only via a critical mass of organization that ethnic nationalism and radicalism can be tackled in a prudent and effective way, by the use of overwhelming and targetted soft power. The federal government alone cannot do this because ethnic nationalism is too embedded in government institutions and amongst the public. So I would expect our politicians and pundits to remove their focus from complaining about Abiy and his government, to building a centrist political and civic force that is able to peacefully, prudently, and effectively combat ethnic radicalism

The TPLF's Long Suicide

 "...the TPLF and, dare I say, a significant portion of the Tigrean elite is in the midst of an identity crisis imposed upon them by unfortunate historical circumstances. The advent of Marxism, the 1974 revolution, the Dergue's terrible misgovernance, etc., led to the birth of a TPLF with an outlook that stood firmly against the long term interests of Tigreans. Tigray, being a small, industrious, out-migratory region, stands to benefit from a citizenship based federalism - a multicultural and decentralized federalism but one in which the citizen, not ethnicity, is primary. Ethnic federalism goes completely against the interests of Tigray, because it results in Tigreans not being able to freely live and work outside their region. Yet the TPLF and many Tigrean intellectuals still support ethnic federalism!"

In 1991, the TPLF, a typically radical and stubborn Ethiopian Marxist party, instead of revising what was clearly a mistaken ideology, doubled down! It hoisted on Ethiopia an extremist and radical constitution, the type of which does not exist anywhere else in the world. But Meles Zenawi and co. had to govern, and to do so, they decided to concoct the impossible 'revolutionary democracy' ideology, which in essence depended solely on the TPLF being the sole power hegemon in Ethiopia.

The TPLF's assumption that it could remain the sole power in Ethiopia was of course completely unrealistic. Ethnic politics inflames ethnic tensions, and eventually the largest ethnic groups assert themselves against minorities, particularly against minorities that are viewed as being dominant or wealthy. This is inevitable. This brings us to the TPLF's second false assumption - that it could hold the Oromo and Amhara at bay by fueling their competition against each other. This was of course a pipe dream. The system set the TPLF up as not just a political target, but an ethnic target. And given the environment of ethnic competition or hate, the nature of the grievance would be deadly. Far deadlier than, say, class grievance. And that's what eventually happened. The "Oromo" and the "Amhara" ousted the "Tigray", as per the TPLF's constitution!

With the advent of the EPRDF's forced reform in 2018, the TPLF got a chance to, again, revise its old suicidal ideology in favour of one that benefitted its Tigray constituency. But it could not overcome its stubborn pride, a pride built upon a perceived military victory over the Dergue, and upon 27 years of ruling Ethiopia as a minority while lording it over all other political competitors. This is understandable. To expect the TPLF, which had its distorted mindset reinforced via political and economic success for decades, to change was and is unrealistic. Modern Ethiopia produces yet another unreformable political prodigal.

There are lessons to be learned from the story of the TPLF, and the most important point is that the lesson learner is not the TPLF but those at the centre of the Ethiopian political spectrum. The most important lesson, I think, is to always err on the side of moderation. The best, that is the most peaceful, politics requires moderation and self reflection, giving the benefit of the doubt to other points of view, and giving primacy to no ideology except peace. Let us at least learn something from the tragic story of the TPLF.

ድላችን ጦር ሜዳ ላይ እንዳይቀር

ህወሓት በጦር ሜዳ መሸነፉ የሚቀር አይመስለኝም። ጊዜ ይፈጅ ይሆናል፤ በርካታ ጉዳት ይደርስ ይሆናል፤ ግን የኢትዮጵያ መንግስት ህወሓትን ይቆጣጠረዋል። ትልቁ ጥያቄ ግን «ከዝያስ?» ነው። የፌደራል መንግስት ብቻውን በትግራይ ክልልም በመላው ኢትዮጵያም ሰላም ሊያሰፍን ይችላል ወይ?

የሚችል አይመስለኝም። የጠ/ሚ ዓቢይ አህመድ መንግስት ላለፉት ሁለት ዓመታት ከባድ የፖለቲካ ስራ ሰርቷል። መንግስቱ ብዙ ነገር ቢሳካለትም የቀሩት ችግሮች ብዙና ከባድ ናቸው። ሽብር፤ የዘር ጭቆና፤ ማፈናቀልና ግድያ ቀጥሏል። መንግስት እነዚህን ችግሮች እስካሁን ሊፈታ አልቻለም። (አንዳንዶች መንግስት እንኳን ሊፈታው የችግሩ አካል ነው ይባላል ግን ለኔ ይህ ስሜታዊነት ነው።)

መንግስት እነዚህን ችግሮች ለምን መፍታት አልቻልም ለሚለው ጥያቄ መልሴ ብቻውን ሊፈታው ከአቅሙ በላይ ነው ነው። መንግስት ችግሮቹን ለመፍታት የህዝብ ጠንካራ ስሜታዊ ሳይሆን ተግባራዊ ትብብር ያስፈልገዋል ግን ይህን እስካሁን በበቂ ደረጃ አላገኝም። 

የህዝብ ተሳትፎ አስፈላጊነትን ለመረዳት ያህል እስቲ የህወሓትን ትግል እንመልከት። የህወሓት አመራር፤ አባላት፤ የአባል አክስትና አጎት፤ አያት፤ ልጅ፤ ወዘተ ናቸው ለህወሓት የሚታገሉት!! ለዚህም ነው ስምንት ሚሊዮን ህዝብ ወክላለው የሚል ድርጅት ሀገር ሙሉን የገዛው እና ዛሬ የሀገር መንግስት ሊሞግት የቻለው። ሁላችንም የናውቀው ግን ለመናገር የሚያሳፍረን ነገር ነው። ሀውሓት ከጫካ እስከ መንግስት እስከ መቀለ ስደት በሄደበት ጉዞ ታላቅ የተቀናበረ የምሁራን፤ የሊሂቃን፤ የነጋዴና የህዝብ ድጋፍ ኖሮት ነው።

የጠ/ሚ ዓቢይ መንግስት ግን እንደዚህ አይነት የተቀነባበረ የተግባር ድጋፍ በበቂ ደረጃ የለውም። ላለፉት 50 ዓመታት ጣቅላላ የ«አንድነት» ፖለቲካ ጎራው እንደ ህወሓት ወይንም ሻቢያ ትልቅ የፖለቲካ «ማሺን» ኖሮት አያውቅም። ለዚህ ነው ህወሓት በቁጥር ትንሽ ሆኖ የአንድነት ጎራውን ለሰላሳ ዓመት በቀላሉ የተቆጣጠረው።

የአንድነት ፖለቲካ ጎራው ከዚህ ግድ መማር አለበት። የሀገር ህልውና ጉዳይ ነው፤ ካሁን ወድያ በመንግስት ብቻ መመካት አይቻልም። እንደ ህወሓት እና ሻቢያ በሁሉም የህብረተሰብ ክፍል የተሟላ የፖለቲካ ማሺን ያስፈልገዋል። ሁላችንም ከነ አክስት አጎቶቻችን በተናጠል ሳይሆን በተቀነባበረ መልኩ ተሳትፈን አብረን መስራት አለብን። በዚህ መንገድ ለአንድነትና ለሰላም ፖለቲካ ከታገልን ስኬታማ እንሆናልን። እንኳን ትናንሽ ተቀናቃኞች እንደ ህወሓት የዓለም ግዙፍ ሀገራትንም መቋቋም እንችላለን። አለበለዛ ለመንግስት ብቻ ትተነው የራሳችን ተሳትፎ በተናጥል የወሬ ድጋፍ መስጠት ከሆነ እድላችን አነስተኛ ነው የሚሆነው።