Using Canada To Understand Ethiopian Ethnic Federalism Today

I am fortunate to have acquired a somewhat intimate knowledge of Canadian politics and have found that, unlike US politics for example, Canadian politics holds wonderful parallels and lessons for Ethiopia in the area of federalism and ethnic federalism. So in this article I will briefly describe the history and nature of Canadian politics and how it can help us understand the Ethiopian political reality today, especially concerning ethnic federalism.

Here’s the (very) brief history… Canada was settled by English and French colonists beginning in the 1600’s. Soonafter, the English and French began warring for control of Canada (and North America as a whole), and around 1770, the English won decisively. However, in order to avoid problems with the large French population that had already settled in what is today known as the province of Quebec, the English government allowed the French to use their own language, worship in their own religion (Catholic), and to keep their own system of law (civil law). Over the following decades and centuries, the English continued to grant Quebec various such levels of autonomy and self-governance, both official and unofficial. For example, Quebec had its own legislature and French and both provincial and federal government services were provided in French and English. Unofficially, almost every second Canadian Prime Minister from 1867 (the official formation of Canada) onwards was French.

Nevertheless, despite such increasing levels of autonomy and recognition of language rights (note that it was always refered to as ‘language’, not ‘ethnic’ rights), ethnic nationalism in the French province of Quebec did not go away. The idea that Quebec was different from the rest of Canada, to the extent that it should secede and be a different country, actually grew over the decades despite increasing political and economic fortunes. So much so that in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, there was a small armed resistance advocating for the separation of Quebec. This was followed by increasing support for even more autonomy and even secession among both the Quebec population and its French elite.

This resulted in two referendums on secession. In the first referendum of 1980, the ‘yes’ side – the secession side - lost by a significant margin. But, the fact that it was held at all and that it gained 40% support scared enough people that the federal government took even further steps to give Quebec more autonomy, to increase the prominence of French throughout the country, and to unofficially increase the amount of money Quebec got from the federal government. Yet, despite this, a second referendum was held 1995, strategically at a time when the economy was in recession and people were angry. This referendum was again won by the ‘no’ side, but by only one percentage point 50.5% to 49.5%! Significantly, 60% of native French speakers voted for secession, but almost 100% of English and other language speakers voted against secession. Thus, despite being a small minority, non-French speakers were the decisive voters in the referendum.

Today, there is little interest in secession in Quebec – or to put it more accurately, it seems impossible for the 40% of Quebec who still support secession to get enough support from the rest of the population to win a referendum.

What are the lessons to learn from this Canadian example for Ethiopia?

Modernization, rather than reducing ethnic nationalism, can actually increase it. As Quebec modernized, became less religious, more affluent, etc. support for ethnic nationalism, manifested in reduction in English and other (non-French) language rights, secession from Canada, etc. actually increased! Modernization and increased ethnic nationalism go hand in hand.

Canada over the centuries embarked on various policies aimed at accommodating and satisfying the demands of French Quebecers such as the granting of extensive language rights, allowing the suppression of English and other languages in Quebec, making French an official language of the entire country despite only a tiny French population outside Quebec, transfering large amounts of federal money to Quebec despite the wealth of Quebec, etc. The political calculation was that if the demands of French Quebecers were met, they would be less likely to manifest their ethnic nationalism in ways that would cause dramatic damage the rest of Canada, such as secession. This shows that ethnic nationalism cannot be defeated by a stick – it requires plenty of carrot.

However, all over the above policies may have slowed the pace of increasing ethnic nationalism, but did not stop it. The results of the 1995 referendum, which almost initiated a process of secession or at least more separated federal arrangement, shows that accommodating ethnic nationalism, though helpful for some time, will not at the end stop the movement.

Ethnic nationalism does not fundamentally mean secession. It is the desire of a certain group for special rights above the rights of the rest of the population, in recognition that this group is a nation, or a pseudo-nation. For hardline ethnic nationalists, this recognition can only be realized within a politically separate nation. For ‘softer’ nationalists, having asymmetric rights within one nation is enough. Having more autonomy than other provinces, having a French-only province, having the federal language use French equal to English, etc. is enough for them to express their nationhood. The common theme however is that it has to have special rights as a group, even though these rights impinge upon the rights of other citizens.

An immigrant to Quebec cannot send his child to English school. English has not official status as a language in Quebec. Anyone in Quebec who does not speak French is de facto a second class citizen. More so than someone who does not speak English and lives in the English parts of Canada. ‘Native’ Quebecers – those who trace their ancestry to the original French Quebecers – are a privileged class in Quebec, even more so that ‘native’ English are in the rest of Canada. These are the practical consequences of ethnic nationalism – asymmetric rights and privilege that impinge on others’ rights.

Quebec nationalists go out of their way to emphasize that theirs is not an ‘ethnic’ nationalism, but a geographic (Quebec) or language-based (French) nationalism. The reason is that ethnic nationalism is seen within Canadian politics as a whole as primitive and potentially discriminatory. Thus when after the failed 1995 referendum one of the leaders of the Quebec separatist movement (truthfully) said that they lost the vote because of English speakers and immigrants, he was roundly denounced by his own side. What he said was true but not the perception of Quebec separatism that separatists wanted to portray. They wanted to portray their side as open to all, especially immigrants, with the common goal of having an independent Quebec. Ethnic nationalism is in a mature political arena seen as too divisive and dangerous by all sides.

Ethnic nationalism is politically costly. Since its inception, Canada has an extraordinary amount of its political energy on this issue. This energy could have been better spend on the myriad of other matters, such as the economy, trade, government organization, etc. that are everyday political issues in any other nation. The cost has been not only to Canada as a whole, but particularly to Quebec. In Quebec, most issues are sign primarily or at least secondarily through ethnic nationalist implications. Even political parties are organized around this issue, instead of around other ideology or interest groups.

Ethnic nationalist is economically costly. Canada spends significant amounts of money implementing the asymmetrical rights and privileges to Quebec that I mentioned above. The Quebec economy, too, has long been held hostage to the ethnic nationalist movement’s desire to use the economy first and foremost as a tool to promote its ethnic nationalist agenda.

Ethnic nationalism can only be significantly weaked through demographics, including integration and assimilation with the rest of the population. As I said above, though accommodation is often necessary and helpful, at the end of the day, it will only slow the tide of ethnic nationalism, not stop it. If it were not for the changing demographics in Quebec resulting from increasing numbers of immigrants, today Quebec might be a separate country or a very separate province in Canada. Immigrants and their children have increased the population of those whose mother tongue is not French to over 20%, and This group is not only not part of Quebec nationalism, but against it. Whereas accommodation could not defeat ethnic nationalism, demographics has done the job. For now.

These lessons are, as far as I am concerned, very much applicable to today’s Ethiopia. For me, Quebec mirrors Oromia. Oromia, notwithstanding the policies of the EPRDF, is today the one and major Ethiopian state where ethnic nationalism has a significant political impact. Yes, there is ethnic nationalism in other states, but where it is strongest and has to be dealt with ‘specially’ is in Oromia. Oromia, because of history and EPRDF policies, is Ethiopia’s asymmetric state – the one that requires special political attention, the one that is most costly, and the one for whom policies of accommodation, but more importantly integration and assimilation have to  be especially targeted. I will address how I think this should be done in another article.

Our Radical Politicians - Land to the Ruler!

Teshome Guebremariam, the recently departed former legal advisor to Emperor Haile Selassie’s government, once said something to the effect of ‘we said “land for the tiller,” but we ended up with land for the ruler (the government)’. Land to the tiller – a policy of giving tenant farmers land title to the land they rent from large landowners – although a morally, politically, and technically difficult policy, seemed a reasonable and moderate response to the land exploitation situation during the Emperor’s time. Land to the ruler – transferring ownership of all land to the government – nationalizing all land – was a radical and extreme response. Unfortunately, our political elite at the time chose the radical and extreme response. Indeed, at critical junctures during Ethiopia’s modern history, our political elite, especially ‘Haile Selassie’s children’ – those educated from the 1950’s onwards – have too often taken radical and extreme political decisions which have resulted in long term disaster for the nation. This has resulted in repeated disasters and unanticipated and unintended consequences for the nation.

In this article, let us consider that fateful decision to nationalize land, a decision that the Ethiopian people have paid for and continue to pay for dearly. In brief, this policy has resulted in:

1. Artificially high national population and birth rate
2. The recent explosion of rural-urban migration that is chocking our cities
3. Low levels of human capital in rural areas, particularly in the area of farming expertise
4. Low agricultural productivity
5. Extremely high food prices and inflation
6. Food insecurity

How did all this come about? First, the nationalization of land, which included forbidding farmers to sell and buy land, essentially imprisoned our rural population. It meant farmers and their families could no longer move to the city. Let me explain by an example – an example farmer – call him ‘Amde’. In 1975, Amde had seven hectares of land – quite a decent sized holding. If Amde wanted to move to the city, he would need some money – some ‘start-up money’ – to live on until he settled down, found a source of income, etc. Normally, this money would come from selling all or even part of his land – his biggest asset. After all, most Ethiopian farmers in the past and today do not have other assets of significant value. However, thanks to the nationalization of land, the farmer was no longer allowed to sell or trade his land, or even mortgage it. Moreover, if he moved to the city, he most cases he would forego all rights to his piece of land! So not only could he not sell his land for money to live on in the city, but if he moved to the city and then for some reason changed his mind after some time and wanted to return to the farm, he could not do so – his farm would have been taken. Knowing this, farmers in general did not move to the city in numbers that they otherwise would have done. Indeed, the statistics show (I discuss this below) that there was minimal rural to urban migration from 1975 until very recently.

So, what was life like for Amde on the farm? Well, like all rural dwellers, he had many children, let’s say seven children (6.5 was the rural average birth rate around 2007 – keep in mind the Addis Ababa average was 2.2 – a big difference). As his children grew older, he divided his seven hectares into seven pieces – his children got one hectare each. And then his children too had seven children each. His land started getting crowded. As the years went by, country-wide, the average plot size of farmers started approaching one hectare and rural areas started getting congested.

Note that at the time of the 1975 land proclamation, about 85% of Ethiopia’s population, about 28 million people, lived in rural areas. In 2015, 40 years later, about 80% of Ethiopia’s population, or about 80 million people, lived in rural areas! In 40 years, the rural share of the population changed only 5%, but given the naturally high rural birth rates, the absolute rural population skyrocketed. Why? Because for 40 years, farmers, not being allowed to sell their land, did not move to urban areas. If the natural, controlled, and steady rural to urban migration that has occurred and continues everywhere around the world were allowed to happen in Ethiopia, then perhaps by 2015 the percentage of population rural areas would have fallen to 70% or lower. This would have meant more people in urban areas where the birth rate is low, and less people in rural areas where the birth rate is high, and this would have resulted in the overall population in Ethiopia being somewhat lower as well. However, because this natural rural-urban migration was artificially restricted in Ethiopia, the population of the rural ‘prison’ grew and grew, in 40 years from 28 million to 80 million. So this continued high rural-urban population ratio is a major cause of the artificially high national population today.

So what happened to Amde’s family? Recall that his children have one hectare each and seven children each. They cannot divide that one hectare into seven pieces for each of their children – the resulting plots would be too small to sustain a household. So they leave their land to only one of their children, with the remaining six children, having received a high school education thanks to the massive increase in rural public education, forced to try and make their living in the city. This is what is happening today in Ethiopia. The inevitable land deficit that we all expected by that the government ignored is now occurring. Today, millions of farmers have only enough land for one child to inherit – the rest of their children are all migrating to the city.

Hence the explosion in rural to urban migration we see today. Plot sizes have shrunk so much so as to be unsustainable. Most rural children are no longer inheriting land from their parents the plot sizes are too small to be divided. And, even though food prices are extremely high and there has never been a better time to be a farmer, if you have enough land, young people are flooding into urban areas. What we are seeing today is 40 years’ worth of pent up, accumulated, and multiplied rural-urban migration happening virtually at once. And this great rural-urban migration explosion is just starting.

But there’s more to this story – let’s go back to Amde. Amde was not a very productive farmer – he was just did not have the skills nor the desire to farm but farmed only to make a living. But his neighour Gemechu was an excellent farmer who made the most of his plot of land and wished to expand. He was, like any other business person, eager to expand is operations, could not. But, given the government land policy, he could not buy land. Amde would have been willing to sell his land to him and Gemechu would have bought it – they would have agreed on a price, but this was not allowed. So the best Gemechu could do was rent land from Amde on a seasonal basis. Gemechu wished to dig a well, plant trees, and make other long term investments, but he could not since the land was only his for a season and he could not know what would happen in the long term. He also dreamed of a time when he could buy other neighbours’ plots and expand to a level where he could learn mechanized farming, learn about growing fruit seedlings, etc. But his dreams never materialized.

Note that Gemechu was producing 20 quintals of teff per hectare, while the not very productive Amde was producing 10. If Gemechu had bought Amde’s seven hectares and planted teff, the seven hectares would have gone from producing 70 quintals to 140 quintals. Overall agricultural productivity would have increased significantly. Gemechu, with his increased income and taking advantage of economies of scale, would have gone on to greater agricultural exploits. Amde would have been able to buy cheaper teff.

What happened to Gemechu was a travesty that the government(s) of Ethiopia brought on the country’s farmers. By not allowing farmers to be entrepreneurial and to expand, the government stifled farmers’ human capital. This has had not only an economic but also psychological, political, and social impact on farmers. Unlike those in all other commercial sectors, farmers uniquely were restricted from freedom in their business – they were not allowed to expand. As a result, they were indirectly restricted from improving their agricultural skills and education and essentially forced to remain as they were, and to give up hope. Imagine if a mechanic was by law prevented from having a garage bigger than a one-car garage. He would not come close to achieving his potential. If a professor were told that he could never look for another job and he could never conduct research on anything but one subject, he too would never achieve his potential. In fact, he soon stop trying and just mindlessly do his job. Same for farmers. The system made it communism for the farmers, capitalism for the rest.

To add insult to injury, successive governments and NGO’s continued to regard farmers as almost daft – as ignorant and incapable and in need of all forms of paternalism and assistance. It is true that the agricultural sector – that farmers – have not been able to increase their human capital – their knowledge and capacity – but this was and is only because they have been restricted from being able to expand their business. In true communist fashion, the governments’ plan was to hold the most important factor – land – constant, and increase inputs such as improved seeds, fertilizer, agricultural education, etc., with the hope that this would result in greater productivity. Of course it has not worked.

Today, in Ethiopia, agricultural productivity per unit of land is low. Food prices are some of the highest in developing countries. Milk, eggs, butter, meat, and honey are more expensive in Ethiopia than in many Western countries! The agricultural sector has been unable respond to the even the high demand and high prices in today’s Ethiopia that should have resulted in greater investment and productivity. Hence the food inflation – the leading source of inflation in the country – something the government continues to battle.

Back to Amde… The once a decade drought arrived and Amde’s children suffered a tiny harvest. In the old days, when Amde had his seven hectares, he was able to withstand drought because the grain he harvested from his seven hectares was enough for more than one year. But today, Amde’s children have one hectare each with which to provide for their families, and the harvest from one hectare is barely enough for one year. So with this drought, Amde’s children’s families end up all receiving food aid for a year.

So there we have it: An artificially high national population and birth rate, an explosion of rural-urban migration that is chocking our cities, low agricultural human capital in rural areas, low agricultural productivity, high food prices and inflation, and food insecurity. All consequences of the radical land proclamation of 1975. This is one example of the dangers and risks of radical and untried policies being implemented by desperate and immature new political elites. Today’s rulers would do well to learn from this and reconsider the other radical and immoderate policy that is haunting Ethiopia – ethnic federalism.

Alternative Political Elite?

When the Dergue collapsed in 1991 and the EPLF, TPLF, and OLF rode into power, we feared the worst. After all, the EPLF, TPLF, and OLF were nothing but ethnic nationalist rebels – shiftas – as far as we were concerned, bent on destroying or breaking apart Ethiopia.

Now, 26 years later, Ethiopia is still alive – yes, with a lot of problems – but still alive. Even though Eritrea separated and an unadvised ethnicist constitution was enacted, Ethiopia has survived. It has survived in large part because its population, in aggregate, was and remains nationalist and patriotic enough to resist the extremes of ethnic nationalism advocated by the TPLF. The TPLF tried, like Ataturk in Turkey, to drag the population kicking and screaming towards something it did not believe in, in this case, ethnic nationalism, but this only worked somewhat. To a large extent, Ethiopianism is alive and well.

Indeed, we can say that the Ethiopian people have moderated the TPLF. Recall that in the early 1990’s, there was no such thing as a ‘narrow nationalist’ – only ‘chauvinists’. Let alone Oromos, even Tigreans were encouraged by the TPLF to identify as ‘Tigrean first and Ethiopian second’. Today there is no such thing. Much of the TPLF now sees the extreme ethnic nationalism it once espoused as an albatross around its neck.

If commendation were possible, the Ethiopian people ought to be commended for this. It is only their strong nationalism and patriotism that has averted disaster and kept the country alive. But what is remarkable is that they did all this without an elite – it was all at the grassroots level. As I said above, in 1991, the EPLF, TPLF, and OLF were the political parties with power. There was no Ethiopian nationalist or Ethiopianist elite to speak of. After all, this elite had committed a long suicide – from 1960 when Haile Selassie’s elite first began to develop suicidal impulses – to the culmination in 1991. Thus when the EPLF, TPLF, and OLF in 1991 began to discuss their future in power, there was no nationalist elite – political or military – to stand up for Ethiopia. It was left to the people – the grassroots – to keep the country alive, and this they did.

Today, still, an Ethiopianist elite is largely absent. This is not surprising – political elites cannot appear overnight – it takes years, maybe generations. Having completed its suicide by 1991, and then having been prevented from rising up since then by the EPRDF, the Ethiopian nationalist elite remains a small, sick, disabled child which has lost all connection to its ancestors.

Is this a result solely of the EPRDF repression of the opposition which we all know about? Certainly not. Were it so, the elite would have strongly manifested itself in the diaspora, outside of the reach of the EPRDF. It has not. Another piece of evidence is the Kinijit fiasco of 2007, which was caused mainly because of elite immaturity and resulting infighting within Kinijit, which was that period’s manifestation of the Ethiopianist elite.

This for me is clear evidence that it is the Ethiopian nationalist political suicide of 1960-1991 that has resulted in its demise. Therefore the idea that many have that EPRDF repression is the cause of the poor state of the Ethiopianist elite, and that if the repression would end all would be fine, is wrongheaded. It was a long and complicated demise and it will take a long and complicated course to resurrect this elite. In the meantime, much of the Ethiopian population remains hungry for nationalist leadership.

So where does this leave those of us Ethiopianists who would like positive change in Ethiopian politics? Those of us who would like a reduction in ethnic nationalism, a reduction in repression, corruption, immorality, and injustice, a platform for safely and constructively discussing and competing policies. Those of us who would like Ethiopia to, at the minimum, be governed by a government that is actually liked by the people. At least a nationalist or populist government. Where does this leave those of us who would like this?

Well, obviously the straightforward path of organizing movements and parties is out of the question. This would result in swift imprisonment and torture, and maybe even death. Since the opposition elite is weak from 50 years of suicide, it cannot hope to directly struggle its way through such repression. This is what the past 26 years of experience shows.

The only possible path is the one that is not direct – the one that involves joining the current political system – joining the EPRDF in other words – and struggling from within. Making the EPRDF itself the vehicle for change since the EPRDF is the only political institution today with the capacity to bring about change and with an experienced elite.

Impossible, the cynics say! The TPLF, representing 8% of the population, will never allow that. Actually, it is quite possible, precisely because if the 92% is only slightly competent, even the superb 8% cannot dominate it. Like Putin worked on the inside and rose all the way to President and changed Russia 180 degrees, those who want change in Ethiopia can do the same. Of course, it will require those who are as wise as serpents and innocent as doves. One has to go along with the party, slowly accumulating political capital and power along the way, not rocking the boat, so to speak, until reaching a level of power which allows him the freedom to enforce his will. At the same time, someone with a good conscience can, while obeying broad party directives, avoid perpetrating injustice and repression, and indeed even rescuing those who might be ill affected by cruel and immoral party cadres. This requires a high level of political maturity and skill – it’s a difficult task. But it remains the only way forward now. Simply waiting for divine intervention or some kind of revolt is akin to doing nothing. Or worse than that – it is waiting for a disaster that we cannot cope with.

So, in my opinion, for those who are interested in bringing positive change to Ethiopian politics, today, there is no other vehicle but the EPRDF. The alternative political elite still hasn’t recovered from 50 years of suicide – it doesn’t exist in Ethiopia nor in the diaspora nor anywhere else. Therefore, rather than beating our heads against a wall trying to do the impossible, trying to mobilize international pressure or trying to build yet another failing opposition movement, let us get in the inside and begin a slow movement of taking over the EPRDF.

The ANDM Disconnect

During and after the 2016 protests, we often heard various ANDM officials claim that one of the main causes of unrest in Amhara State was the ‘disconnect’ between ANDM the party and the people of Amhara State. The people do not consider ANDM as having come from them, as being part of them, as wanting the same things that they want, as representing them, as standing up for their interests, etc. To put it simply, ANDM and the people of Amhara State are not of one mind nor of one heart.

This diagnosis of the unrest is, in my opinion is, not only correct, but perfect – it strikes at the very heart of the matter. Politics is best when a people are, among themselves, of one mind and heart, and when a people and its leadership are of one mind and one heart. Politics is at its worst when a people are divided amongst themselves and divided from their leadership. Division is the single biggest enemy of peaceful and prosperous politics and civil life.

Note that by division I don’t mean that there should not be differences. Differing ideologies, opinions, or even interests, to some extent, are natural. There almost ought to be differing ideologies, opinions, and interests. However, a people and leadership of one mind and one heart have a level of trust and understanding that allows them to handle these differences in an agreed upon peaceful and effective manner. So the differences do not end up resulting in division! The people and their leadership realize that at the end of the day, they have to live together and that therefore their basic interests are intertwined. They have to cooperate on basic issues and must not cross certain lines that lead to division. This is what being of one heart and mind is about.

So, yes, in Amhara State, there is division between the people and their leadership. ANDM is disconnected (was never really connected in the first place) from the people of Amhara State. What’s the consequence of this disconnect? Well, in general, it’s poor governance – ineffective government, corruption, injustice, etc. But specific to Ethiopia’s current political problems, the consequence is a disproportionately weak ANDM and Amhara State, and a disproportionately weak Ethiopian nationalism.

Is this a problem for the EPRDF as a whole? What’s wrong if ANDM is weak, if Amhara State is politically weak, and if Ethiopian nationalism is weak? There are those diehard fundamentalists in the EPRDF who do not see it as a problem. Their answer to every problem and situation is to stay the course because they have been in power for 26 years and they know what they are doing! For them, the 2016 protests are just another temporary setback which will be soon forgotten. But for forward thinking members of the EPRDF, who are well aware that the EPRDF has made numerous changes over its history, the 2016 protests indicate that significant changes are required for the EPRDF to continue in power. And one of these changes is that parties other than the TPLF – such as ANDM – have to shoulder their proper share of responsibility and exercise their proper share of power.

Why can’t the TPLF go it alone, so to speak, as it has for a quarter decade so far? The reason is that it is now clear that the vanguard party developmental state (10 years old) – which today is the EPRDF’s main policy and instrument of survival – and ethnic federalism (23 years old) and are incompatible. Not only incompatible, but a combustible combination – combustible enough to blow up the EPRDF’s hold on power. The EPRDF being a TPLF-led vanguard party, in other words with the TPLF holding most of the power and the other parties such as ANDM being junior partners, cannot sustain the developmental state because the resulting ethnic resentment will be too much handle. Therefore, ANDM (and OPDO and SEPDM etc.) need to have more weight in the EPRDF, so that the EPRDF is no longer a TPLF-led front, and thereby anti-TPLF and anti-Tigrean resentment will be slowly reduced. If ANDM and the others continue to be weak and estranged from its people, anti-TPLF resentment will continue increasing and the EPRDF’s hold on power will be weakened.

In order for ANDM to carry its weight in the EPRDF, it must be reconciled with the people of Amhara State. How can this be done? The first step would be for ANDM leadership to understand and accept that their political survival requires such reconciliation. The second is to bring about reconciliation via good governance and so make good governance the focus of their (perpetual!) mandate. Wait a minute – how is this possible? Corruption and favouritism are natural to the one party developmental state. All politicians in a developmental state have to have clients and networks and patronage, otherwise they will be unable to survive. As we have seen in Ethiopia, trying to achieve good governance is always a losing battle in a one party developmental state. Actually, let alone in Ethiopia, the Chinese Communist Party has for 40 years found it impossible to deal effectively with poor governance. Given this, how can ANDM bring about good governance?

The answer is that ANDM must first realize that 1) their survival is today very tenuous; 2) reconciling with the people of Amhara State their only hope for survival; and 3) given the current political reality in Ethiopia good governance is ANDM’s only way to bring about reconciliation. ANDM has no choice – in order to survive, it must reconcile with its people, and in order to reconcile, it must bring about good governance – peace, justice, transparency, no corruption, no favouritism, and a focus on aligning policy with the interests of the public.

What will the TPLF say about this? Will it not consider an ANDM united with the people of Amhara State as a threat? Will it not interfere in Amhara State? Let me say it clearly – the TPLF does not have a choice in the matter. If ANDM reconciles with its population – or simply just makes the decision to do so – there is nothing the TPLF can do about it. Unless there are federal issues at stake, the TPLF has to leave the management of Amhara State to ANDM. If it interferes, it is going to have to literally colonize Amhara State with Tigreans, something which it has not done to date and which it will not do, since this will result in a revolt it cannot control. Note that the EPRDF had a hard time controlling the 2016 revolt even though it was as much an anti-ANDM as anti-TPLF revolt. But if ANDM is one with the population, then the EPRDF would have to give in to ANDM’s wishes.

Let me add here that even today, the TPLF is not the direct cause of corruption, favouritism, injustice, etc. in Amhara State. The TPLF’s tentacles do not and more importantly cannot directly reach the local level. To put it simply, if the administrators of, say, Debre Marqos woreda, are corrupt and inefficient and do not represent the will of the people, this is a problem between them and the people, and a problem that can be fixed between them. The administrators are not from the TPLF, neither is their security from the TPLF. In most cases the administrators and the security apparatus are neighbours and relatives of the people of Debre Marqos. I use this example to illustrate that if ANDM and the people of Amhara State have the will, it is possible for ANDM to reconcile with the people of Amhara State. There will be no interference from the TPLF.

What will be the consequence of this reconciliation? It means that ANDM will have a significant increase in its political power. That is, it will be able to mobilize its people much more effectively than it can now, and this ability to mobilize is the basis of political power. This increase in political power will mean that ANDM will no longer be a junior partner in the EPRDF relative to the TPLF. This is the key to its survival. Again, understanding that this is the key to its survival is what should motivate it to change.

Will not the TPLF resist? Of course, there will be parts of the TPLF, the old guard, who will resist, but they will be unable to. Why? The TPLF is a minority whose dominance is solely a result of their unity and the disunity of the majority. Just a slight increase in the level of unity amongst the majority is enough to overcome any resistance some factions in the TPLF may try to put up. If ANDM and the people of Amhara State are reconciled, that is, if there is unity in Amhara State, the TPLF simply can no longer dominate. And many in the TPLF know this very well. In addition, note that, as I mentioned above, there is a part of the TPLF that wants to relinquish their dominance because it understands that this dominance is the biggest source of anti-EPRDF resentment and that if this dominance continues, both the TPLF and its Tigrean constituency will be at great risk. The problem is that they don’t see any political force, include ANDM and the other junior partners in the EPRDF, that is ready to take over the power that the TPLF relinquishes. But if ANDM does its job and becomes hand and glove with the people of Amhara State, then TPLF dominance will decrease in an orderly and stable manner, and in a roundabout way the survival of the EPRDF and TPLF will be reassured.

‘One Heart’ (‘And Lb’) should become the new slogan of ANDM. Everyone at all levels should be required so sign on to this. This is the only way for ANDM to repair the disconnect with the people of Amhara State and to become one with the people. This in turn is the only way ANDM can survive. Most importantly, this is key to the survival of the Ethiopian nation.