Where the TPLF went wrong

2009/1/23 (Ethiopian calendar)

2016/10/3 (European calendar)

[Note: An Amharic version of this post will appear sometime!]

(pdf version)

A lot has been written about this over the past 25 years, but it doesn't hurt repeating, especially given today's political circumstances in Ethiopia. The TPLF's biggest historical mistake was interpreting its coming to power in 1991 as a full mandate from the vast majority of Ethiopians and assuming it meant a complete rejection of everything that preceded it. This mistaken assumption involved a typically modern Ethiopian exercise in black and white or zero sum thinking.

Basically, this is how the thought process worked... The Haile Selassie government fell, not because it failed to make some sensible reforms, but because it failed to make all the radical changes demanded of it by the students movement. The fall of the Dergue government had nothing to do with the Cold War, a failed Communist economy, or the war with Somalia, but because Ethiopia was a prison of nationalities that had to be liberated. The rise of the TPLF had nothing to do with the end of the Cold War and a bankrupt regime, but because the TPLF and its ethnic ideology best represented the interests of a majority of Ethiopians. The TPLF blinded itself to obvious facts in a bid to convince itself of its monopoly on truth and ability to rule Ethiopia.

Thus, after gaining power, the TPLF, in the form of the EPRDF, began a ruling style that involved continually trying to do the radical and the impossible, its hubris deluding it into believing that it was special enough to do anything politically.

This mindset is what emboldened the EPRDF to saddle Ethiopia (and itself) with perhaps the most radical ethnic based constitution in world history. With a little more maturity, it would have realized that this constitution was not only unpopular and fundamentally at odds with the interests of a large section of the population, but so radical, untested, and risky that there was a good chance it would in the future make governing impossible. For everyone except the EPRDF and other ethnic nationalists, it was clear that a more moderate constitution would have easily satisfied all constituencies, including ethnic nationalists and made governing far easier for the EPRDF.

Building on the constitution, the EPRDF embarked on an ethnic policy that can only be described as playing with fire. It engaged in policies (such as official identification by ethnicity) and rhetoric ('reactionaries' and 'narrow nationalists') that emphasized differences among Ethiopians and diminished commonalities. It thought that it could promote ethnic nationalism and at the same time control ethnic strife, knowing full well that its ethnic political base, Tigray, was composed of a small minority! An impossibly delicate formula if there ever was one. However, thanks to various factors, especially the sad state of the Ethiopian nationalist elite, the EPRDF has managed so far to survive on this knife's edge.

But the fundamentals remain wrong, and this explains today's smoldering dissent. It's a political reality that a people can tolerate far more oppression from their own ethnic group or in a non-ethnic context than they can from another ethnic group. The TPLF knows this quite well, having leveraged the political tool of ethnicity to its fullest during its liberation struggle. Yet, the EPRDF continued a policy of promoting ethnic nationalism while real power and perception of real power, remained in the hands of the TPLF. This has inevitably resulted in widespread resentment against the TPLF and Tigray. This was all predictable from the beginning; there have been ever increasing signs of it in the past two decades, yet hubris has prevented the EPRDF from changing course.

Note that this policy from the beginning was the antithesis of what is best for Tigray. A small minority can flourish in a multi-ethnic society, but not in a society where ethnic division and tension dominate, since the minority is dependent on migration and integration to prosper. The region of Tigray, like all the small ethnicities in Ethiopia, would do best in a country that is more united than divided. Yet, the ideology of the TPLF (and its big brother EPLF) was so ingrained that they basically ignored this danger and continued promoting ethnically divisive policies.

To be fair, the EPRDF did eventually realize the seriousness of the problem. Part of the reasons for the full mobilization of party resources towards the developmental state project ('lemat', for the masses) that begin during the mid part Prime Minister Meles' tenure was to mitigate ethnic division. The rhetoric of economic development was ramped up as a political tool to promote civic nationalism – to give all parts of the country something in common to unite around – and counter the obvious damage of ethnic nationalism. But of course the economy cannot by itself bring down ethnic boundaries and increase civic nationalism. Inter-ethnic integration, which the EPRDF's constitution essentially prevents, is the only way to do so.

The above is just a small list of the radical and reckless policies of the EPRDF over the past 25 years, which aros a consequence of the circumstances around its rise to power, including the absence of an opposing elite power to act as a moderating influence. Now, what does this history teach us about what is happening today? What is happening today?

Well, we continue to hear from hardline EPRDF leaders the same old rhetoric about reactionaries and narrow nationalists – the same old hubris. But there are moderates in the EPRDF and TPLF who have long ago come to realize the folly in their fundamental assumptions. These moderates and hardliners are discussing behind closed doors how to address the current revolt. The moderates are right and sensible, of course, but what has always handicapped them is external leverage. They need a strong Ethiopian nationalist movement and elite, the opposing elite power which I mentioned above, with power on the ground, that they can count on as a foil for the hardliners. They need a political partner on the other side, in other words, so that they can say to the hardliners, “Look, you've tried it your way, and now there is an opposition that your hardline policies cannot dislodge. It's time for you to step aside and let us negotiate a new system of governance.”

Unfortunately, this Ethiopian nationalist movement is not yet there. The soft and hard ethnic nationalists in Oromia who are against TPLF domination have been doing their part for years, but not the Ethiopian nationalists. Now we have the uprisings in Amhara Region, and this is a huge step in the right direction, but there is no organization yet. It is important that these uprisings soon coalesce into a tangible political movement so that it can work with the moderates in EPRDF to find a way out if its quagmire. Failing this, we have to count on the EPRDF reforming by itself. It's a tall order for any organization, especially on with the historical baggage of the TPLF.