ተረት ተረት፤ አዲስ አበባ የኦሮሞ ገቤሬዎችን አፈናቅሏል

1. የአዲስ አበባ ህዝብ ምንም ፖለቲካዊ ውሳኔ አድርጎ አያውቅም። በኢህአዴግ (ከነ ኦህዴድ) የተገዛ ህዝብ ነበር። ስለዚህ የአዲስ አበባ ህዝብ ማንንም አላፈናቀለም። አፈናቃይ ካለ ኢህአዴግ ከነ ኦህዴድ ነው።

2. ከአዲስ አበባ የተፈናቀሉት ባብዛኛው ኦሮሞ ቢሆንም የተወሰኑ አማሮች እና የሌላ ጎሳ አባላት ነበሩ።

3. ካአዲስ አበባ ውስጥ የተፈናቀሉት ደግሞ ከሁሉም ጎሳ ነበሩ። እነዚህ የአዲስ አበባ ተፈናቃዮች ከአዲስ አበባ ዙርያ የተፈናቀሉት ገበሬዎች ይበልጥ ተበድለዋል በደልን በገንዘብ ከተረጎምነው። ከካዛንቺስ 50 ካሪሜትር ቦታው የተፈናቀለው ምናልታብት ሁለት ሶስት ሚሊዮን ብር ነው ያጣው። ከቡልቡላ የተፈናቀለው ገበሬ የዚህ ሩብም አልከሰረም።

4. ገበሬዎች እና ሌሎች «ተፈናቀሉ» ስንል መንግስት የማይመጥን ትንሽ ካሳ ሰጥቷቸው በግድ ከመሬታቸው አስነሳቸው ነው። አድግራጊው የአዲስ አበባ ህዝብ ያልመረጠው የአዲስ አበባ መንግስት ውየንም አብዛኛው ጊዜ የኦህዴድ መንግስት ነው። ገበሬውን አነስተኛ ካሳ ሰጥቶት ለኢንቬስተር በከፍተኛ ዋጋ ሽጦ ትርፉን ኪስ አስገብቷል። ለዚህ የአዲስ አበባ ህዝብ ትጠያቂ አይደለም፤ ኢህአዴግ እና ኦህዴድ ናቸው።

5. ታላቁ ግን ማንም የማያነሳው ጉዳይ የሀገራችን የመሬት ፖሊሲ ነው። መሬት የመንግስት በመሆኑ ነው ገበሬዎችም ሌሎችም የሚፈናቀሉት እና «ተፈናቀሉ» የሚባለው። አዲስ አበባ ሲሰፋ (እንደ ከተማ ይሁን እንደ metropolis) ዙርያ ያሉት ገበሬዎች ዋና ተጠቃሚ ነበር መሆን ያለባቸው፤ ይሆኑም ነበር መሬት የግል ቢሆን። አዲስ አበባ ዙርያ ያሉት ገበሬዎች ከተማው እየሰፋ ስለሄደ መሬታቸውን በእጅግ ውድ ዋጋ ሊሸጡ እና ሊጠቀሙ ይችላሉ። ቡልጋ ያለው ገበሬ የመሬቱ ዋጋ አንድ ብር በካሬ ቢሆን ይው መሬት አዲስ አበባ ዙርያ መቶ ብር ሊሆን ይችላል። በዚህ መንገድ ነው የትም ሀገር ከተማ ሲሰፋ ዙራይ ያሉት ገበሬዎች ሎተሪ እንዳሸነፉ የሚቆጠረው። ግን ኢትዮጵያ ገበሬው መረቱን መሸት ስለማይፈቀድ እና መንግስት ሲፈልግ መንጠቅ ስለሚችል ከተማ ዙርያ ያለ ገበሬ ጭራሽ ይሰጋ! ስለዚህ በዚምህ ረገድ ጥፋቱ የአዲስ አበባ ህዝብ ሳይሆን የኢህአዴግ እና ኦህዴድ የመሬት ፖሊሲ ነው። አዲስ አበባ ዙርያ ያሉ ገበሬዎች በኢህአዴግ/ኦህዴድ ምክንያት በሚሊዮኖች የሚቆጥር ብር አጥቷልና!

የደርግ ኢሰባዊ ድርጊቶች በአግባቡ ለህዝብ ቢገለጽ ኖሮ ታሪክ (ብሶ) እንዳይደገም ይረዳ ነበር...

በደርግ ዘመን የሚካሄዱት ኢሰባዊ ድርጊቶች እንደ ግድያ፤ እስር፤ ማሰቃየት ወዘተ ለኢትዮጵያ ህዝብ በበቂ ደረጃ በይፋ አልቀረበም። «የእርቅ እና ሰላም» እና የፍትህ ሂደት በታላቅ መድረክ ለህዝብ አልቀረበም። መቀረብ ነበረበት። ህዝቡ ከተጎጂዎች ታሪኮቸውን በደምብ መስማት ነበረበት። የጨቋኞችን የፍርድ ሂደት በደምብ መስማት ነበረበት። ይህ ሳይደረግ ቀርቶ ጉዳዩ ላይላዩን ብቻ ታይቶ ህዝቡ «የደርግ ባለስልጣኖች ታሰሩ ቀጥሎ ተፈረደባቸው» ተብሎ ጉዳዩ በዛው ተዘጋ። ለስነልቦና የሚያስፈልገው ግልጽ የሆነ የእርቅ፤ ሰላም እና ፍትህ ሂደት አልተካሄደም።

በዚህ ምክንያት ዛሬ ብዙ ሰው ስለ ደርግ፤ ነጭ ሽብር እና ቀይ ሽብር አያውቅም። የለማወቅ ብዛቱ ይገርማል፤ አዲሱ ትውልድ ብቻ ሳይሆን የደርግ ዘመነን የሚያውቁትም በአግባቡ ታሪኩን አያውቁትም። ይህ «ማህበራዊ መርሳት» አንዱ ምክንያት ይመስለኛል ኢህአዴግ የደርግን ጭቆና በባሰ ሁኔታ እንዲደግም እድል የተሰጠው።

ሰሞኑን ከአንድ ዘመዴ ጋር ስለ ቅርብ ቀናት የደህንነት፤ የፖሊስ እና የሌሎች «መርማሪዎች» እና ሥቃይ አዛዥ እና አስፈጻሚዎች መታሰር እየተወያየን ነበር። ይህ ዘመዴ በደርግ ጊዜ ታስሮ ነበር። በታሰረበት ጊዜ እሱ እና ሌሎች ላይ የደረሰባቸውን የእስር ስቃይ በትንሹ አካፈለኝ/አስታወሰኝ፤

1. ዘመዴ ብዙ ከተገረፉት አንዱ ቢሆንም የደረሰብኝ ከሌሎች ይሻላል ይላል፤ ቆሻሻ ካልሲ ከአፍ ውስጥ ወትፈው ነው ለሳምንታት የገረፉት።  

2. አሰቃዮች ሴቶችን በሲጋራ መለኮሻ ነበር «እንትናቸውን» የሚያቃጥሉት። 

3. ጥፍር መንቀል ወዘተ ተራ እና የተለመደ ነበር። 

4. አንድ የታወቀ ዘመዴ የሚያውቀው አሰቃይ ነበር። ለሊቱን በየ እስር ቤቱ እየዞረ አንዳንድ እስረኞችን መርጦ አውጥቶ በሚኪና ይወስዳቸዋል። ሜዳ ላይ ለቆ «ሩጡ» ብሎ ያዛቸው እና በካላሹ ተረከዛቸውን መሬት መሬቱን ይተኩስባቸውል። «ጨዋታው» ሲያልቅ ይገላቸዋል። ይህ አሰቃይ መጨረሻ ላይ ደርግ እራሱ አስሮት ወደ ዘመዴ ያለበት እስር ቤት ገባ። አዕምሮውን ክፉኛ ሳተ፤ ጨርቁን ጣለ።

እንደዚህ አይነት ታሪኮች ብዙ ናቸው ግን ህዝባችን በደምብ አልተነገረውም። አስቀየሚ ዝርዝሮቹ  በይፋ ይነገሩ አደለም የምለው። ላያስፈልጉ ይችላሉ። ግን ክስተቶቹ፤ ተጎጂው፤ ወንጀለኛው፤ ወዘተ በህዝብ መደረክ በሚገባው ደረጃ መቅረብ አለበት። አብዛኛው ኢትዮጵያዊ ይህን አሳፋሪ ታሪካችንን ማወቅ አለበት።

ለምን የደርግ ጭካኔ ታሪክ በደምብ አይልተነገረም? እንደሚመስለኝ ኢህአዴግ እራሱ ለሰው ልጅ የሚሰጠው ዋጋ ትንሽ ስለሆነ ነው። እራሱ እንደ ደርግ ህዝብን እንደሚረግጥ ስለሚያውቅ ይመስለኛል። ስለዚህ ኢህአዴግ በደርግ ግፎች ትልቅ የፖለቲካ ትርፍ ማትረፍ ቢፈልግም የራሱ እምነቶች እና ስራዎች ይህን እድልም እንዳይጠቀም አድርጎታል።

አሁን የ«እርቅና ሰላም» ኮሚሽን ሲቋቋም ያንን የደርግንም ታሪክ እንዲያካትት እና እንዲያሰማ መደረግ ያለበት ይመስለኛል። ኮሚሽኑ የ44 ዓመታት ግፍን ያስተናግድ። እኛ ኢትዮጵያዊያን ለረዥም ዓመታት ወንጀለኞች፤ ገዳዮች፤ አሰቃዮች ወዘተ እየወለድን እያሳደግን ወደ ስልጣን እያመጣን መቆየታችንን ማየት አለብን። የዚህ ቀጥታ ሰለቦች ታሪካቸውን የመናገር እድል ማግኘት አለባቸው። ሌሎቻችን ጥፋት እና ሃላፊነታችንን በነሱ በደረሰባቸው ማየት እና ማመን አለብን።

ይህ የንስሀ ሂደት ባለፈው 27 ዓመት ብቻ ከተገደበ እራሳችንን በሚገባው እንዳንወቅስ ይረዳናል። «እነሱ ናቸው ጥፋተኞቹ» ብለን የራሳችንን ሃላፊነት እንዳናይ ያረገናል። ግን ከደርግ ጀምሮ ታሪክን ካየን ሙሉ ግንዛቤ ይኖረናል። የኛ የማህበራዊ ጉድለታችንን እንድናምን ይረዳናል። አንድ ህበረተሰብ በተደጋጋሚ ጨቃኞች ሲወልድ እራሱን ምፈተሽ አለበት።

ተረት ተረት፤ በኢትዮጵያ ያለው የ«ቋንቋ ተኮር ፌደራሊዝም» ነው

በኢትዮጵያ ያለው በሀግም በህግ መንፈስ (letter and spirit of the law) የቋንቋ ተኮር ፌደራሊዝም ሳይሆን የጎሳ (ብሄር ብሄረሰቦች ህዝቦች) ፌደራሊዝም ነው። ልዩነቱ ምንድነው?

የቋንቋ ፌደራሊዝም ማለት የተለያየ የቋንቋ ተናጋሪዎች በቋንቋቸው የቋንቋ የቡድን መብት ይኖራቸዋል ማለት ነው። ለምሳሌ በኦሮሚያ የክልል ቋንቋ ኦሮምኛ ሆኖ ማንም ኦርምኛ የሚናገር ሰው በቋንቋ ችሎታው እኩ መብት አላቸው። እንደ እንግዳ ወይንም «መጤ» አይቆጠሩም። የክልሉ ቋንቋ ኦሮምኛ ነው ብሎ ሲሰየም ሁሉንም የቋንቋ ተናጋሪ ያካትተዋል። ስለዚህ የቋንቋ ፌደራሊዝም በዘር አይለይም። ማንም ቋንቋ እስከቻለ ቡድን ውስጥ አለ ማለት ነው። አግላይ አይደለም።

የጎሳ ፌደራሊዝም ግን ደም እና አጥንት የሚቆጥር ነው። በጎሳ ፌደራሊዝም ኦሮሚያ የኦሮሞ ተናጋሪ ክልል ሳይሆን የኦርሞ በደሙ ኦሮሞ የሆነ ሰው ክልል ነው። ኦሮሞ ያልሆነ ቋንቋውም ባህሉም «ኦሮሞ» ቢሆን የክልሉ ባለቤት አይደለም። ስለዚህ ይህ አሰራር በመሰረቱ አግላይ ነው። በሌላ ቋንቋ ዘረኛ ነው ማለት ይቻላል። አንድ ሰው ምንም ያህል ኦሮምኛ ቢችል በባህልም ሌላም ብዙ የተዋሃዶ ቢሆንም ኦሮሞ አይደለም ስለዚህ በኦሮሞ ክልል በዓድ ወይንም መጤ ነው።

እንደሚታዩት በሁለቱ በቋንቋ እና በጎሳ ፌደራሊዝም ታላቅ መሰረታዊ ልዩነት አለ። አንዱ ክፍት ነው ማንንም መስፈርት እስካሟለ ያቅፋል። ሌላው ግን ዝግ ነው ማንም ምንም ቢያደርግ ሊሳተፍ አይችልም። በመሰረቱ አግላይ ነው። ዘረኛ ነው የዘረኝነትን መንፈስም ተግባርም ይጋብዛል።

ለምሳሌ ጎሳ በመታወቅያ መደረጉ። እንደ የአፓርታይድ ዘመን ደቡብ አፍሪካ! ጎሳ በመታወቅያ የሚደረገው በጎሳ ለመለየት ነው። መረጃ ብቻ ሆኖ አይቀርም መለያ ይሆናል። ማለትም ዘረኝነትን ይጋብዛል። ለዚህ ነው ደቡብ አፍሪካ ይህን ስርዓት የነበረት ዘረኝነትን ለማራመድ ስለሚጠቅም። እና ምን ማለት ነው ኢትዮጵያ ይህን የዘረኝነት ስርዓት በገልበጧ?! የጎሳ ፌደራሊዝም ምን ያህል ዘረኝነትን እንደሚያራምድ እንዳሚያስፋፋ ነው የሚገልጸው። አንዴ የሀገሪቷ ዋና ህግ (ህገ መንግስቷ) ጎሰኝነትን መዋቀራዊ ካደረገች የዘረኝነት ስርዓቶች ይከተላሉ።

በዚህ ምክንያት ነው ዓለም ዙርያ የትም ሀገር የጎሳ ፌደራሊዝም ውየንም የጎሳ መብት (ከሞላ ጎደል) የሌለው። ማንም ሀገር በህገ መንግስቱ «ጎሳ»፤ «ብሄር ብሄረሰብ ህዝብ» አይነቱን ጽንሰ ሀሳብ አይጠቀምም። የቋንቋ ፌደራሊዝም፤ የቋንቋ የቡድን መብቶች፤ የክልል ቡድን መብቶች በህግ ደረጃ ያሰፈኑ ሀገራት በርካታ ናቸው። ግን ማንኛውም ህጉን በጎሳ የመሰረተ የለም።

ለዚህ ይህ የኢትዮጵያ የ1985 ህገ መንግስት ጸንፍ (radical) የያዘ በዓለም ዙርያ መችሄም ታይቶ የማይታወቅ እጅግ ሃላፊነት-ቢስ ሙከራ (experiment) ነው የተባለው። የትም ሀገር ያልተደረገ እና አስፈላጊ ያልሆነ ህገ መንግስት በኢትዮጵያ አይነቱ ደካማ ሀገር መጫኑ ታላቅ ልክስክስነት እና ህጻንነት ነበር። በዚህ ነውረኛ ሙከራ ምክንያት በርካታ ዜጎቻችን ተሰቃይተዋል።

ይህ አይነት የጎሳ ፌደራሊዝም የትም ሀገር የሌለው ምክንያት አለ! ህዝብን በጎሳ መከፋፈል ወይን መብት በጎሳ መመደብ ማለት ኩፍኛ ግጭትን መጋበዝ ማለት ነው። ዓለም ዙርያ የታወቀ ነገር ነው። አንድ ምሳሌ ልስጣችሁ።

በካናዳ ኬቤክ የምትባል የፈረንሳይኛ ተናጋሪ ክፍለ ሀገር አለች (http://asfawdarguemeshal.blogspot.com/2017/05/using-canada-to-understand-ethiopian.html)። ኬቤክ ለረዥም ዓመታት ከሌላው ካናዳ እለያየሁ እያለች ትሟገታለች ሁለት ጊዜም የመገንጠል ሬፈረንደም አካሄዳለች። ሁለቱም ጊዜ ህዝቡ ለጥቂት አንገንጠል አለ። የ ኬቤክ ቤርተኞች ግን ተጠንቅቀው የኛ ብሄርተኝነት የቋንቋ ነው እንጂ የጎሳ አይደለም ነው የሚሉት። ጎሳ አላቸው፤ 350 ዓመት በፊት ከፈረንሳይ ወደ ካናዳ የፈለሱት ፈረንሳዮች። ግን እኛ ኬቤክ ስንል ማንነታችን እንደ ቡድን መብት ይከበር ስንል በጎሳ ሳይሆን በቋንቋ ነው ብለው አስምረው ነው የሚናገሩት። በኬቤክ ማንም ፈረንሳይኛ ተናጋሪ እኩል የኬቤክ ዜጋ ነው ብለው ጠንክረው ይናገራሉ። ልምንድነው ጉዳዩን እንዲህ የሚያሰምሩበት? የቋንቋ ቡድን ክፍት ነው እና «ዘረኛ» መባል አይቻልም። ከሞሮኮ የመጣ ፈረንሳይ ተናጋሪ፤ ከኢትዮጵያ ወደ ኬቤክ የመጣ ፈረንሳይኛ የተማረ ወዘተ ሁሉም እኩል የኬቤክ ሰው ናቸው። በጎሳ ቢሆን ግን ፈረንጁ የድሮ የኬቤክ ሰው ብቻ ነው የክፍለ ሀገሩ ባለቤት የሚሆነው። ይህ ደግሞ ዘረኝነት ነው። የኬቤክ ብሄርተኞች «ዘረኞች» መባል እጅግ ስለሚፈሩ ያላቸውን መጤዎች ወደነሱ ማምጣትም ስለሚፈልጉ ሁልጊዜ የኛ ብሄርተኝነት የቋንቋ ነው ብለው ተጠንቅቀው ይገልጻሉ።

ሌሎችም በተለምዶ የሚጠቀሱት ሀገሮች እንደ ህንድ፤ ቤልጀም፤ ኤስፓኝ ወዘተ እንዲሁ ነው። የቡድን መብት በቋንቋ ወይንም በክፍለ ሀገር ነው የሚመሰረተው። ጎሳ፤ ብሄር፤ ብሄርተሰብ፤ ህዝብ ወዘተ ተጠንቅቆ ይወገዳል። ዘረኝነትን እና ግጭትን እንደሚጋበዝ የታወቀ ስለሆነ ነው። ዘረኝነትም ቢኖር ቢያንስ ዘረኛ ላለመባል ጥያቄአቸውም በቋንቋ ወይንም በክፍለ ሀገር ሽፋን ያቀርቡታል።

የዓለም ልምድ እንዲህ ሆኖ ኢህአዴግ ይህንን የሙከራ ህገ መንግስት ኢትዮጵያ ላይ መጫኑ የኛ ልሂቃን የጸንፈኝነት ዝንባሌን በደምብ ያሻያል። ትንሽ የቀለም ትምህርት ስንማር ቀንደኛ ጸንፈኛ መሆን የእውቀታችን መለክያ ይመስላችን ይሆን አላውቅም። በተማሪ ንቅናቄው ይህ በደምብ ታይቷል። በህወሓትም እንዲሁ። በኢህአፓም። ዛሬም በተለያዩ ፖለቲከኞች እናየዋለን። የችግር መፍትሄው ቀላላእና ሚዛናዊ ለዘብተኛ ፊት ለፊት እያለ ጸንፈ የያዘ ውስብስብ የሆነ መፍትሄ (ማባባሻ) ይፈለጋል። የኢትዮጵያ ህገ መንግስት ጉዳይ እንዲህ ነበር።

ዛሬ ሀገ መንግስቱ «ብሄር፤ ብሄረሰቦች፤ ህዝቦች» የሚለውን አውጥቶ የቋንቋ ፌደራሊዝም እንዲሆን አስፈላጊ ለውጦች ቢደረግ ብቻ ታላቅ መሻሻያ ይሆናል። ለነ ይህ በቂ ባይሆንም ታላቅ ታላቅ ማሻሻያ ነው የሚሆነው። ህዝባችን እና መሪዎቻችን ይህን ለማድረግ ያብቃን።

ስለዚህ ጉዳይ አንዳርጋቸው ጽጌ ያለውን ከዚህ ቪዲዮ ብትመለከቱ ጥሩ ይመስለኛል፤ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mCUIw2ud8EM

ተረት ተረት፤ አዲስ አበባ የሰፋችው ኦሮሞ ገበሬን በማፈናቀል ነው

እንደ አብዛኛው ውሸት «አዲስ አበባ የሰፋችው ኦሮሞ ገበሬን በማፈናቀል ነው» የሚለው የተወሰነ እውነታ አለው። አዎን በኢህአዴግ አገዛዝ በአዲስ አበባ ዙርያ ያሉ ገበሬዎች ለመሬታቸው ከሚገባው እጅግ ዝቅተኛ የሆነ ካሳ ተከፍሏቸው በግዴታ ከመሬታቸው ተባረዋል። ግን ይህ ሙሉ ታሪኩ አይደለም።

እንደሚታወቀው በሀገራችን መሬት የመንግስት ነው የሚል አሳዛኝ ህግ ነው ያለው። ይህ ህግ ሲተገበር ስናይ መንግስት ባሰኘው ጊዜ የከተማም ይሁን የገጠር መሬት ከነዋሪዎች ይወስዳል። ሲወስድ ደግሞ የሚከፍለው ካሳ የ«ገበያ» ዋጋ ሳይሆን መንግስት እራሱ የሚተምነው እጅግ አናሳ ካሳ ነው። ልምሳሌ አዲስ አበባ ውስጥ ለ«ልማት» ተብሎ መሬትን መንግስት ሲወስድ የሚከፍለው ካሳ የቤትና የጊቢው አብሮ ዋጋ ሳይሆን የቤቱ (የግንቡ) ዋጋ ብቻ ነው። ለምሳሌ 100 ካሬ ላይ ቤት አለኝ ከሸጥኩት 500,000 ብር ያመጣል እንበል። መንግስት ሊወስደው ከፈለገ ግን የቤቱ ግምብ ዋጋ ብቻ እራሱ (ሶስተኛ ወገን ሳይሆን) ገምቶ ምናልባት 50,000 ብር ከፍሎኝ በግድ ይወስደዋል። በገጥር ደግሞ እንደ ክልሉ እና ዞኑ ቢለያይም አንድ ምሳሌ ልስጣችሁ። መንግስት ከገበሬ መሬቱን ሲወስድ የሶስት ዓመት ገቢውን ለካሳ ይከፍለዋል። ገጠር መሬት መሸጥ ባይኖርም የዚህ መሬት ዋጋ ከዚህ በላይ እንደሚሆን መገመት ይቻላል። የሶስት ዓመት ገቢ ሳይሆን ቢያንስ የአስር ነው መታሰብ የነበረበት።

ከዚም አልፎ ተርፎ ይግባኝ የለም። መንግስት አንዴ ትፈናቀላላችሁ ካለ ይህን ውሳኔ መታገል አይቻልም። ከመሬት ንትቅያው በስተጀርባ ያለው የገንዘብ እና የፖለቲካ ኃይል እጅግ ከባድ ነው። የኢህአዴግ ባለሟሎች አሉ፤ ኢነቬስተር ዩኖራል፤ ጉቦኛ መንግስት ሰራተኛው አለ፤ ባለ ስልጣን አለ። ባለ መሬቱ ከነዚህ ጋር መጋፋት አይችልም እና ተዛዙ ሲመጣ እሺ ጌታዬ ብሎ መንግስት የሚሰጠውን ካሳ ተቀብሎ መሄድ ነው።

ይህ ሁኔታ ያለው በመላው ሀገሪቷ ነው በአዲስ አበባ ብቻ አይደለም። ከመሬታቸው አለ አግባብ የሚፈናቀሉት ኦሮሞ ብቻ ሳይሆኑ ሌሎች ሁሉ ናቸው። ገበሬዎች ብቻ ሳይሆን ከተሜዎችም ናቸው። አዲስ አበባን ከመሬታቸው የሚፈናቀሉትን ካየን ከአዲስ አበባ ዙርያ ካሉት ገበሬዎች ይልቅ የከተማው ተፈናቃይ ነው ይበልጥ መፈናቀል የሚጎዳው። ለምን? አራት ኪሎ 100 ካሬ ላይ የሚኖር ቤቱን ከነ ጊቢው ቢሸጠው አንድ ሚሊዮን ያገኝበት ነበር 50,000 ተሰጥቶ ይባረራል። ገበሬው ግን ሰፋ ያለ መሬት ቢኖረውም ከከተማ ሩቅ በመሆኑ ዋጋው ያን ያህል ውድ አይደለም በሚሰጠው ካሳ እና በመሬቱ እውነተኛ ዋጋ ያለው ልዩነት እንደ ከተማው መሬት አይሆንም። ስለዚህ አዲስ አበባ እና ዙርያ ሁሉም በመንግስት ከመሬታቸው የተፈናቀሉ ቢጎዱም በአማካይነት የከተማው ከገበሬው ይበልጥ ተጎድቷል።

በመጨረሻ ማን ነበር እነዚህን ገበሬዎች የሚያፈናቅለው ብለን ከጠየቅን የኦሮሚያ የኦህዴድ ቀበሌ እና ውረዳ ሰራተኞች እና የነሱ አዛዦች ናቸው። ለምሳሌ ባለ ሃብት ወይንም የአዲስ አበባ መንግስት በኢህአዴግ ድጋፍ መጥተው የለገጣፎን ባለስልጣኖች መሬት እንፈልጋለን ይላሉ። እነዚህ የኦህዴድ ባለ ስልጣኖች አላማቸው ትንሽ ካሳ ለገበሬው ሰጥቶ በትልቅ ዋጋ ለአዲስ አበባ ወይንም ለባለ ሃብት መስጠት እና በመካከል ከዋጋ ልዩነቱ ጉቦ መብላት ነው። አዲስ አበባ ውስጥም ይህ ነበር አሰራሩ። በጠቅላላ ላለፉ 27 ዓመት መሬት ለመንግስት ሹማምንት ታላቅ የጉቦ የገቢ ምንጭ እና ለኢህአዴግ ታላቅ የካድሬ መያዣ መንገድ ነበር። ስለዚህ አዲስ አበባ ሳይሆን የራሱ የኦህዴድ ካድሬ ነው አዲስ አበባ ዙርያ ያለውን ኦሮሞ ገበሬ አለ አግባብ ያፈናቀለው። አዲስ አበባ ናት ያፈናቀለቻቸው ማለት ሃሰት ነው።

ሙሉ እውነታው ይህ ነው፤ አዲስ አበባ ዙርያ ሳይሆን አዲስ አበባ ውስጥም ሀገር ዙርያም በየቀኑ ዜጎቻችን ከመሬታቸው አለ አግባብ እና አለ በቂ ካሳ ይፈናቀላሉ። የሚፈናቀሉት ደግሞ ኦሮሞዎች ብቻ ሳይሆኑ ሁሉም ነው። ችግሩ በአዲስ አበባ እና በኦሮሚያ መካከል ሳይሆን የመሬት የመንግስት ነው የሚለው ፖሊሲ (http://asfawdarguemeshal.blogspot.com/2018/03/blog-post_47.html) ነው። መሬት የግል ቢሆን እነዚህ ገበሬዎች በነፃነት በሚያስደስታቸው ዋጋ መሬታቸውን ሽጠው ነበር።

Short Memories!

Some of us seem surprised at comments by a certain political commentator, Muluwerq Kidanemariam, that given the current political atmosphere, Tigray Region might find it necessary to invoke article 39 of the constitution and exit Ethiopia. But given the history of the TPLF, such comments are nothing unusual and nothing to be alarmed about.

It seems that many have forgotten, or were too young to remember, the TPLF and EPRDF of the 1990's, particularly until the 2000 Ethio-Eritrean War. This was the peak of ethnic nationalism and anti-Ethiopian nationalist rhetoric in Ethiopia, sponsored and encouraged by the TPLF and EPRDF. TPLF supporters, arm in arm with their EPLF comrades, gleefully lorded it over us 'chauvinists'. It was de rigueur for EPRDF members and supporters to identify with their ethnicity first, and Ethiopia second, and reluctantly at that. Often us naïve and shell-shocked Ethiopian nationalists would during the course of a discussion ask a TPLF or OPDO/OLF supporter if they consider themselves Ethiopian, and the defiant answer would be that they are Tigrean or Oromo first, and then Ethiopian (maybe)!


EPRDF officials and supporters would often say that if by some improbable tragedy the TPLF/EPRDF would fall from power and the 'chauvinists' replace them, they would promptly exit Ethiopia. Their 'Ethiopianness' hung on a thread. This was the tone of Ethiopian politics during the 1990's, and this is merely what Ato Muluwerq has repeated in his interview. Nothing new!

During the Ethio-Eritrean war, things changed a little. The departure of EPLF officials and supporters from Ethiopian political circles resulted in a lowering of anti-Ethiopianism in Addis Ababa. In addition, the war effort required the EPRDF to mobilize a good degree of patriotism - Ethiopian patriotism - all around Ethiopia, even in Oromia, the region that the EPRDF claimed was most victimized by Ethiopian nationalism. The EPRDF were very pragmatic - they did what they needed to do to achieve their goal which was, via war, saving face over the EPLF. So pragmatic were they that they recruited former military officers of their arch-enemy Dergue into the Ethiopian military for the fight!

After the war, and leading up to the 2005 elections, the EPRDF began to shift from fervent anti-Ethiopian nationalism to a little more centrist position. Its anti-chauvinist rhetoric began to be accompanied by anti-'narrow nationalist' rhetoric. Eventually, driven by a more flexible Meles Zenawi, the EPRDF even tried the open 2005 elections, leaving itself vulnerable to the feared and hated chauvinist political forces. When the course of the elections did not go as planned, Meles reverted to form and raised the specter of anti-Tigrayan violence and even talked about genocide! Again, this is what we are seeing now - again, many TPLF supporters are interpreting the threat to the monopoly that the TPLF/EPRDF has on political power as an anti-Tigrayan pogrom!

After crushing the 2005 anti-government movement - with indispensable help from the opposition I might add - the ERPDF moved quickly to an agenda of political monopoly through economic growth - the China/East Asia 'developmental state' model. In the Ethiopian context, the EPRDF named this model 'lmatawi mengst'. The EPRDF figured that a focus on development would make the people forget about politics and, just as importantly, ethnicity. The developmental state was a bargain with the Ethiopian people - high economic growth in exchange for monopoly political power - and it was a great success for the EPRDF. Far more successful than it would have ever imagined. Any political opposition was squashed with impunity, but we, the masses, generally acquiesced, was we were to busy making money - or trying to.

During this time, the EPRDF continued moving slowly away from ethnic nationalism. The rhetoric about Tigrawi-first, Ethiopian-second became a distant memory. Instead, members and supporters of the EPRDF began to portray themselves as being 'more Ethiopian' than their opponents, including the 'chauvinists'! The term 'chauvinist' itself became passé in EPRDF circles, and was replaced by terrorists and anti-Ethiopians! What a change from the old days!

However, with time, the developmental state began to display its own problems. As elsewhere, for example China, the masses began to express intense dissatisfaction with the corruption of the ruling party and the resulting lack of civic and economic justice. This is a significant problem in and of itself. But in Ethiopia, it has been increased orders of magnitude because of ethnic nationalism. Because of ethnic nationalism, this dissatisfaction is expressed not just in civic terms, but ethnic terms, and as we all know, any conflict is greatly increased if ethnicity becomes a factor.

So now, the TPLF and its supporters see themselves faced with an existential crisis, and they don't seem to have anyone to help them figure out an innovative solution. So they retreat into old theories and clichés of their childhood, such as what Ato Muluwerq talks about in his interview.

This is not surprising, neither should it be alarming. But it is folly to expect the TPLF, a small partner in the EPRDF, to continue to manufacture solutions - good or bad - to Ethiopian political problems. Inevitably, they will reach a state of exhaustion - they might even be there now. Their never ending yearning for Meles, who had a way of assessing and finding a way out of problems, shows this. They should be relieved of this huge burden that we have saddled them with for decades. By 'we', I mean the general political opposition, especially those who consider ourselves Ethiopian nationalists. It is we who have failed the nation, and even though we have severely debilitated ourselves, we have no choice but to somehow grow up and do our fair share.

So let us not worry about the Ato Muluwerq's of this world. They are at their wits end, and for this I don't blame them. It us up to us to find a way out of this quagmire.

Freeing Political Prisoners

Undoubtedly most of you have heard that the Ethiopian government is going to free all political prisoners, or pardon those who have broken laws concerning treason and terrorism, or some such thing. Anyway, it appears that many of the known political prisoners will be freed.

This is a great measure. I don't think anyone could say otherwise. A lot of these folks have been suffering cruelties at the hands of the security apparatus, cruelties unbecoming Ethiopia. The Ethiopian tradition is, as practiced in the past, honour and civility and magnanimity. Political prisoners, even those who were a grave threat to the ruling monarch, were imprisoned, preferably far away, on Mount Wehni for example, but given a comfortable imprisonment, if there is such a thing. Modern torture, or ancient torture for that matter, was unthinkable. If anyone even happened to hear of such a thing, they would have immediately thought it dishonourable and dismissed it out of hand.

So, this is a step that shows magnanimity, honour, and civility, it's good for the country, but most of all, it is good for the prisoners, who have been bearing on their shoulders the guilt of all of us Ethiopians.

Nevertheless, a note of caution. Remember what happened that last time several high-profile political prisoners were released. The opposition descended into a downward spiral from which it has not recovered to this day. And yes, I am not forgetting the release of Birtukan Mideksa, but I shudder to recall it and what she went through in the prison. All I can say is, may God bless her and keep her and may God forgive us for what we have done to her and all the unknown Birtukans out there.

I humbly urge all of us Ethiopians to keep in mind today that Rome was not built in a day, and when the EPRDF deigns to do something good and noble is not the time to shout and scream for it to step down from power. There is nobody to replace the EPRDF. Our past 50 years of history, including our elite's long suicide from 1960 to 1991 as well as the EPRDF's monopoly on power has made sure that the protests of the grassroots have no viable elite to lead them. Today is the time to renew our efforts to work on feasible, yes, feasible, politically realistic projects to improve our political and social environment. In our little small circles. We're not all kings and we're not meant to be. A good deed is worth a thousand good words. The line between good and evil cuts through all our hearts. Let's point our fingers at ourselves, particularly those of us in the diaspora who have betrayed our country by leaving it, and see how we can fix ourselves and our surroundings. Maybe then we can build a solid grassroots capable of growing and nurturing a political elite that is a viable foil and partner for the EPRDF.

The ANDM Disconnect

During and after the 2016 protests, we often heard various ANDM officials claim that one of the main causes of unrest in Amhara State was the ‘disconnect’ between ANDM the party and the people of Amhara State. The people do not consider ANDM as having come from them, as being part of them, as wanting the same things that they want, as representing them, as standing up for their interests, etc. To put it simply, ANDM and the people of Amhara State are not of one mind nor of one heart.

This diagnosis of the unrest is, in my opinion is, not only correct, but perfect – it strikes at the very heart of the matter. Politics is best when a people are, among themselves, of one mind and heart, and when a people and its leadership are of one mind and one heart. Politics is at its worst when a people are divided amongst themselves and divided from their leadership. Division is the single biggest enemy of peaceful and prosperous politics and civil life.

Note that by division I don’t mean that there should not be differences. Differing ideologies, opinions, or even interests, to some extent, are natural. There almost ought to be differing ideologies, opinions, and interests. However, a people and leadership of one mind and one heart have a level of trust and understanding that allows them to handle these differences in an agreed upon peaceful and effective manner. So the differences do not end up resulting in division! The people and their leadership realize that at the end of the day, they have to live together and that therefore their basic interests are intertwined. They have to cooperate on basic issues and must not cross certain lines that lead to division. This is what being of one heart and mind is about.

So, yes, in Amhara State, there is division between the people and their leadership. ANDM is disconnected (was never really connected in the first place) from the people of Amhara State. What’s the consequence of this disconnect? Well, in general, it’s poor governance – ineffective government, corruption, injustice, etc. But specific to Ethiopia’s current political problems, the consequence is a disproportionately weak ANDM and Amhara State, and a disproportionately weak Ethiopian nationalism.

Is this a problem for the EPRDF as a whole? What’s wrong if ANDM is weak, if Amhara State is politically weak, and if Ethiopian nationalism is weak? There are those diehard fundamentalists in the EPRDF who do not see it as a problem. Their answer to every problem and situation is to stay the course because they have been in power for 26 years and they know what they are doing! For them, the 2016 protests are just another temporary setback which will be soon forgotten. But for forward thinking members of the EPRDF, who are well aware that the EPRDF has made numerous changes over its history, the 2016 protests indicate that significant changes are required for the EPRDF to continue in power. And one of these changes is that parties other than the TPLF – such as ANDM – have to shoulder their proper share of responsibility and exercise their proper share of power.

Why can’t the TPLF go it alone, so to speak, as it has for a quarter decade so far? The reason is that it is now clear that the vanguard party developmental state (10 years old) – which today is the EPRDF’s main policy and instrument of survival – and ethnic federalism (23 years old) and are incompatible. Not only incompatible, but a combustible combination – combustible enough to blow up the EPRDF’s hold on power. The EPRDF being a TPLF-led vanguard party, in other words with the TPLF holding most of the power and the other parties such as ANDM being junior partners, cannot sustain the developmental state because the resulting ethnic resentment will be too much handle. Therefore, ANDM (and OPDO and SEPDM etc.) need to have more weight in the EPRDF, so that the EPRDF is no longer a TPLF-led front, and thereby anti-TPLF and anti-Tigrean resentment will be slowly reduced. If ANDM and the others continue to be weak and estranged from its people, anti-TPLF resentment will continue increasing and the EPRDF’s hold on power will be weakened.

In order for ANDM to carry its weight in the EPRDF, it must be reconciled with the people of Amhara State. How can this be done? The first step would be for ANDM leadership to understand and accept that their political survival requires such reconciliation. The second is to bring about reconciliation via good governance and so make good governance the focus of their (perpetual!) mandate. Wait a minute – how is this possible? Corruption and favouritism are natural to the one party developmental state. All politicians in a developmental state have to have clients and networks and patronage, otherwise they will be unable to survive. As we have seen in Ethiopia, trying to achieve good governance is always a losing battle in a one party developmental state. Actually, let alone in Ethiopia, the Chinese Communist Party has for 40 years found it impossible to deal effectively with poor governance. Given this, how can ANDM bring about good governance?

The answer is that ANDM must first realize that 1) their survival is today very tenuous; 2) reconciling with the people of Amhara State their only hope for survival; and 3) given the current political reality in Ethiopia good governance is ANDM’s only way to bring about reconciliation. ANDM has no choice – in order to survive, it must reconcile with its people, and in order to reconcile, it must bring about good governance – peace, justice, transparency, no corruption, no favouritism, and a focus on aligning policy with the interests of the public.

What will the TPLF say about this? Will it not consider an ANDM united with the people of Amhara State as a threat? Will it not interfere in Amhara State? Let me say it clearly – the TPLF does not have a choice in the matter. If ANDM reconciles with its population – or simply just makes the decision to do so – there is nothing the TPLF can do about it. Unless there are federal issues at stake, the TPLF has to leave the management of Amhara State to ANDM. If it interferes, it is going to have to literally colonize Amhara State with Tigreans, something which it has not done to date and which it will not do, since this will result in a revolt it cannot control. Note that the EPRDF had a hard time controlling the 2016 revolt even though it was as much an anti-ANDM as anti-TPLF revolt. But if ANDM is one with the population, then the EPRDF would have to give in to ANDM’s wishes.

Let me add here that even today, the TPLF is not the direct cause of corruption, favouritism, injustice, etc. in Amhara State. The TPLF’s tentacles do not and more importantly cannot directly reach the local level. To put it simply, if the administrators of, say, Debre Marqos woreda, are corrupt and inefficient and do not represent the will of the people, this is a problem between them and the people, and a problem that can be fixed between them. The administrators are not from the TPLF, neither is their security from the TPLF. In most cases the administrators and the security apparatus are neighbours and relatives of the people of Debre Marqos. I use this example to illustrate that if ANDM and the people of Amhara State have the will, it is possible for ANDM to reconcile with the people of Amhara State. There will be no interference from the TPLF.

What will be the consequence of this reconciliation? It means that ANDM will have a significant increase in its political power. That is, it will be able to mobilize its people much more effectively than it can now, and this ability to mobilize is the basis of political power. This increase in political power will mean that ANDM will no longer be a junior partner in the EPRDF relative to the TPLF. This is the key to its survival. Again, understanding that this is the key to its survival is what should motivate it to change.

Will not the TPLF resist? Of course, there will be parts of the TPLF, the old guard, who will resist, but they will be unable to. Why? The TPLF is a minority whose dominance is solely a result of their unity and the disunity of the majority. Just a slight increase in the level of unity amongst the majority is enough to overcome any resistance some factions in the TPLF may try to put up. If ANDM and the people of Amhara State are reconciled, that is, if there is unity in Amhara State, the TPLF simply can no longer dominate. And many in the TPLF know this very well. In addition, note that, as I mentioned above, there is a part of the TPLF that wants to relinquish their dominance because it understands that this dominance is the biggest source of anti-EPRDF resentment and that if this dominance continues, both the TPLF and its Tigrean constituency will be at great risk. The problem is that they don’t see any political force, include ANDM and the other junior partners in the EPRDF, that is ready to take over the power that the TPLF relinquishes. But if ANDM does its job and becomes hand and glove with the people of Amhara State, then TPLF dominance will decrease in an orderly and stable manner, and in a roundabout way the survival of the EPRDF and TPLF will be reassured.

‘One Heart’ (‘And Lb’) should become the new slogan of ANDM. Everyone at all levels should be required so sign on to this. This is the only way for ANDM to repair the disconnect with the people of Amhara State and to become one with the people. This in turn is the only way ANDM can survive. Most importantly, this is key to the survival of the Ethiopian nation.

Where the TPLF went wrong

2009/1/23 (Ethiopian calendar)

2016/10/3 (European calendar)

[Note: An Amharic version of this post will appear sometime!]

(pdf version)

A lot has been written about this over the past 25 years, but it doesn't hurt repeating, especially given today's political circumstances in Ethiopia. The TPLF's biggest historical mistake was interpreting its coming to power in 1991 as a full mandate from the vast majority of Ethiopians and assuming it meant a complete rejection of everything that preceded it. This mistaken assumption involved a typically modern Ethiopian exercise in black and white or zero sum thinking.

Basically, this is how the thought process worked... The Haile Selassie government fell, not because it failed to make some sensible reforms, but because it failed to make all the radical changes demanded of it by the students movement. The fall of the Dergue government had nothing to do with the Cold War, a failed Communist economy, or the war with Somalia, but because Ethiopia was a prison of nationalities that had to be liberated. The rise of the TPLF had nothing to do with the end of the Cold War and a bankrupt regime, but because the TPLF and its ethnic ideology best represented the interests of a majority of Ethiopians. The TPLF blinded itself to obvious facts in a bid to convince itself of its monopoly on truth and ability to rule Ethiopia.

Thus, after gaining power, the TPLF, in the form of the EPRDF, began a ruling style that involved continually trying to do the radical and the impossible, its hubris deluding it into believing that it was special enough to do anything politically.

This mindset is what emboldened the EPRDF to saddle Ethiopia (and itself) with perhaps the most radical ethnic based constitution in world history. With a little more maturity, it would have realized that this constitution was not only unpopular and fundamentally at odds with the interests of a large section of the population, but so radical, untested, and risky that there was a good chance it would in the future make governing impossible. For everyone except the EPRDF and other ethnic nationalists, it was clear that a more moderate constitution would have easily satisfied all constituencies, including ethnic nationalists and made governing far easier for the EPRDF.

Building on the constitution, the EPRDF embarked on an ethnic policy that can only be described as playing with fire. It engaged in policies (such as official identification by ethnicity) and rhetoric ('reactionaries' and 'narrow nationalists') that emphasized differences among Ethiopians and diminished commonalities. It thought that it could promote ethnic nationalism and at the same time control ethnic strife, knowing full well that its ethnic political base, Tigray, was composed of a small minority! An impossibly delicate formula if there ever was one. However, thanks to various factors, especially the sad state of the Ethiopian nationalist elite, the EPRDF has managed so far to survive on this knife's edge.

But the fundamentals remain wrong, and this explains today's smoldering dissent. It's a political reality that a people can tolerate far more oppression from their own ethnic group or in a non-ethnic context than they can from another ethnic group. The TPLF knows this quite well, having leveraged the political tool of ethnicity to its fullest during its liberation struggle. Yet, the EPRDF continued a policy of promoting ethnic nationalism while real power and perception of real power, remained in the hands of the TPLF. This has inevitably resulted in widespread resentment against the TPLF and Tigray. This was all predictable from the beginning; there have been ever increasing signs of it in the past two decades, yet hubris has prevented the EPRDF from changing course.

Note that this policy from the beginning was the antithesis of what is best for Tigray. A small minority can flourish in a multi-ethnic society, but not in a society where ethnic division and tension dominate, since the minority is dependent on migration and integration to prosper. The region of Tigray, like all the small ethnicities in Ethiopia, would do best in a country that is more united than divided. Yet, the ideology of the TPLF (and its big brother EPLF) was so ingrained that they basically ignored this danger and continued promoting ethnically divisive policies.

To be fair, the EPRDF did eventually realize the seriousness of the problem. Part of the reasons for the full mobilization of party resources towards the developmental state project ('lemat', for the masses) that begin during the mid part Prime Minister Meles' tenure was to mitigate ethnic division. The rhetoric of economic development was ramped up as a political tool to promote civic nationalism – to give all parts of the country something in common to unite around – and counter the obvious damage of ethnic nationalism. But of course the economy cannot by itself bring down ethnic boundaries and increase civic nationalism. Inter-ethnic integration, which the EPRDF's constitution essentially prevents, is the only way to do so.

The above is just a small list of the radical and reckless policies of the EPRDF over the past 25 years, which aros a consequence of the circumstances around its rise to power, including the absence of an opposing elite power to act as a moderating influence. Now, what does this history teach us about what is happening today? What is happening today?

Well, we continue to hear from hardline EPRDF leaders the same old rhetoric about reactionaries and narrow nationalists – the same old hubris. But there are moderates in the EPRDF and TPLF who have long ago come to realize the folly in their fundamental assumptions. These moderates and hardliners are discussing behind closed doors how to address the current revolt. The moderates are right and sensible, of course, but what has always handicapped them is external leverage. They need a strong Ethiopian nationalist movement and elite, the opposing elite power which I mentioned above, with power on the ground, that they can count on as a foil for the hardliners. They need a political partner on the other side, in other words, so that they can say to the hardliners, “Look, you've tried it your way, and now there is an opposition that your hardline policies cannot dislodge. It's time for you to step aside and let us negotiate a new system of governance.”

Unfortunately, this Ethiopian nationalist movement is not yet there. The soft and hard ethnic nationalists in Oromia who are against TPLF domination have been doing their part for years, but not the Ethiopian nationalists. Now we have the uprisings in Amhara Region, and this is a huge step in the right direction, but there is no organization yet. It is important that these uprisings soon coalesce into a tangible political movement so that it can work with the moderates in EPRDF to find a way out if its quagmire. Failing this, we have to count on the EPRDF reforming by itself. It's a tall order for any organization, especially on with the historical baggage of the TPLF.

Curbing Ethnic Nationalism via Integration and Demography

2009/1/15 (Ethiopian calendar)

2016/9/25 (European calendar)

[Note: An Amharic version of this post will appear shortly!]

In a recent post on the dangers of ethnic nationalism in Ethiopia, I explained why I agree with the idea now fashionable among followers of Ethiopian politics to establish Afaan Oromo as a federal language equal to Amharic. This policy will have two 'effects' – an integrative effect – it will help increase inter-ethnic integration – and a 'placating' effect – it will have a psychologically soothing effect on ethnic nationalists and reduce their zeal, so to speak. In this article, I'll explain that the integrative effect is the strongest and most effective and that the placating effect will be minimal. In addition, unless accompanied by other policies that advance inter-ethnic integration and policies that ensure demographics do not favour ethnic nationalism, the policy step of making Afaan Oromo a federal language, by itself, will not have much effect..

Before going further, let me review why ethnic nationalism is dangerous for Ethiopia as a whole. First, what is ethnic nationalism? We know there are different kinds of it – soft nationalism, hard nationalism, opportunistic nationalism, ideological nationalism, etc. For our purposes here, let's define an ethnic nationalist as one who places his ethnicity ahead of his country. The type of person who says, for example, I'm Tigrean first, then Ethiopian. We all know what this means at the gut level, but let's try and spell it out with an example.

Let's say that in a given province the language of the ethnic group that is a large majority is not an official language. If members of this ethnicity campaign to have their language made the official language, it would benefit them but be a disadvantage (depending on how they take it) to those who belong to other ethnicities as they would have to learn this new language. For the province as a whole, though, the benefits are greater than the costs because a large majority have their wishes respected. Let's consider a similar example, except that the ethnic group requesting that its language be the official language is a small minority in the province. Obviously having their language be the official language would benefit the small minorty, but it would place the vast majority at a disadvantage. Yet, the minority insist. They put their ethnic demands ahead of the greater good, they put their ethnicity ahead of their province. This is what I call ethnic nationalism.

The costs of such ethnic nationalism to a nation are, again, at a gut level, quite clear. The theory is obvious as well. Christopher Clapham put it succinctly in an article just after the 2005 election – to paraphrase: When in a multi-ethnic country such as Ethiopia centrifugal forces begin to exceed centripetal forces the nation begins to pull apart. This is what is being tangibly proven in Ethiopia today, so much so that even the ethnic nationalist EPRDF is worried about it. They've always been worried about it to some extent, identifying 'narrow nationalists' as a threat to the nation. But now they're realizing that even their kind of ethnic nationalism is causing dangers that might require significant reform, such as even changing their 'front' from a group of ethnic based parties to a single non-ethnic entity! (They've seen that political oppression and ethnic identity is a dangerous mix. People are much less tolerant of a small amount of oppression that they perceive is ethnic-based than worse oppression that is not ethnic-based!)

While insisting on the dangers of ethnic nationalism to Ethiopia, I in no way deny that ethnic sentiments and identity and are part of Man's nature, or to use a modern term, a human right. As far as I am concerned, ethnic nationalism too is a human right. As such I think it is futile and even dangerous to repress ethnic identity and ethnic nationalism. If an Oromo wants Afaan Oromo to be the federal language, or if he wants Addis Ababa to be devolved into Oromia, or even if he wants to have Oromia secede from Ethiopia, he has a right to these views and to exercise them politically. Of course, like any other right, the rub lies in the extent to which these conflict with others' rights.

Again, though ethnic identity arises from Man's natural desires, it is, when it crosses the line I mentioned above, a danger to the society at large. One clearly cannot have a country where in every sphere everyone favours their own ethnic group at the expense of the country as a whole. It is for this reason that we Ethiopian nationalists must do our share to reduce ethnic nationalism in Ethiopia.

That was a long review! On to a discussion of integration as a tool to reduce ethnic nationalism and increase civic nationalism... Integration is the social and political mixing of ethnic groups so as to create new groups whose loyalty is to the mixture – the nation. We all know it as an age old formula for creating new kinship, and kinship is what we are really talking about here. The reason that Ethiopia as a nation still stands today is the result of thousands of years of integration.

In today's Ethiopia, integration promoting policies are things like promoting inter-regional migration, business, infrastructure such as transportation, etc. Assuming the ethnic-based regions stay as they are, the best way to promote migration is to have people learn languages of other regions so that they can migrate there, and so that people of the other region can also come here, so to speak. So for example if Afaan Oromo is taught in school in Amhara region and is made a priority, teachers from Oromia would have to be brought to Amhara, and they would probably settle there if properly welcomed. And of course the main goal – Amharas having learnt Afaan Oromo will find it easier to emigrate to Oromia.

At the start of the article, I mentioned making Afaan Oromo a federal language equal to Amharic. This makes sense for various reasons, including integrating the vast number of Oromo youth who for the past 25 years, thanks to ethnic nationalism, have not been taught Amharic or in fact have been taught that speaking Amharic is not a good thing. It also makes sense in the context of the Oromo being the largest or close to the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia. And as I described above, this policy will have an effective integrative effect, it will increase kinship and identity at the national level, reducing ethnic nationalism, in this case Oromo nationalism.

I will note here that I'm afraid many who advocate this policy also, mistakenly, think that the placating effect will be high. That is, they think that making Afaan Oromo a federal language will be seen as a gesture of goodwill by the Oromo public and result in a major reduction in Oromo ethnic nationalism. This, I think, is a very wrong assumption. We can see throughout the world examples of cases where concessions to ethnic nationalism had no such effect. From Canada to Spain to Belgium to Scotland etc., we see the central government making concessions to ethnic nationalists, and these concessions end up reducing only the rate of acceleration of ethnic nationalism!

In the case of Ethiopia and Oromia, there's no reason to think the same won't happen. As soon as Afaan Oromo is made a federal language, Oromo ethnic nationalists will demand that Addis Ababa be absorbed into Oromia State. Against democracy, so to speak, since the majority of Addis Ababans would not want this. This demand is driven purely by grievance and history and is exactly the type of demand that prioritizes the desires of an ethnic group over that of the population at large. And after this demand, others will follow.

However, if the central government and the governments of the other states follow policies of integration and demographic balancing in concert, then Oromo ethnic nationalism will be curbed. Again, if we look world wide, the 'success' stories of reducing ethnic nationalism involve either integration or demographics. Consider Quebec... Its geographical setting is on the edge of most of Canada, sort of like Eritrea to Ethiopia. For this and other reasons, even with official bilingualism (English and French), integration with the rest of Canada remained minimal. However, demographics did the job of burying Quebec ethnic nationalism. Like all of the West, Quebec has brought in lots of immigrants (it has tried to focus on French speaking immigrants) to augment the labour force, pay taxes, etc. These immigrants are very much anti-Quebec nationalism, and their numbers have increased so much that they have tilted the balance in Quebec. If a referendum for secession were called today, a small majority of White French Quebecers would vote to secede, but their majority would be easily overcome by the immigrant vote. Where all sorts of policies failed, the reality of demographics did the job.

So too in Ethiopia civic nationalists have to ensure that the proportion of civic nationalists to ethnic nationalists in the population does not get too low. Encouraging population growth in urban centres, which tend to be civic nationalist, is one such policy. Amhara State, being a non-ethnic nationalist state, also has to ensure that its population does not decline relative to other states in the country. And so on.

In summary, ethnic nationalism is a right which citizens must be allowed to exercise politically. However, too much ethnic nationalism, such as what we've had for the past 25 years, destabilizes the nation and is dangerous enough to result in a failed state. Therefore ethnic nationalism must be curbed, and the force that will curb it, through thoroughly democratic means, is the Ethiopian or civic nationalist constituency. The policy instruments to curb ethnic nationalism is the promotion of policies that advance inter-ethnic integration and keeping a healthy balance between the ethnic and civic nationalist constituencies.