Some thoughts on Oromiffa as the second federal language...

I fully support the idea that Oromiffa should become the second federal language, for various reasons. These include the relatively large number of Oromiffa speakers in Ethiopia, political events over the past few decades, including Oromo nationalism, Oromo region ensuring Amharic is not taught in Oromo schools as part of its drive towards Oromo nationalism, thereby created facts on the ground to force the issue, etc. make this seem to be the most prudent political direction. And I would add - and I would consider this the most important benefit of having Oromiffa as a federal language - that this can actually reduce ethnic nationalism and thereby ethnic conflict by increasing integration and the integrated population. I've written previously about this (https://asfawdarguemeshal.blogspot.com/2016/09/curbing-ethnic-nationalism-via_26.html and http://asfawdarguemeshal.blogspot.com/2018/07/towards-integrated-ethiopia.html). To repeat, this means that by making Oromiffa a federal language, and thereby, for example, encouraging Amhara Region to achieve full fluency in Oromiffa, we increase integration, and we reduce ethnic nationalism, which for me is one of the existential issues for Ethiopia.

However, I think there are two very important points to make here. First, the issue of Oromiffa as a federal language is often presented as one of principle, and this is done so to claim a moral high ground. I think that in order to avoid building on sand,  we have to be honest and acknowledge that this is a political issue, not one of 'principle', insofar as principle exists. By principle I mean values such as equality, restoration, fairness, etc. By principle, a Somali can demand the same for the Somali language. Why should Amharic and Oromiffa be privileged, he can rightly ask? He might even add that while before only Amharic speakers had an 'advantage' over him, now both Amharic and Oromo speakers have this 'advantage'. (I put 'advantage' in quotes because it can easily be considered a disadvantage. A Somali who is properly taught Amharic and Oromiffa in school becomes trilingual whereas the Oromo remains monolingual - the Somali is better off.) So let us not pretend this is an issue of principle, of righteousness vs unrighteousness, of morality vs immorality, of oppressed vs oppressor. Oromiffa becomes a federal language not because of the need for equality, restoration, or fairness, but for political and practical reasons, for the same reasons as Amharic remains, because it is spoken, natively or not natively, by a large number of citizens who have the political power to enforce their demand.

A second, implicit idea in all of this is the desire for many to make this a political negotiating tool vs Oromo ethnic nationalism. "If you want us to support you in making Oromiffa a federal language, then give us ... in exchange." What most are asking in return is, I think, a revision of ethnic federalism to make it less ethnic and more national - a revision of the constitution in other words. Some are also asking for culturally symbolic concessions such as changing the script to Geez. As I said above, given that the demand is political, the demand for political concessions is certainly fair, in my mind. It makes sense, and it makes sense to carry this into the negotiating room and the public discussion sphere. What will come of it, we'll see.

አዲሱ ትውልድ አዲስ በመሆኑ ምክትንያት ብቻ ከድሮው ይሻላል ማለት ስህተት ነው

በርካታ ወጣቶች የኢትዮጵያ የፖለቲካዊ እና መህበራዊ ችግሮችን በበፊቶቹ ተውልድ እያሳበቡ ይገኛሉ (አንዱ ምሳሌ ይህ ነው፤ https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=1934811083224914&set=a.308423195863719&type=3)። የበፊት ትውልድ ያጠፋው የሚያጠፋው ለሁሉም ግልጽ ነው። ግን አዲሱ ትውልድ አዲስ በመሆኑ ብቻ ይሻላል ማለቱ ትልቅ ስህተት ነው!

ጠ/ሚ አብይም ይህንን በትክክል አስረድተዋል። ጠማማ አያት ኣን አባት ያለው ልጅ ከጠማማነት ውጭ ነኝ ማለት አይችልም። ማለቱ እራሱ ያለውን ችግር ይገልጻል! ትህትና እና እራስን መመርመር ብቻ ነው መፍትሄው። ተሳስቼው ይሆናል እነሱም ተሳስተዋል ግን አልፈርድባቸውም ነው ትክክለኛው አስተሳሰብ የሚመስለኝ።

ስለዚህ ጉዳይ ዘጠኝ ዓመት በፊት ደሳለኝ አስፋው የጻፈውን ልጥቀስላችሁ። በዛን ወቅት ልደቱ አያሌው እነ ኃይሉ ሻውል፤ ብርሃኑ ገጋ ወዘተ እየወቀሰ ፖለቲካውን ለኛ ለአዲሱ ትውልድ ተውት እያለ ነበር…

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Is The New Generation Really Better Than The Old?

In his essay, "Civility and Political Discourse in Ethiopia: Time to Change the Guard," Dr. Yacob Hailemariam makes two broad points: 1) The Marxist-Leninist upbringing of most Ethiopian politicians has resulted in a dysfunctional political culture lacking civility and compromise; and, partly for this reason, 2) it is time for the younger generation (presumably untainted by Marxism-Leninism) to take over the political landscape. 

Solomon G. Selassie, in his comment on Dr. Yacob Hailemariam's essay, addresses Dr. Yacob's first point. He illustrates that even those groups (and individuals) far from Marxist ideology - Medhin, EDP, AEUP, UDJ, etc. - suffer from the same dysfunctional traits as the ex-Marxists. This suggests that Marxism-Leninism is not the only problem. Ato Solomon suggests that cultural traits - specifically, a militaristic and uncompromising tradition - have also played a role in our dysfunctional politics. Needless to say, I agree wholeheartedly with him.

Here in this article, I would like to briefly comment on Dr. Yacob's second point. Certainly he is right to say that there must be a culture of 'passing the baton' in Ethiopian politics. No doubt about it - the old personalized, patron-client politics must come to an end, giving way to healthy, strong, and stable institutions. Nobody would disagree with this.

What I have trouble with is the (perhaps unintended) assumption that the inheritors of the baton, the 'younger' generations, will do a better job than their predecessors because they are unburdened by Marxist-Leninist thought. I would counter that not only can we not assume that the younger generations would do better, but there is a good possibility that they would do worse.

Let me offer a couple of small anecdotes. I remember a video of an EDP meeting taken during the difficult months in 2005 when the opposition was under intense pressure. In the video, a young party member stood up and ranted against "diaspora PhD's, tired of eating Big Macs in the West, coming to Ethiopia to tell opposition activists what to do." As I watched his speech, I thought that I could close my eyes and picture any 'old guard' politician making the same sort of dysfunctional remarks.

Another example is of course Lidetu Ayalew, who in his book YeArem Ersha (The Weed Farm) wrote about this very topic. No matter how empathetic one is towards Ato Lidetu, it would be hard to say that his behaviour is markedly different from his elder colleagues. Perhaps on a superficial level, perhaps in the way he talks. But when it comes to fundamentals, especially when it comes to the great weakness of Ethiopian politicians - their incapacity to manage conflict - he is no different from his predecessors. The apple does not fall far from the tree.

Why might our younger politicians have the same or perhaps even less ability than their elders? Well, it is quite simple - if we assume that the old guard of Ethiopian politicians are a troubled, dysfunctional lot, then we have to say that the new guard, their children in essence, have had a terrible childhood! They have been brought up with poor or no role models and exhibit the resulting symptoms - identity crises and rootlessness, inferiority complex, fear, rebellious character, etc. In addition, they have been brought up in a toxic political environment. They need healing, and in order to heal, they need good, positive role models and mentors. They need a positive connection with the past. They need the guidance of elders who have learned from the past, such as Dr. Yacob, to help them avoid making the same mistakes as their predecessors.

In my opinion, those members of the older generation who have some connection with and appreciation of the past glories of Ethiopia, but yet have learned from past errors, who know what introspection means, who know to say sorry, and who have a burning desire for positive change are few and far between and therefore invaluable to the democracy movement. If they leave the political scene, they are leaving it to their peers who remain unchanged and dysfunctional, and to younger colleagues who are lost, having not had the benefit of positive inter-generational guidance. This, I think, presents a grave danger to the state of Ethiopian politics.


Dessalegn Asfaw can be reached at dessalegn_asfaw@yahoo.com

Short Memories!

Some of us seem surprised at comments by a certain political commentator, Muluwerq Kidanemariam, that given the current political atmosphere, Tigray Region might find it necessary to invoke article 39 of the constitution and exit Ethiopia. But given the history of the TPLF, such comments are nothing unusual and nothing to be alarmed about.

It seems that many have forgotten, or were too young to remember, the TPLF and EPRDF of the 1990's, particularly until the 2000 Ethio-Eritrean War. This was the peak of ethnic nationalism and anti-Ethiopian nationalist rhetoric in Ethiopia, sponsored and encouraged by the TPLF and EPRDF. TPLF supporters, arm in arm with their EPLF comrades, gleefully lorded it over us 'chauvinists'. It was de rigueur for EPRDF members and supporters to identify with their ethnicity first, and Ethiopia second, and reluctantly at that. Often us naïve and shell-shocked Ethiopian nationalists would during the course of a discussion ask a TPLF or OPDO/OLF supporter if they consider themselves Ethiopian, and the defiant answer would be that they are Tigrean or Oromo first, and then Ethiopian (maybe)!


EPRDF officials and supporters would often say that if by some improbable tragedy the TPLF/EPRDF would fall from power and the 'chauvinists' replace them, they would promptly exit Ethiopia. Their 'Ethiopianness' hung on a thread. This was the tone of Ethiopian politics during the 1990's, and this is merely what Ato Muluwerq has repeated in his interview. Nothing new!

During the Ethio-Eritrean war, things changed a little. The departure of EPLF officials and supporters from Ethiopian political circles resulted in a lowering of anti-Ethiopianism in Addis Ababa. In addition, the war effort required the EPRDF to mobilize a good degree of patriotism - Ethiopian patriotism - all around Ethiopia, even in Oromia, the region that the EPRDF claimed was most victimized by Ethiopian nationalism. The EPRDF were very pragmatic - they did what they needed to do to achieve their goal which was, via war, saving face over the EPLF. So pragmatic were they that they recruited former military officers of their arch-enemy Dergue into the Ethiopian military for the fight!

After the war, and leading up to the 2005 elections, the EPRDF began to shift from fervent anti-Ethiopian nationalism to a little more centrist position. Its anti-chauvinist rhetoric began to be accompanied by anti-'narrow nationalist' rhetoric. Eventually, driven by a more flexible Meles Zenawi, the EPRDF even tried the open 2005 elections, leaving itself vulnerable to the feared and hated chauvinist political forces. When the course of the elections did not go as planned, Meles reverted to form and raised the specter of anti-Tigrayan violence and even talked about genocide! Again, this is what we are seeing now - again, many TPLF supporters are interpreting the threat to the monopoly that the TPLF/EPRDF has on political power as an anti-Tigrayan pogrom!

After crushing the 2005 anti-government movement - with indispensable help from the opposition I might add - the ERPDF moved quickly to an agenda of political monopoly through economic growth - the China/East Asia 'developmental state' model. In the Ethiopian context, the EPRDF named this model 'lmatawi mengst'. The EPRDF figured that a focus on development would make the people forget about politics and, just as importantly, ethnicity. The developmental state was a bargain with the Ethiopian people - high economic growth in exchange for monopoly political power - and it was a great success for the EPRDF. Far more successful than it would have ever imagined. Any political opposition was squashed with impunity, but we, the masses, generally acquiesced, was we were to busy making money - or trying to.

During this time, the EPRDF continued moving slowly away from ethnic nationalism. The rhetoric about Tigrawi-first, Ethiopian-second became a distant memory. Instead, members and supporters of the EPRDF began to portray themselves as being 'more Ethiopian' than their opponents, including the 'chauvinists'! The term 'chauvinist' itself became passé in EPRDF circles, and was replaced by terrorists and anti-Ethiopians! What a change from the old days!

However, with time, the developmental state began to display its own problems. As elsewhere, for example China, the masses began to express intense dissatisfaction with the corruption of the ruling party and the resulting lack of civic and economic justice. This is a significant problem in and of itself. But in Ethiopia, it has been increased orders of magnitude because of ethnic nationalism. Because of ethnic nationalism, this dissatisfaction is expressed not just in civic terms, but ethnic terms, and as we all know, any conflict is greatly increased if ethnicity becomes a factor.

So now, the TPLF and its supporters see themselves faced with an existential crisis, and they don't seem to have anyone to help them figure out an innovative solution. So they retreat into old theories and clichés of their childhood, such as what Ato Muluwerq talks about in his interview.

This is not surprising, neither should it be alarming. But it is folly to expect the TPLF, a small partner in the EPRDF, to continue to manufacture solutions - good or bad - to Ethiopian political problems. Inevitably, they will reach a state of exhaustion - they might even be there now. Their never ending yearning for Meles, who had a way of assessing and finding a way out of problems, shows this. They should be relieved of this huge burden that we have saddled them with for decades. By 'we', I mean the general political opposition, especially those who consider ourselves Ethiopian nationalists. It is we who have failed the nation, and even though we have severely debilitated ourselves, we have no choice but to somehow grow up and do our fair share.

So let us not worry about the Ato Muluwerq's of this world. They are at their wits end, and for this I don't blame them. It us up to us to find a way out of this quagmire.

Freeing Political Prisoners

Undoubtedly most of you have heard that the Ethiopian government is going to free all political prisoners, or pardon those who have broken laws concerning treason and terrorism, or some such thing. Anyway, it appears that many of the known political prisoners will be freed.

This is a great measure. I don't think anyone could say otherwise. A lot of these folks have been suffering cruelties at the hands of the security apparatus, cruelties unbecoming Ethiopia. The Ethiopian tradition is, as practiced in the past, honour and civility and magnanimity. Political prisoners, even those who were a grave threat to the ruling monarch, were imprisoned, preferably far away, on Mount Wehni for example, but given a comfortable imprisonment, if there is such a thing. Modern torture, or ancient torture for that matter, was unthinkable. If anyone even happened to hear of such a thing, they would have immediately thought it dishonourable and dismissed it out of hand.

So, this is a step that shows magnanimity, honour, and civility, it's good for the country, but most of all, it is good for the prisoners, who have been bearing on their shoulders the guilt of all of us Ethiopians.

Nevertheless, a note of caution. Remember what happened that last time several high-profile political prisoners were released. The opposition descended into a downward spiral from which it has not recovered to this day. And yes, I am not forgetting the release of Birtukan Mideksa, but I shudder to recall it and what she went through in the prison. All I can say is, may God bless her and keep her and may God forgive us for what we have done to her and all the unknown Birtukans out there.

I humbly urge all of us Ethiopians to keep in mind today that Rome was not built in a day, and when the EPRDF deigns to do something good and noble is not the time to shout and scream for it to step down from power. There is nobody to replace the EPRDF. Our past 50 years of history, including our elite's long suicide from 1960 to 1991 as well as the EPRDF's monopoly on power has made sure that the protests of the grassroots have no viable elite to lead them. Today is the time to renew our efforts to work on feasible, yes, feasible, politically realistic projects to improve our political and social environment. In our little small circles. We're not all kings and we're not meant to be. A good deed is worth a thousand good words. The line between good and evil cuts through all our hearts. Let's point our fingers at ourselves, particularly those of us in the diaspora who have betrayed our country by leaving it, and see how we can fix ourselves and our surroundings. Maybe then we can build a solid grassroots capable of growing and nurturing a political elite that is a viable foil and partner for the EPRDF.

ማንን እንሰዋ

በ2012 ጠቅላላ ስብሰባቸው የቻይና ኮምዩኒስት ፓርቲ መሪዎች ለህልውናቸው ብለው በሙስና ላይ ታላቅ እርምጃ መውሰድ እንዳለባቸው ተረድተው የእርምጃ ውሳኔ ወሰዱ። እርምጃቸው ሺ ዢንፒንግን  መሪ (ፕሬዚደንት) መሾምና የጸረ ሙስና «ሚኒስቴር»፤ ክፍል ወይ ቢሮ ሳይሆን ሚኒስቴር» ማቋቋም ነበር። ፕሬዚደንት ሺ ሙስናንና ጸረ መልካም አስተዳደርን እዋገለሁ ዋናው ጉዳዬም አደርገዋለሁ በማለት ለምርጫ ቀረበ። የኮምዩኒስት ፓርቲ ሹማምንት ይህን አውቀው ተስማምተው መረጡት።

ልምን? የጸረ ሙስና ዘመቻ እራሳቸውን ሊጎዳ ሊያከስር ሊያሳስርም እንደሚችል እያወቁ እንዴት የጸረ ሙስና ዘመቻ እንዲካሄድ ፈለጉ? ምክነያቱ ሙስና ፓርቲውን (አባላቱን) እጅግ እየጎዳና ህልውናውን ሊያጠፋ እንደሚችል ስለተረዱ ነው። የተለያዩ መሪዎቻቸውም በዪፋ እንደዚ ብለው ግመው ተናግረው ነበር፡ « ፓርቲአችንም ሀገራችን በሙስና ምክነያት ሊፈርሱ ይችላሉ» ብለዋል።

ስለዚህ ፓርቲው ፈርሶ ሁላችንም ከምንሞት ሙስናን ቀንሰን ህዝባችንን አባብለን ፓርቲው ይትረፍ አብዛኞቻችን እንትረፍ ግን አንዳንዶቻችን በተለይ ሙስና ውስጥ እጅግ የሰመጡት ደግሞም የማንፈልጋቸው ባልደረቦቻችን ይውደቁ ይታሰሩ። ይህ ነበር የቻይና ኮምዩኒስት ፓርቲ ሹማምንት አስተሳሰብ ፕሬዚደንት ሺን ሲመርጡት። ሰውነታችን ሙሉ በሙሉ ከሚሞት ትንሽ እንድማ ነው።

ከመረጡት በኋላ ሃይሉን ማንቀሳቀስ ጀመረና አብዛኛው ካሰበው በላይ ደም ፈሰሰ። ብዙ ሰው ተሰወ። እንግዲህ እንደዚህ አይነቱ ሰፊ እቅድ ሁልግዜ እንደተጠበቀው አይሄድም። ሆኖም ፕሬዚደንት ሺ ተእልኮዋቸውን በሞላ ጎደል አሟሉ።

እንዲሁም በኢትዮጵያ ከህወሃት ጠቅላላ ስብሰባ የሚካሂደው በችይና ኮምሁኒስት ፓርቲ 2012 ስብሰባ የተካሄደው ነው። ሙስና እየገደለን እንደሆነ እናውቃለን፤ ሙስናን ማጥፋት አለበን፤ ግን ከማህላችን ማንን እንሰዋ?! ፖለቲካው በዚህ ዙርያ ነው። ስብሰባውም ሳምንታት የሚፈጀው ለዚህ ነው! ህወሃት መትረፍ ከፈለገ ይህን እርምጃ መውሰድ አለበት ግን ውሳኔው ከባድ ነው።

በኔ ሚስኪን እይታ የተወሰኑ ዋና ሹማምንት መውደቅ አለባቸው። እስር ይሁን በሙስና የተገኘውን ሃብት መንጠቅ ይሁን ተገቢውና ውጤታማ እርምጃ አላውቅም ግን ህዝቡ ይህን ይጠብቃል። መዋቀሩም ይህ መድሃኒት ያስፈልገዋል። የወደፊት ሙሰኞችን ተጠንቀቁ ይቅርባትሁ የሚለው ምልእክት በትክክል የሚደርሳቸው ታላላቅ ሹማምንት ከወደቁ ብቻ ነው።

ከዛም ቀጥሎ ግን ከዚህ በፊት እንደጠቀስኩት የሙስናን ደረጃ በቋሚነት ዝቅ አርጎ ለመጠበቅ የ100% መመሪያውን ኢህአዴግ መሰረዝ አለበት። ከፌደራል ምክር ቤት እስከ ቀበሌ የኢህአዴግ ሹማምንት ስራውን በደምብ ካልሰራ በህዝብ ድምጽ ብልጫ ከስልጣን ሊወርድ እንደሚችል ማወቅ አለበት። ይህ ነው ዋናው የሙስና መቋቋሚያ መንገድ።

ኢሳት፤ ተስፋ የሚሰጥ ወይም የሚያስቆጥ?

ይህን ቪዲዮ (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OUGKE49Lagg) ይመልከቱ። እኔ እጅግ ከምወዳቸው ጋዜጠኛ ሲሳይ አጌና ስለ ኦህዴድና በአዴን ለህወሃት ሙሉ ተገዥነት ይተቻል። ቪዲዮውን ካያችሁ በኋላ እስቲ ንገሩኝ፤ ስለሀገራችን ኢትዮጵያ በተስፋ ተሞላችሁ ወይም ቆረጣችሁ? ይህ ለናንተም ለሃገሪቷም ይበጃል አይበጅም? የፖለቲካ ለውጥ ለዘላለም አይመጣም ወይም አንድ ቀን ይመጣል ያሰኛችኋል? ከዚም አልፎ በሀገሬ ለውጥ ለማምጣት ሚና መጫወት እችላለሁ አልችልም፤ የትኛው ስሜት ይይላል?
ከዚህ በፊት ደጋግሜ እንደጻፍኩት፤
1. የትግራይ ተወላጆች በምክላከያ አናሳ ቁጥር ነው ያላቸው። የሌሎች ጎሳ ተወላጆች ከነኦሮሞና አማራ እጅግ አብዛኛው ናቸው። ይህ ሃቅ ነው። ህወሃትም ፍልጎት ሳይሆን ምርጫ የለውም፤ ትግሬ ቢበዛ ለውግያም ለሰላምም አይበጅም። ስለዚህ ትግሬዎች የስልጣን ቦታዎኦች ተቆጣጥረው ሌሎቹ ሌላውን ይዘዋል። ግን ይህ ሁኔታ ለርጅም ጊዜ አይዘልቅም። ሌሎቹ ወደፊት ግድ ሹመት ያገኛሉ ሰላምን ለመጠበቅ።
2. የደህንነቶ የጎሳ ክፍፍል በዪፋ ባይታወቅም ከሸፈቱ ምስክሮች ዘንድ በርካታ ቲግራይ ያልሆኑ ደህንነት ውስጥ እንዳሉ መረጃ አለን። ሆኖም ከሁሉም የመንግስት አካል ደህንነት ነው በህወሃት ታንቆ የተያዘው። ማንኛውም አምባገነን መንግስት ከሁሉም በላይ ደህንነትን ነው ተጠንቅቆ የሚይዘውና።
3. የትግራይ ህብረተሰብ አሁንም የኢትዮጵያ 8% በላይ አይደለም።
እነዚህ ሃቆች የሚነግሩን ህውሃት ኢትዮጵያን የሚገዛት በበርካታ ህዝብ ፈቃድና ተባባሪነት ነው። ግን በዛው መጠን ፈቃደኛውም ተባባሪውም በሙሉ ልቡ አምኖበት ሳይሆን በአቅም፤ በብስለት፤ በመተባብር፤ ወዘተ ጉድለት ነው የሚያደርኩትን የሚያደርጉት። አቅም፤ ብስለት፤ ትብብር በትንሹም ቢጨእር ያለው አገዛዝ በሰላም ይዘየር ነበር። ስለዚህ ይህ ሁኔታ እንዲፈጥር ነው ማድረግ ያለብን።
ለዚህ ነው ከዚህ በፊትም አሁንም የምለው ከነ የሩሲያ ቭላዲሚር ፑቲን አይነቱ እንማር። ፑቲን ከጎጀውን ከሀዲው የልትሲን መንግስት እየሰራ ውስጥ ለወስጥ ጥሩ ስራ እየሰራ ግን ማንነቱን ደብቆ ሃይሉን አከማቸ። ተቃዋሚ አልሆንም። ለምን፤ እንደማያዋጣና እንደምይሆን ገቡንም ለማሳካት እንደማይሆን ተረድቶ ከመንግስት ውስት በስውር መስራቱ ያዋጣልብሎ ሰራ። የሱም ቢጤዎች ብዙ ነበሩ ጉብዝናና ብልጥነታቸውም እንዲአሸንፉ ረዳቸው።
የኢትዮጵያም ሁኔታ እንደዚህ ነው። በደርግ ጊዜ ታላቅ የሆነ የግዥ መደብ ሞተ እራሱንም አጠፋ አቅምም አጣ። አሁን ያለው አማራጭ ከውስጥ ሆኖ መስራት ነው።
ደግሞ ይቻላል። ከላይ እንደጠቀስኩት ህውሃትም ደጋፊዎቻቸውም እጅግ አናሳ ናቸው። ዛሬም እንደሚታየው ተገዥ ፓርቲዎቻቸውን ኦህድድና በአዴንን እንደፈለጉት በዘላቂነት ማሽከርከር አቅቷቸዋል። ስለዚህ ተስፋ አለን፤ ከሰራን። ከመሸሽ ወይም ከማይሆን የፊትለፊት ግጭት መንገድ ከመያዝ ብልጥ ሆነን ከውስጥ ሃገሪትን መያዝ ነው።

Alternative Political Elite?

When the Dergue collapsed in 1991 and the EPLF, TPLF, and OLF rode into power, we feared the worst. After all, the EPLF, TPLF, and OLF were nothing but ethnic nationalist rebels – shiftas – as far as we were concerned, bent on destroying or breaking apart Ethiopia.

Now, 26 years later, Ethiopia is still alive – yes, with a lot of problems – but still alive. Even though Eritrea separated and an unadvised ethnicist constitution was enacted, Ethiopia has survived. It has survived in large part because its population, in aggregate, was and remains nationalist and patriotic enough to resist the extremes of ethnic nationalism advocated by the TPLF. The TPLF tried, like Ataturk in Turkey, to drag the population kicking and screaming towards something it did not believe in, in this case, ethnic nationalism, but this only worked somewhat. To a large extent, Ethiopianism is alive and well.

Indeed, we can say that the Ethiopian people have moderated the TPLF. Recall that in the early 1990’s, there was no such thing as a ‘narrow nationalist’ – only ‘chauvinists’. Let alone Oromos, even Tigreans were encouraged by the TPLF to identify as ‘Tigrean first and Ethiopian second’. Today there is no such thing. Much of the TPLF now sees the extreme ethnic nationalism it once espoused as an albatross around its neck.

If commendation were possible, the Ethiopian people ought to be commended for this. It is only their strong nationalism and patriotism that has averted disaster and kept the country alive. But what is remarkable is that they did all this without an elite – it was all at the grassroots level. As I said above, in 1991, the EPLF, TPLF, and OLF were the political parties with power. There was no Ethiopian nationalist or Ethiopianist elite to speak of. After all, this elite had committed a long suicide – from 1960 when Haile Selassie’s elite first began to develop suicidal impulses – to the culmination in 1991. Thus when the EPLF, TPLF, and OLF in 1991 began to discuss their future in power, there was no nationalist elite – political or military – to stand up for Ethiopia. It was left to the people – the grassroots – to keep the country alive, and this they did.

Today, still, an Ethiopianist elite is largely absent. This is not surprising – political elites cannot appear overnight – it takes years, maybe generations. Having completed its suicide by 1991, and then having been prevented from rising up since then by the EPRDF, the Ethiopian nationalist elite remains a small, sick, disabled child which has lost all connection to its ancestors.

Is this a result solely of the EPRDF repression of the opposition which we all know about? Certainly not. Were it so, the elite would have strongly manifested itself in the diaspora, outside of the reach of the EPRDF. It has not. Another piece of evidence is the Kinijit fiasco of 2007, which was caused mainly because of elite immaturity and resulting infighting within Kinijit, which was that period’s manifestation of the Ethiopianist elite.

This for me is clear evidence that it is the Ethiopian nationalist political suicide of 1960-1991 that has resulted in its demise. Therefore the idea that many have that EPRDF repression is the cause of the poor state of the Ethiopianist elite, and that if the repression would end all would be fine, is wrongheaded. It was a long and complicated demise and it will take a long and complicated course to resurrect this elite. In the meantime, much of the Ethiopian population remains hungry for nationalist leadership.

So where does this leave those of us Ethiopianists who would like positive change in Ethiopian politics? Those of us who would like a reduction in ethnic nationalism, a reduction in repression, corruption, immorality, and injustice, a platform for safely and constructively discussing and competing policies. Those of us who would like Ethiopia to, at the minimum, be governed by a government that is actually liked by the people. At least a nationalist or populist government. Where does this leave those of us who would like this?

Well, obviously the straightforward path of organizing movements and parties is out of the question. This would result in swift imprisonment and torture, and maybe even death. Since the opposition elite is weak from 50 years of suicide, it cannot hope to directly struggle its way through such repression. This is what the past 26 years of experience shows.

The only possible path is the one that is not direct – the one that involves joining the current political system – joining the EPRDF in other words – and struggling from within. Making the EPRDF itself the vehicle for change since the EPRDF is the only political institution today with the capacity to bring about change and with an experienced elite.

Impossible, the cynics say! The TPLF, representing 8% of the population, will never allow that. Actually, it is quite possible, precisely because if the 92% is only slightly competent, even the superb 8% cannot dominate it. Like Putin worked on the inside and rose all the way to President and changed Russia 180 degrees, those who want change in Ethiopia can do the same. Of course, it will require those who are as wise as serpents and innocent as doves. One has to go along with the party, slowly accumulating political capital and power along the way, not rocking the boat, so to speak, until reaching a level of power which allows him the freedom to enforce his will. At the same time, someone with a good conscience can, while obeying broad party directives, avoid perpetrating injustice and repression, and indeed even rescuing those who might be ill affected by cruel and immoral party cadres. This requires a high level of political maturity and skill – it’s a difficult task. But it remains the only way forward now. Simply waiting for divine intervention or some kind of revolt is akin to doing nothing. Or worse than that – it is waiting for a disaster that we cannot cope with.

So, in my opinion, for those who are interested in bringing positive change to Ethiopian politics, today, there is no other vehicle but the EPRDF. The alternative political elite still hasn’t recovered from 50 years of suicide – it doesn’t exist in Ethiopia nor in the diaspora nor anywhere else. Therefore, rather than beating our heads against a wall trying to do the impossible, trying to mobilize international pressure or trying to build yet another failing opposition movement, let us get in the inside and begin a slow movement of taking over the EPRDF.

The ANDM Disconnect

During and after the 2016 protests, we often heard various ANDM officials claim that one of the main causes of unrest in Amhara State was the ‘disconnect’ between ANDM the party and the people of Amhara State. The people do not consider ANDM as having come from them, as being part of them, as wanting the same things that they want, as representing them, as standing up for their interests, etc. To put it simply, ANDM and the people of Amhara State are not of one mind nor of one heart.

This diagnosis of the unrest is, in my opinion is, not only correct, but perfect – it strikes at the very heart of the matter. Politics is best when a people are, among themselves, of one mind and heart, and when a people and its leadership are of one mind and one heart. Politics is at its worst when a people are divided amongst themselves and divided from their leadership. Division is the single biggest enemy of peaceful and prosperous politics and civil life.

Note that by division I don’t mean that there should not be differences. Differing ideologies, opinions, or even interests, to some extent, are natural. There almost ought to be differing ideologies, opinions, and interests. However, a people and leadership of one mind and one heart have a level of trust and understanding that allows them to handle these differences in an agreed upon peaceful and effective manner. So the differences do not end up resulting in division! The people and their leadership realize that at the end of the day, they have to live together and that therefore their basic interests are intertwined. They have to cooperate on basic issues and must not cross certain lines that lead to division. This is what being of one heart and mind is about.

So, yes, in Amhara State, there is division between the people and their leadership. ANDM is disconnected (was never really connected in the first place) from the people of Amhara State. What’s the consequence of this disconnect? Well, in general, it’s poor governance – ineffective government, corruption, injustice, etc. But specific to Ethiopia’s current political problems, the consequence is a disproportionately weak ANDM and Amhara State, and a disproportionately weak Ethiopian nationalism.

Is this a problem for the EPRDF as a whole? What’s wrong if ANDM is weak, if Amhara State is politically weak, and if Ethiopian nationalism is weak? There are those diehard fundamentalists in the EPRDF who do not see it as a problem. Their answer to every problem and situation is to stay the course because they have been in power for 26 years and they know what they are doing! For them, the 2016 protests are just another temporary setback which will be soon forgotten. But for forward thinking members of the EPRDF, who are well aware that the EPRDF has made numerous changes over its history, the 2016 protests indicate that significant changes are required for the EPRDF to continue in power. And one of these changes is that parties other than the TPLF – such as ANDM – have to shoulder their proper share of responsibility and exercise their proper share of power.

Why can’t the TPLF go it alone, so to speak, as it has for a quarter decade so far? The reason is that it is now clear that the vanguard party developmental state (10 years old) – which today is the EPRDF’s main policy and instrument of survival – and ethnic federalism (23 years old) and are incompatible. Not only incompatible, but a combustible combination – combustible enough to blow up the EPRDF’s hold on power. The EPRDF being a TPLF-led vanguard party, in other words with the TPLF holding most of the power and the other parties such as ANDM being junior partners, cannot sustain the developmental state because the resulting ethnic resentment will be too much handle. Therefore, ANDM (and OPDO and SEPDM etc.) need to have more weight in the EPRDF, so that the EPRDF is no longer a TPLF-led front, and thereby anti-TPLF and anti-Tigrean resentment will be slowly reduced. If ANDM and the others continue to be weak and estranged from its people, anti-TPLF resentment will continue increasing and the EPRDF’s hold on power will be weakened.

In order for ANDM to carry its weight in the EPRDF, it must be reconciled with the people of Amhara State. How can this be done? The first step would be for ANDM leadership to understand and accept that their political survival requires such reconciliation. The second is to bring about reconciliation via good governance and so make good governance the focus of their (perpetual!) mandate. Wait a minute – how is this possible? Corruption and favouritism are natural to the one party developmental state. All politicians in a developmental state have to have clients and networks and patronage, otherwise they will be unable to survive. As we have seen in Ethiopia, trying to achieve good governance is always a losing battle in a one party developmental state. Actually, let alone in Ethiopia, the Chinese Communist Party has for 40 years found it impossible to deal effectively with poor governance. Given this, how can ANDM bring about good governance?

The answer is that ANDM must first realize that 1) their survival is today very tenuous; 2) reconciling with the people of Amhara State their only hope for survival; and 3) given the current political reality in Ethiopia good governance is ANDM’s only way to bring about reconciliation. ANDM has no choice – in order to survive, it must reconcile with its people, and in order to reconcile, it must bring about good governance – peace, justice, transparency, no corruption, no favouritism, and a focus on aligning policy with the interests of the public.

What will the TPLF say about this? Will it not consider an ANDM united with the people of Amhara State as a threat? Will it not interfere in Amhara State? Let me say it clearly – the TPLF does not have a choice in the matter. If ANDM reconciles with its population – or simply just makes the decision to do so – there is nothing the TPLF can do about it. Unless there are federal issues at stake, the TPLF has to leave the management of Amhara State to ANDM. If it interferes, it is going to have to literally colonize Amhara State with Tigreans, something which it has not done to date and which it will not do, since this will result in a revolt it cannot control. Note that the EPRDF had a hard time controlling the 2016 revolt even though it was as much an anti-ANDM as anti-TPLF revolt. But if ANDM is one with the population, then the EPRDF would have to give in to ANDM’s wishes.

Let me add here that even today, the TPLF is not the direct cause of corruption, favouritism, injustice, etc. in Amhara State. The TPLF’s tentacles do not and more importantly cannot directly reach the local level. To put it simply, if the administrators of, say, Debre Marqos woreda, are corrupt and inefficient and do not represent the will of the people, this is a problem between them and the people, and a problem that can be fixed between them. The administrators are not from the TPLF, neither is their security from the TPLF. In most cases the administrators and the security apparatus are neighbours and relatives of the people of Debre Marqos. I use this example to illustrate that if ANDM and the people of Amhara State have the will, it is possible for ANDM to reconcile with the people of Amhara State. There will be no interference from the TPLF.

What will be the consequence of this reconciliation? It means that ANDM will have a significant increase in its political power. That is, it will be able to mobilize its people much more effectively than it can now, and this ability to mobilize is the basis of political power. This increase in political power will mean that ANDM will no longer be a junior partner in the EPRDF relative to the TPLF. This is the key to its survival. Again, understanding that this is the key to its survival is what should motivate it to change.

Will not the TPLF resist? Of course, there will be parts of the TPLF, the old guard, who will resist, but they will be unable to. Why? The TPLF is a minority whose dominance is solely a result of their unity and the disunity of the majority. Just a slight increase in the level of unity amongst the majority is enough to overcome any resistance some factions in the TPLF may try to put up. If ANDM and the people of Amhara State are reconciled, that is, if there is unity in Amhara State, the TPLF simply can no longer dominate. And many in the TPLF know this very well. In addition, note that, as I mentioned above, there is a part of the TPLF that wants to relinquish their dominance because it understands that this dominance is the biggest source of anti-EPRDF resentment and that if this dominance continues, both the TPLF and its Tigrean constituency will be at great risk. The problem is that they don’t see any political force, include ANDM and the other junior partners in the EPRDF, that is ready to take over the power that the TPLF relinquishes. But if ANDM does its job and becomes hand and glove with the people of Amhara State, then TPLF dominance will decrease in an orderly and stable manner, and in a roundabout way the survival of the EPRDF and TPLF will be reassured.

‘One Heart’ (‘And Lb’) should become the new slogan of ANDM. Everyone at all levels should be required so sign on to this. This is the only way for ANDM to repair the disconnect with the people of Amhara State and to become one with the people. This in turn is the only way ANDM can survive. Most importantly, this is key to the survival of the Ethiopian nation.

One Response to the ODF's “Our Common Future: A Proposal”

2009/2/17 (Ethiopian calendar)

2016/10/27 (European calendar)

(pdf)

[Note: An Amharic version of this post will appear sometime!]

It was with great pleasure that I read the Oromo Democratic Front's (ODF) discussion paper “Our Common Future: A Proposal.” It has been a long time since I read a constructive and inviting paper from an Ethiopian political party, a paper inviting us to do work rather than mire ourselves in sloganeering and pity. I commend the ODF for their initiative, and my aim here is to answer their invitation for a response to their proposal. I am but an individual commentator, a mere layman representing no one but myself, but I hope that my comments do the proposal some justice. I shall make my comments on the ideas in the proposal based on the order they were presented in the paper.

I fully agree with the ODF that a “country-wide consensus” on Ethiopia is indeed urgently required, but it has been urgently required for 22 years. The last 'consensus', the 1994 FDRE constitution was in my opinion too radical and not consultative enough, and so we've been waiting for a better one ever since. However, such consensuses are not created overnight, or in a conference or two. It takes years of discussion and deliberation to develop positions, let alone agreements on such a complicated matter as a country's political structure. It is remarkable that the Ethiopian opposition in all its forms has for 25 years hardly made any progress in this matter. We seem to be discussing the same issues over and over again, with the same confrontational zero-sum mindset as in the past. So we would all do well to heed what the ODF recommends and begin work immediately on this “country-wide consensus”.

Next, the proposal frames the current political problem as one between two opposing sides – the current regime as one side and those wanting a “unitary nation” as the other. It implies that “core Oromo demands” have been “sidestepped” or ignored in this debate. This framing is, to put it bluntly, wholly inaccurate. First, though I'm sure there are many that wish for a unitary nation, that is no federal system whatsoever, they form a small minority. To illustrate this, consider the official position of Kinijit and its successor parties in this regard, which was to maintain the current (federal) constitution as it is for the foreseeable future, and past that, amend it as per its own provisions! What kind of amendment it would be was not decided, but there were many proposals, ranging from language-based federalism, which would be almost the same as the current arrangement but simply replacing the concept of ethnicity with language, to federalism with states with redrawn boundaries removing ethnicity entirely. None of this makes for a centralized “unitary nation” -- it is at the very least federalism of some sort. Given Kinijit's large constituency as shown by its electoral victory, this is the majority position, not that of a “unitary nation”.

Second, unless I am mistaken, the main “core Oromo demand” is that the current constitution actually be respected rather than the EPRDF and TPLF in particular using its extrajudicial power to exercise undue influence. This demand is not sidestepped and has not been sidestepped in the debate in any way since all sides that have significant constituencies affirm the current constitution as a political reality, whether they like it or not. I would like to note here that if anything is being sidestepped it is the core demands of the Ethiopian nationalists, since the status quo already fulfils a large portion of the “Oromo demands”, which is a multinational state! The status quo has already brought Ethiopia, constitutionally speaking, from one extreme to the other extreme. There is no possible going further! Thus Oromo demands in this regard have been exceedingly fulfilled, save for the actual implementation portion.

Other demands, such as Oromiffa becoming an official federal language are also supported by all major constituencies. All this to say that talk about the “unitary nation” constituency is a red herring, and therefore presenting the current regime and the “unitary nation” constituency as the poles in the debate is incorrect.

Instead, the debate is multipolar, perhaps too multipolar. If we consider Oromia as one constituency, we have in Oromia a spectrum all the way from Ethiopian nationalists to soft Oromo nationalists to hardline Oromo nationalists. These factions themselves have a lot to sort out in terms of simply agreeing to disagree, let alone being able to unite into one constituency.

Then we have the Ethiopian nationalist constituency, which includes perhaps most of Amhara region, but also that large disenfranchised group of non-Amhara Ethiopians and mixed Ethiopians who consider themselves not to be ethnic nationalists. This constituency is the one that voted for Kinijit, and since its diversity means that it does not have ethnicity as a binding material, so to speak, it is an extremely fractious constituency. The inability of this constituency to “avoid the hair-splitting type of exchanges” and other dysfunctional traits in order to reach a basic consensus has, in my opinion, been the main reason for Ethiopia's current troubles and will end up being the ruin of the nation(s).

Third, there is the EPRDF, which though it has internal divisions is certainly the most united and coherent constituency. As the ODF proposal says, the EPRDF is convinced, or tries to convince itself, that there is no alternative to it. Well, we must admit that there is some truth in this, and the ODF proposal is proof of this in that it clearly outlines divisions in Ethiopian politics that have nothing to do with the EPRDF. We all know that were the EPRDF to vanish today, as the proposal implies, there is no consensus among the rest of us, so there would be anarchy. However, the lack of a consensus amongst the opposition has not stopped the EPRDF from the increasing “social rejection” that the proposal speaks of. Indeed, if we look to the past, both the Haile Selassie and Dergue regimes fell into some sort of anarchy, not into a ready opposition. So a weak opposition is no guarantee of long life for the EPRDF – it is only a guarantee of a hard fall. Thus the EPRDF had better start doing something to actually aid the opposition to develop rather than persecuting it.

Next, I would like to comment on the ODF conviction that the current constitution – Ethiopia as a multinational state – was “unavoidable”, implying that it is Ethiopia's destiny and natural state. Of course, it is the conviction of us Ethiopian nationalists (non ethnic nationalists) that Ethiopia as a multinational state, let alone being its natural state, is an unstable state ripe for conflict. Here we agree to disagree, but as I stated above, as was Kinijit's official position, most Ethiopian nationalists accept political reality and work within the current constitution. I would just like to add that talk of inevitability of the multinational state completely ignores other factors in Ethiopia's recent political past, including pseudo-feudalism, communism, and the Cold War, all of which are not ethnicity and yet have played a significant role in forming today's political reality. Ignoring these factors is I think a misreading of history that affects our perception of current political reality.

Now on to the numbered sections of the ODF proposal. The first, about the benefits of non-violent versus armed struggle is a case well made and there is little to argue about here. We agree to disagree with those who favour armed struggle! I would just like to add a point about 'democracy' however, as the document states that one thing all Ethiopian movements agree on is the goal of democracy. What we laymen think of us democracy is one man one vote, which immediately excludes group rights, especially huge group rights such as ethnic rights. Our problem is precisely that we do not agree with what democracy means and we cannot agree until we come to a general consensus about what our country should look like – in other words its constitution not only as it is formally written, but its spirit. So the term democracy becomes, I believe, a distraction as we work on the “country wide consensus” that this proposal advocates for. If we keep talking about democracy, we'll end up with the same problem as the Egyptian Arab Spring movement, which upon realizing that what it thought was democracy ended up empowering the Muslim Brotherhood a little too much decided it didn't want democracy after all.

The second section, on the divisive role of Ethiopian history, is excellent. I completely agree that short of some sort of miracle, we are going to have to learn to agree to disagree about Ethiopian history. I actually think that reasonable people can agree on a set of unbiased facts about Ethiopian history – that's not the main problem. The problem is that we all interpret these facts with our own political lens. Let's take the simple example of the concept of the Oromo nation. The Oromo in Ethiopia have at various times in history formed various nations, perhaps even a single nation, been an integral part as an ethnic group, not a nation, of the Ethiopian nation as we know it, assimilated into and assimilated other groups, invaded and have been invaded, terrorized and have been terrorized, etc. Most reasonable people would agree on this set of facts. I interpret this history as the Oromo being one of the ethnic groups in Ethiopia while others interpret this as the Oromo nation being distinct from what it calls Ethiopia, as having had various interactions with Ethiopia, but as a nation unto itself. Same facts, different interpretations, but these differences have major implications on building the “country-wide consensus”.

The good thing is that if we “can agree to disagree with different readings” of Ethiopian history, then we can take history out of the Ethiopian nationalism vs ethnic nationalism debate, and this would greatly help unfog the debate. The debate then will simply be about political position rather than history, grievance, etc. This kind of development is would not be new – the example of Canada and Quebec is a case in point. The history of Canada is simple and well-documented – there's not much to argue about its contents. Quebec nationalists interpret the history as that of a Quebec nation invaded and with a right to independence, while others view the history as a competition between two North American colonialists which one party won and is a fait accompli. Same facts, different interpretations. But the only important fact here is that Quebec nationalists want independence today, regardless of history, and the opposite side wants a single Canada, regardless of history. It is current political competition that drives the debate.

The third section on self-determination is also excellent in that it nicely breaks down a large idea – ethnic self determination in the context of Ethiopia – into smaller principles that are much easier to discuss and come to agreement on. I agree with all the premises as they apply in this context. (I disagree with “being an Oromo was officially portrayed as antithetical to being an Ethiopian”, but that's not one of the principles, just an aside.) However, there is more to go – it is a bare minimum, not surprisingly, as this is proposal is just a starting point. One can agree with all the premises, as I do, yet disagree on their political interpretation, as I do with the interpretation of the ODF.

Finally, the fourth and fifth sections dealing with the zero sum attitudes in Ethiopian politics, particularly as it relates to demonizing opponents and lacking empathy. The proposal makes it clear that in order to properly learn from the past, we have to empathize not only with current opponents but with past actors and understand why they did what they did. If we do so, we will realize that there was and in the case of the EPRDF there is some good that they have done, and these should be built upon, rather than everything having to be torn down and built up again.

I completely agree with these thoughts. The zero sum mentality means for a complete absence of introspection, which in turn means continual conflict. With a little bit of empathy and introspection, much of the current conflict would be easily transformed. I think Ethiopians have to start giving the saying 'a people get the government they deserve' much more weight than we currently do. As I am fond of saying, much of the reason Ethiopia today has an ethnic-based constitution that Ethiopian nationalists do not like (but accept!) is because Ethiopian nationalists committed political suicide over the two decades before the new constitution was formed, so that they were unable to be at the table. Yet we Ethiopian nationalists continue to blame the EPRDF for it, as if the EPRDF could suddenly reverse its cherished ideology and take a huge political risk once in power! Unfortunately, it is this focus on continually blaming the EPRDF for everything that has kept us unable to fix our own problems and therefore kept us weak and inept.

In conclusion, I think the ODF proposal is an excellent document that all stakeholders in Ethiopian politics should read, discuss, and build upon. However, let us reflect on why previous such attempts, such as Medrek, for example, have stuttered and failed, and learn from those mistakes. Also, let us ask ourselves where the other stakeholders are while the grassroots, leaderless, is up in arms.