2009/1/23
(Ethiopian calendar)
2016/10/3
(European calendar)
[Note:
An Amharic version of this post will appear sometime!]
A
lot has been written about this over
the past 25 years,
but it doesn't hurt repeating, especially
given
today's political circumstances in Ethiopia.
The TPLF's biggest historical
mistake
was
interpreting its coming to power in 1991 as a full
mandate
from the vast majority of Ethiopians and
assuming
it
meant a complete rejection of everything that preceded it. This
mistaken assumption involved
a typically
modern Ethiopian exercise in black and white or
zero sum thinking.
Basically,
this is how the thought process worked... The Haile Selassie
government fell, not because it failed to make some sensible reforms,
but because it
failed to make all the radical changes demanded of it by the students
movement. The fall of the Dergue government had nothing to do with
the Cold War, a failed Communist economy, or the war with Somalia,
but
because Ethiopia was a prison of nationalities that had to be
liberated. The rise
of the TPLF
had
nothing to do with the end of the Cold War and a bankrupt regime, but
because the TPLF and its ethnic
ideology
best
represented the interests of a majority of Ethiopians. The
TPLF blinded itself to obvious facts in a bid to convince itself of
its monopoly on truth and ability to rule Ethiopia.
Thus,
after
gaining
power, the TPLF, in the form of
the EPRDF, began
a ruling style that involved continually trying to do the radical
and the impossible,
its
hubris deluding it into believing that
it was
special enough to do anything politically.
This
mindset
is what emboldened
the EPRDF to saddle Ethiopia (and itself) with perhaps the most
radical ethnic based constitution in world history. With
a little more maturity,
it would have realized that this constitution was not only unpopular
and
fundamentally at odds with the interests of
a
large
section of the population, but so
radical, untested, and risky that there was a good chance it would in
the future make governing impossible. For
everyone except the EPRDF and other ethnic nationalists, it was clear
that
a more moderate constitution would have easily satisfied
all constituencies, including
ethnic nationalists
and made governing far easier for the EPRDF.
Building
on the constitution, the
EPRDF
embarked on an ethnic
policy that
can only be described as playing
with fire. It
engaged
in
policies (such as official identification by ethnicity) and rhetoric
('reactionaries'
and 'narrow
nationalists')
that emphasized differences among Ethiopians and diminished
commonalities. It thought that it could promote
ethnic nationalism
and at
the same time control ethnic strife, knowing
full well that its ethnic political base, Tigray, was
composed
of a small minority! An
impossibly
delicate formula
if there ever was one. However,
thanks
to various factors, especially the sad state of the Ethiopian
nationalist elite, the EPRDF has managed so
far to survive on this knife's edge.
But
the fundamentals remain wrong, and
this explains today's smoldering dissent.
It's
a political reality that a people
can tolerate far more oppression from their own ethnic group or in a
non-ethnic context than they can from
another ethnic group.
The TPLF knows
this quite well, having leveraged
the
political tool of ethnicity to its fullest during
its liberation struggle. Yet, the EPRDF continued a policy of
promoting ethnic nationalism while real power and
perception of real power, remained
in the hands of the TPLF. This has inevitably
resulted in widespread resentment against the TPLF and Tigray. This
was all predictable from the beginning; there have been ever
increasing signs of it in the past two decades, yet hubris has
prevented the EPRDF from changing course.
Note
that this policy from
the beginning was
the antithesis of what is best for Tigray. A small minority can
flourish in a multi-ethnic society, but not in
a
society where ethnic division and tension dominate, since the
minority is dependent on
migration and integration to prosper. The region of Tigray, like
all the small ethnicities in Ethiopia,
would do best in a
country
that is more united than divided. Yet,
the
ideology of the TPLF (and its big brother EPLF) was so ingrained that
they basically
ignored this danger and continued promoting ethnically divisive
policies.
To
be fair,
the EPRDF
did eventually realize the seriousness of the problem. Part of the
reasons for the full mobilization of party resources towards the
developmental state project
('lemat', for
the masses)
that begin during the
mid part Prime
Minister Meles' tenure was to
mitigate ethnic division.
The
rhetoric of economic development was ramped
up
as a political tool to promote civic
nationalism
– to give all parts of the country something in common to unite
around – and
counter the obvious damage of ethnic nationalism. But of course the
economy cannot by itself bring down ethnic boundaries and
increase civic nationalism.
Inter-ethnic integration, which the EPRDF's
constitution essentially prevents, is the only way to do so.
The
above is just a small list of the radical and reckless policies of
the EPRDF over the past 25 years, which aros a consequence of the
circumstances around its rise to power, including the absence of an
opposing elite power to act as a moderating influence. Now, what does
this history teach us about what is happening today? What is
happening today?
Well,
we continue to hear from hardline EPRDF
leaders
the same old rhetoric about reactionaries and narrow nationalists –
the
same old hubris. But there are moderates in the EPRDF and TPLF who
have long
ago come
to realize the folly in their fundamental assumptions. These
moderates and hardliners are discussing behind closed doors how to
address the current revolt. The moderates are right and sensible, of
course, but what has always handicapped them is external leverage.
They need a strong Ethiopian nationalist movement and elite, the
opposing elite power which I mentioned above,
with power on the ground, that they can count on as a foil for the
hardliners. They need a political partner on the other side, in other
words, so
that they can say to the hardliners, “Look, you've
tried it your way, and now
there is an opposition that your hardline policies cannot dislodge.
It's time for you to step aside and let us negotiate a new
system of governance.”
Unfortunately,
this Ethiopian nationalist movement is not yet there. The
soft and hard ethnic nationalists in Oromia who are against TPLF
domination have been doing their part for years, but not the
Ethiopian nationalists. Now we have the
uprisings in Amhara Region, and
this is
a huge
step
in the right direction, but there is no organization yet. It
is important that these uprisings soon coalesce into a tangible
political movement so that it can work
with
the moderates
in EPRDF
to
find
a way out if its quagmire. Failing this, we have to count on the
EPRDF reforming by itself. It's a tall order for any organization,
especially on with the historical baggage of the TPLF.
