The Ethiopian Business Class Must Rise As A Political Power

Erring on the side of caution, we should assume that 29 years of institutionalized ethnic politics in Ethiopia has created significant 'facts on the ground'. From the political class down to the masses, ethnic nationalism has a following that cannot be ignored. It has become a political fact of life.

Unfettered ethnic nationalism both in theory and in practice (the institution of ethnic federalism) can be described as a conflict generating machine. In order to have a peaceful and productive political environment, ethnic nationalism must be curtailed and ethnic federalism must be altered to become a more pluralistic multicultural federalism, the type of which there are many successful examples throughout the world.

The task of reducing ethnic nationalist sentiment and moving from ethnic federalism towards multicultural federalism cannot be left to the federal government, the ruling Prosperity Party, and Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed alone. For two reasons: First, there is a significant concentration of ethnic nationalists both in the government, party, and deep state structures. Even with the departure of the TPLF and the arrests of prominent ethnic agitators, the fact is that in towns such as Shashemene, the executive, judiciary, and police are controlled by ethnic nationalists. There is also a strong ethnic nationalist presence in the Oromia wing of the ruling party. Remember the old saying about the OPDO being the OLF in disguise. Secondly, there is a degree of ethnic nationalism amongst the population especially in Oromia that cannot be ignored. The government and Prosperity Party must be careful not to antagonize this constituency. For these two reasons, the extent to which the government and party can act against ethnic nationalism using soft and hard power is limited. 

Given this, a political actor other than the government and ruling party has to step up to the plate in the struggle to reduce ethnic nationalism in Ethiopia. What political actor has the potential to do this? The masses, the intellectual class, and opposition political class have not shown any signs of being capable of political organization and action. They seem to be still weakened by over 45 years of Marxism, political revolution, and terror. This is evidenced by the fact that there has been no opposition political organization of any consequence for decades. There has been no mass political movement Ethiopia to speak of, except perhaps 'qerro', which has a significant ethnic nationalist element. So it is unlikely that the masses or opposition intellectual and political classes will be capable in the near future of creating a political movement that can work towards reducing ethnic nationalism.

There is another social class than in the near term can turn itself into a major political actor, and this social class is the new and rising business class. For two reasons. First, this class has both financial and intellectual resources. Second, and more importantly, it has the powerful invisible hand - its desire for  profit and wealth - as an incentive to work towards a stable and peaceful political environment. The only way the business class can make money and keep its wealth is by reducing ethnic nationalism and thereby bringing about a peaceful political environment. This is a strong incentive that the other social classes, such as the masses, intellectual or political elite cannot make use of. The business class, for the sake of its own survival and to protect its investments, must get politically involved and work towards reducing ethnic nationalism. We can only hope that business leaders understand this and begin the long and steady work of making the business class a political force.

The blueprint for the business class' political involvement is straightforward as it follows the same model used throughout the world from ancient times until today. Traditionally, the business class wields influences politics via soft power generated by money. It exercises influence via lobbying and marketing of various kinds,  by providing direct and indirect incentives to politicians, bureaucrats, civil society, businesses, and most importantly by creating institutions that work for its political aims, etc. The business class aims to become a permanent political influencer, not a single issue and one time lobby.

Let me give a practical example of what the actions of the business class lobby might look like. Let's take the case of Shashemene, which today has many of its government officials arrested as a result of their participation, directly or indirectly, in promoting ethnic violence and murder during the past year. To reduce ethnic nationalism in Shashemene, the entire governing structure would be targeted for influence and lobbying. In addition, influential institutions, such as organizations supporting local culture and traditions, empowering local youth in business activities, etc. would be established to give a safe and peaceful way to channel multiculturalism and economic aspirations without resorting to ethnic nationalism. These institutions would also help crowd out ethnic nationalist institutions and influence. In addition, institutions tertiary to the cause such as schools, hospitals, and businesses would be established to round out an all encompassing influencing structure. In the medium term, this work would result in attracting the populace into a more moderate political mindset, as well as tying the interests of politicians, merchants, students - all sectors of society - with moderate politics. In the long term, it will lead to the birth of a new moderate generation.

It may seem to some that the end of the TPLF means the end of ethnic nationalism and ethnic federalism. This view it seems to me is quite unrealistic. 30 years of institutionalized ethnic politics has created ethnic nationalism on the ground. The strong 'qerro' movement is an example of the result of this ethnic nationalism. This ethnic nationalism cannot be dealt with by the government alone, as the government is constrained by ethnic nationalists in its ranks, as well as ethnic nationalism in Oromia. The government needs the support of other political actors. Politicians, intellectuals, and the masses must tangible support the government to reduce ethnic nationalism. But more importantly, the social class with the most capacity, the business class, must establish itself as a political force and begin to tactfully use its enormous potential soft power in a campaign against ethnic nationalism. In this way, Ethiopia will move towards a less ethnic more peaceful political environment.

ተረት ተረት፤ አዲስ አበባ የኦሮሞ ገቤሬዎችን አፈናቅሏል

1. የአዲስ አበባ ህዝብ ምንም ፖለቲካዊ ውሳኔ አድርጎ አያውቅም። በኢህአዴግ (ከነ ኦህዴድ) የተገዛ ህዝብ ነበር። ስለዚህ የአዲስ አበባ ህዝብ ማንንም አላፈናቀለም። አፈናቃይ ካለ ኢህአዴግ ከነ ኦህዴድ ነው።

2. ከአዲስ አበባ የተፈናቀሉት ባብዛኛው ኦሮሞ ቢሆንም የተወሰኑ አማሮች እና የሌላ ጎሳ አባላት ነበሩ።

3. ካአዲስ አበባ ውስጥ የተፈናቀሉት ደግሞ ከሁሉም ጎሳ ነበሩ። እነዚህ የአዲስ አበባ ተፈናቃዮች ከአዲስ አበባ ዙርያ የተፈናቀሉት ገበሬዎች ይበልጥ ተበድለዋል በደልን በገንዘብ ከተረጎምነው። ከካዛንቺስ 50 ካሪሜትር ቦታው የተፈናቀለው ምናልታብት ሁለት ሶስት ሚሊዮን ብር ነው ያጣው። ከቡልቡላ የተፈናቀለው ገበሬ የዚህ ሩብም አልከሰረም።

4. ገበሬዎች እና ሌሎች «ተፈናቀሉ» ስንል መንግስት የማይመጥን ትንሽ ካሳ ሰጥቷቸው በግድ ከመሬታቸው አስነሳቸው ነው። አድግራጊው የአዲስ አበባ ህዝብ ያልመረጠው የአዲስ አበባ መንግስት ውየንም አብዛኛው ጊዜ የኦህዴድ መንግስት ነው። ገበሬውን አነስተኛ ካሳ ሰጥቶት ለኢንቬስተር በከፍተኛ ዋጋ ሽጦ ትርፉን ኪስ አስገብቷል። ለዚህ የአዲስ አበባ ህዝብ ትጠያቂ አይደለም፤ ኢህአዴግ እና ኦህዴድ ናቸው።

5. ታላቁ ግን ማንም የማያነሳው ጉዳይ የሀገራችን የመሬት ፖሊሲ ነው። መሬት የመንግስት በመሆኑ ነው ገበሬዎችም ሌሎችም የሚፈናቀሉት እና «ተፈናቀሉ» የሚባለው። አዲስ አበባ ሲሰፋ (እንደ ከተማ ይሁን እንደ metropolis) ዙርያ ያሉት ገበሬዎች ዋና ተጠቃሚ ነበር መሆን ያለባቸው፤ ይሆኑም ነበር መሬት የግል ቢሆን። አዲስ አበባ ዙርያ ያሉት ገበሬዎች ከተማው እየሰፋ ስለሄደ መሬታቸውን በእጅግ ውድ ዋጋ ሊሸጡ እና ሊጠቀሙ ይችላሉ። ቡልጋ ያለው ገበሬ የመሬቱ ዋጋ አንድ ብር በካሬ ቢሆን ይው መሬት አዲስ አበባ ዙርያ መቶ ብር ሊሆን ይችላል። በዚህ መንገድ ነው የትም ሀገር ከተማ ሲሰፋ ዙራይ ያሉት ገበሬዎች ሎተሪ እንዳሸነፉ የሚቆጠረው። ግን ኢትዮጵያ ገበሬው መረቱን መሸት ስለማይፈቀድ እና መንግስት ሲፈልግ መንጠቅ ስለሚችል ከተማ ዙርያ ያለ ገበሬ ጭራሽ ይሰጋ! ስለዚህ በዚምህ ረገድ ጥፋቱ የአዲስ አበባ ህዝብ ሳይሆን የኢህአዴግ እና ኦህዴድ የመሬት ፖሊሲ ነው። አዲስ አበባ ዙርያ ያሉ ገበሬዎች በኢህአዴግ/ኦህዴድ ምክንያት በሚሊዮኖች የሚቆጥር ብር አጥቷልና!

ተረት ተረት፤ አዲስ አበባ የሰፋችው ኦሮሞ ገበሬን በማፈናቀል ነው

እንደ አብዛኛው ውሸት «አዲስ አበባ የሰፋችው ኦሮሞ ገበሬን በማፈናቀል ነው» የሚለው የተወሰነ እውነታ አለው። አዎን በኢህአዴግ አገዛዝ በአዲስ አበባ ዙርያ ያሉ ገበሬዎች ለመሬታቸው ከሚገባው እጅግ ዝቅተኛ የሆነ ካሳ ተከፍሏቸው በግዴታ ከመሬታቸው ተባረዋል። ግን ይህ ሙሉ ታሪኩ አይደለም።

እንደሚታወቀው በሀገራችን መሬት የመንግስት ነው የሚል አሳዛኝ ህግ ነው ያለው። ይህ ህግ ሲተገበር ስናይ መንግስት ባሰኘው ጊዜ የከተማም ይሁን የገጠር መሬት ከነዋሪዎች ይወስዳል። ሲወስድ ደግሞ የሚከፍለው ካሳ የ«ገበያ» ዋጋ ሳይሆን መንግስት እራሱ የሚተምነው እጅግ አናሳ ካሳ ነው። ልምሳሌ አዲስ አበባ ውስጥ ለ«ልማት» ተብሎ መሬትን መንግስት ሲወስድ የሚከፍለው ካሳ የቤትና የጊቢው አብሮ ዋጋ ሳይሆን የቤቱ (የግንቡ) ዋጋ ብቻ ነው። ለምሳሌ 100 ካሬ ላይ ቤት አለኝ ከሸጥኩት 500,000 ብር ያመጣል እንበል። መንግስት ሊወስደው ከፈለገ ግን የቤቱ ግምብ ዋጋ ብቻ እራሱ (ሶስተኛ ወገን ሳይሆን) ገምቶ ምናልባት 50,000 ብር ከፍሎኝ በግድ ይወስደዋል። በገጥር ደግሞ እንደ ክልሉ እና ዞኑ ቢለያይም አንድ ምሳሌ ልስጣችሁ። መንግስት ከገበሬ መሬቱን ሲወስድ የሶስት ዓመት ገቢውን ለካሳ ይከፍለዋል። ገጠር መሬት መሸጥ ባይኖርም የዚህ መሬት ዋጋ ከዚህ በላይ እንደሚሆን መገመት ይቻላል። የሶስት ዓመት ገቢ ሳይሆን ቢያንስ የአስር ነው መታሰብ የነበረበት።

ከዚም አልፎ ተርፎ ይግባኝ የለም። መንግስት አንዴ ትፈናቀላላችሁ ካለ ይህን ውሳኔ መታገል አይቻልም። ከመሬት ንትቅያው በስተጀርባ ያለው የገንዘብ እና የፖለቲካ ኃይል እጅግ ከባድ ነው። የኢህአዴግ ባለሟሎች አሉ፤ ኢነቬስተር ዩኖራል፤ ጉቦኛ መንግስት ሰራተኛው አለ፤ ባለ ስልጣን አለ። ባለ መሬቱ ከነዚህ ጋር መጋፋት አይችልም እና ተዛዙ ሲመጣ እሺ ጌታዬ ብሎ መንግስት የሚሰጠውን ካሳ ተቀብሎ መሄድ ነው።

ይህ ሁኔታ ያለው በመላው ሀገሪቷ ነው በአዲስ አበባ ብቻ አይደለም። ከመሬታቸው አለ አግባብ የሚፈናቀሉት ኦሮሞ ብቻ ሳይሆኑ ሌሎች ሁሉ ናቸው። ገበሬዎች ብቻ ሳይሆን ከተሜዎችም ናቸው። አዲስ አበባን ከመሬታቸው የሚፈናቀሉትን ካየን ከአዲስ አበባ ዙርያ ካሉት ገበሬዎች ይልቅ የከተማው ተፈናቃይ ነው ይበልጥ መፈናቀል የሚጎዳው። ለምን? አራት ኪሎ 100 ካሬ ላይ የሚኖር ቤቱን ከነ ጊቢው ቢሸጠው አንድ ሚሊዮን ያገኝበት ነበር 50,000 ተሰጥቶ ይባረራል። ገበሬው ግን ሰፋ ያለ መሬት ቢኖረውም ከከተማ ሩቅ በመሆኑ ዋጋው ያን ያህል ውድ አይደለም በሚሰጠው ካሳ እና በመሬቱ እውነተኛ ዋጋ ያለው ልዩነት እንደ ከተማው መሬት አይሆንም። ስለዚህ አዲስ አበባ እና ዙርያ ሁሉም በመንግስት ከመሬታቸው የተፈናቀሉ ቢጎዱም በአማካይነት የከተማው ከገበሬው ይበልጥ ተጎድቷል።

በመጨረሻ ማን ነበር እነዚህን ገበሬዎች የሚያፈናቅለው ብለን ከጠየቅን የኦሮሚያ የኦህዴድ ቀበሌ እና ውረዳ ሰራተኞች እና የነሱ አዛዦች ናቸው። ለምሳሌ ባለ ሃብት ወይንም የአዲስ አበባ መንግስት በኢህአዴግ ድጋፍ መጥተው የለገጣፎን ባለስልጣኖች መሬት እንፈልጋለን ይላሉ። እነዚህ የኦህዴድ ባለ ስልጣኖች አላማቸው ትንሽ ካሳ ለገበሬው ሰጥቶ በትልቅ ዋጋ ለአዲስ አበባ ወይንም ለባለ ሃብት መስጠት እና በመካከል ከዋጋ ልዩነቱ ጉቦ መብላት ነው። አዲስ አበባ ውስጥም ይህ ነበር አሰራሩ። በጠቅላላ ላለፉ 27 ዓመት መሬት ለመንግስት ሹማምንት ታላቅ የጉቦ የገቢ ምንጭ እና ለኢህአዴግ ታላቅ የካድሬ መያዣ መንገድ ነበር። ስለዚህ አዲስ አበባ ሳይሆን የራሱ የኦህዴድ ካድሬ ነው አዲስ አበባ ዙርያ ያለውን ኦሮሞ ገበሬ አለ አግባብ ያፈናቀለው። አዲስ አበባ ናት ያፈናቀለቻቸው ማለት ሃሰት ነው።

ሙሉ እውነታው ይህ ነው፤ አዲስ አበባ ዙርያ ሳይሆን አዲስ አበባ ውስጥም ሀገር ዙርያም በየቀኑ ዜጎቻችን ከመሬታቸው አለ አግባብ እና አለ በቂ ካሳ ይፈናቀላሉ። የሚፈናቀሉት ደግሞ ኦሮሞዎች ብቻ ሳይሆኑ ሁሉም ነው። ችግሩ በአዲስ አበባ እና በኦሮሚያ መካከል ሳይሆን የመሬት የመንግስት ነው የሚለው ፖሊሲ (http://asfawdarguemeshal.blogspot.com/2018/03/blog-post_47.html) ነው። መሬት የግል ቢሆን እነዚህ ገበሬዎች በነፃነት በሚያስደስታቸው ዋጋ መሬታቸውን ሽጠው ነበር።

Catalonia - Another Lesson for Ethiopia

The first lesson, Ladies and Gentlemen, is that ethnic politics is not particular to Ethiopia. I make this obvious point because it seems that a lot of my fellow Ethiopianists - those of us who are wary of ethnic politics - continue to think that only Ethiopia is 'plagued' by ethnic politics. No, ethnicity is universal, nation-states have been for the past two hundred years at least universal, and therefore ethnic politics exists in all states to some extent or another, depending on their ethnic demographics and history.

The second is that the root of ethnic politics is ethnic identity, which has existed for the most part of the existence of this world! People naturally have and are fond of their ethnic or national identity, which, by the way, are fundamentally equivalent. If you ask someone who identifies as Spanish what it means to be Spanish, and if you ask someone who identifies as Catalan what it means to be Catalan, the answer will be the same. My language, my culture, my geography, my ancestry, etc.

What about exclusivism - that is, what about an ethnic or state identity that excludes others? Today's clever Catalan secessionist will say that anyone can be Catalan as long as they identify as Catalan and speak or want to speak the language. Quebec separatists have said the same for decades. Secessionists often adopt this position to ensure that they are not attacked as exclusivists or 'racists'. Anyone can become Catalan or Quebecois, as long as... At the end of the day, ethnicity (and nationalism) are fundamentally exclusivist of course. It is a particular language or culture or geography or way of thinking that one has to adopt. So an Ethiopian nationalist can also say that anyone who adopts Ethiopian language, culture, etc., can be an Ethiopian.

A fourth point is that although ethnic identity is natural and the root of ethnic nationalism, ethnic nationalism itself, that is, the need to politically assert ethnicity, can be manufactured. Latent ethnic sentiments can be stoked by clever politics on the part of ethnic nationalist politicians, and stupid politics by those opposing, and this is what we have seen in Spain. Catalans who only a few years ago would oppose secession today are all for it not because anything substantive has changed in Spanish politics, but because of clever and poor marketing.

The fifth lesson - another very important one - is that wealth, 'development', modernity, etc. do not mitigate ethnic identity. In fact they may amplify it. Catalonia, compared to Oromia, is quite rich. And 'educated'. And modern. Yet it is rife with ethnic politics driven by the need to assert ethnic identity. So the assumption by some in Ethiopia that with development ethnic nationalism, especially 'narrow nationalism', will decrease is a false and dangerous one.

The sixth lesson is nothing except demographics can stem the tide of ethnic nationalism. The problem in Catalonia, as was the problem in Quebec until 25 years ago, is that there are too many people who are today or are potential Catalan nationalists. So secession via referendum is always a threat and ethnic nationalism is always the main political issue. This situation exists because there has not been enough Spanish-Catalan assimilation to create a 'mixed-identity' population in Catalonia and, very imporantly, in the rest of Spain. If there were a sizeable mixed-identity population, then Catalan nationalism would be much weaker. So without sufficient assimilation, the threat of ethnic nationalism always exists, and the solution will end up being ethnic strife or, if possible, secession.

This last lesson is what, I believe, the policy of the Government of Ethiopia should be based on. It is what we Ethiopian nationalists have to advocate for. Assimilation is the key to reducing ethnic nationalism and tension in Ethiopia. Note here that assimilation is not one way - it does not mean everyone should assimilate towards one particular ethnicity - for example, 'Amhara'. It means that there should be assimilation towards some merged and mixed ethnicity. In Ethiopia, for example, if there were significant intermigration and intermarriage between Oromos and other Ethiopians, with Oromiffa being spoken in most parts of Ethiopia along with Amharic and a significant mixed population, such demographics would greatly reduce the power of ethnic nationalism and tension such as exists today. In my view, the Ethiopian government (and state governments) must seriously study and implement policies that promote such assimilation, such as for example teaching Afan Oromo in schools in Amhara State and promoting inter-state migration. Such policies will bring about the necessary assimilation that will mitigate ethnic tension.

Using Canada To Understand Ethiopian Ethnic Federalism Today

I am fortunate to have acquired a somewhat intimate knowledge of Canadian politics and have found that, unlike US politics for example, Canadian politics holds wonderful parallels and lessons for Ethiopia in the area of federalism and ethnic federalism. So in this article I will briefly describe the history and nature of Canadian politics and how it can help us understand the Ethiopian political reality today, especially concerning ethnic federalism.

Here’s the (very) brief history… Canada was settled by English and French colonists beginning in the 1600’s. Soonafter, the English and French began warring for control of Canada (and North America as a whole), and around 1770, the English won decisively. However, in order to avoid problems with the large French population that had already settled in what is today known as the province of Quebec, the English government allowed the French to use their own language, worship in their own religion (Catholic), and to keep their own system of law (civil law). Over the following decades and centuries, the English continued to grant Quebec various such levels of autonomy and self-governance, both official and unofficial. For example, Quebec had its own legislature and French and both provincial and federal government services were provided in French and English. Unofficially, almost every second Canadian Prime Minister from 1867 (the official formation of Canada) onwards was French.

Nevertheless, despite such increasing levels of autonomy and recognition of language rights (note that it was always refered to as ‘language’, not ‘ethnic’ rights), ethnic nationalism in the French province of Quebec did not go away. The idea that Quebec was different from the rest of Canada, to the extent that it should secede and be a different country, actually grew over the decades despite increasing political and economic fortunes. So much so that in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, there was a small armed resistance advocating for the separation of Quebec. This was followed by increasing support for even more autonomy and even secession among both the Quebec population and its French elite.

This resulted in two referendums on secession. In the first referendum of 1980, the ‘yes’ side – the secession side - lost by a significant margin. But, the fact that it was held at all and that it gained 40% support scared enough people that the federal government took even further steps to give Quebec more autonomy, to increase the prominence of French throughout the country, and to unofficially increase the amount of money Quebec got from the federal government. Yet, despite this, a second referendum was held 1995, strategically at a time when the economy was in recession and people were angry. This referendum was again won by the ‘no’ side, but by only one percentage point 50.5% to 49.5%! Significantly, 60% of native French speakers voted for secession, but almost 100% of English and other language speakers voted against secession. Thus, despite being a small minority, non-French speakers were the decisive voters in the referendum.

Today, there is little interest in secession in Quebec – or to put it more accurately, it seems impossible for the 40% of Quebec who still support secession to get enough support from the rest of the population to win a referendum.

What are the lessons to learn from this Canadian example for Ethiopia?

Modernization, rather than reducing ethnic nationalism, can actually increase it. As Quebec modernized, became less religious, more affluent, etc. support for ethnic nationalism, manifested in reduction in English and other (non-French) language rights, secession from Canada, etc. actually increased! Modernization and increased ethnic nationalism go hand in hand.

Canada over the centuries embarked on various policies aimed at accommodating and satisfying the demands of French Quebecers such as the granting of extensive language rights, allowing the suppression of English and other languages in Quebec, making French an official language of the entire country despite only a tiny French population outside Quebec, transfering large amounts of federal money to Quebec despite the wealth of Quebec, etc. The political calculation was that if the demands of French Quebecers were met, they would be less likely to manifest their ethnic nationalism in ways that would cause dramatic damage the rest of Canada, such as secession. This shows that ethnic nationalism cannot be defeated by a stick – it requires plenty of carrot.

However, all over the above policies may have slowed the pace of increasing ethnic nationalism, but did not stop it. The results of the 1995 referendum, which almost initiated a process of secession or at least more separated federal arrangement, shows that accommodating ethnic nationalism, though helpful for some time, will not at the end stop the movement.

Ethnic nationalism does not fundamentally mean secession. It is the desire of a certain group for special rights above the rights of the rest of the population, in recognition that this group is a nation, or a pseudo-nation. For hardline ethnic nationalists, this recognition can only be realized within a politically separate nation. For ‘softer’ nationalists, having asymmetric rights within one nation is enough. Having more autonomy than other provinces, having a French-only province, having the federal language use French equal to English, etc. is enough for them to express their nationhood. The common theme however is that it has to have special rights as a group, even though these rights impinge upon the rights of other citizens.

An immigrant to Quebec cannot send his child to English school. English has not official status as a language in Quebec. Anyone in Quebec who does not speak French is de facto a second class citizen. More so than someone who does not speak English and lives in the English parts of Canada. ‘Native’ Quebecers – those who trace their ancestry to the original French Quebecers – are a privileged class in Quebec, even more so that ‘native’ English are in the rest of Canada. These are the practical consequences of ethnic nationalism – asymmetric rights and privilege that impinge on others’ rights.

Quebec nationalists go out of their way to emphasize that theirs is not an ‘ethnic’ nationalism, but a geographic (Quebec) or language-based (French) nationalism. The reason is that ethnic nationalism is seen within Canadian politics as a whole as primitive and potentially discriminatory. Thus when after the failed 1995 referendum one of the leaders of the Quebec separatist movement (truthfully) said that they lost the vote because of English speakers and immigrants, he was roundly denounced by his own side. What he said was true but not the perception of Quebec separatism that separatists wanted to portray. They wanted to portray their side as open to all, especially immigrants, with the common goal of having an independent Quebec. Ethnic nationalism is in a mature political arena seen as too divisive and dangerous by all sides.

Ethnic nationalism is politically costly. Since its inception, Canada has an extraordinary amount of its political energy on this issue. This energy could have been better spend on the myriad of other matters, such as the economy, trade, government organization, etc. that are everyday political issues in any other nation. The cost has been not only to Canada as a whole, but particularly to Quebec. In Quebec, most issues are sign primarily or at least secondarily through ethnic nationalist implications. Even political parties are organized around this issue, instead of around other ideology or interest groups.

Ethnic nationalist is economically costly. Canada spends significant amounts of money implementing the asymmetrical rights and privileges to Quebec that I mentioned above. The Quebec economy, too, has long been held hostage to the ethnic nationalist movement’s desire to use the economy first and foremost as a tool to promote its ethnic nationalist agenda.

Ethnic nationalism can only be significantly weaked through demographics, including integration and assimilation with the rest of the population. As I said above, though accommodation is often necessary and helpful, at the end of the day, it will only slow the tide of ethnic nationalism, not stop it. If it were not for the changing demographics in Quebec resulting from increasing numbers of immigrants, today Quebec might be a separate country or a very separate province in Canada. Immigrants and their children have increased the population of those whose mother tongue is not French to over 20%, and This group is not only not part of Quebec nationalism, but against it. Whereas accommodation could not defeat ethnic nationalism, demographics has done the job. For now.

These lessons are, as far as I am concerned, very much applicable to today’s Ethiopia. For me, Quebec mirrors Oromia. Oromia, notwithstanding the policies of the EPRDF, is today the one and major Ethiopian state where ethnic nationalism has a significant political impact. Yes, there is ethnic nationalism in other states, but where it is strongest and has to be dealt with ‘specially’ is in Oromia. Oromia, because of history and EPRDF policies, is Ethiopia’s asymmetric state – the one that requires special political attention, the one that is most costly, and the one for whom policies of accommodation, but more importantly integration and assimilation have to  be especially targeted. I will address how I think this should be done in another article.