ለማ መገርሳ ልክ ነው፤ የዴሞግራፊ ለውጥ ግድ ነው

ከዚህ በፊት እንደጻፍኩት የጎሳ ብሄርተኝነትን ከፖለቲካችን ለመቀነስ እና ለማጥፋት የዴሞግራፊ ለውጦች ማምጣት ግድ ነው (https://asfawdarguemeshal.blogspot.com/2016/09/curbing-ethnic-nationalism-via_26.html)። ምከንያቱ ባጭሩ እንዲህ ነው...

የጎሳ ብሄርተኝነት ህዝብ ውስጥ በተለይ የኦሮሞ ህዝብ ውስጥ በደምብ እንደገባ ሁላችንም ገብቶናል። በልሂቃን ደረጃ ብቻ ሳይሆን በብዙሃን ደረጃም። ይህን ጎሰኝነት በስብከት እና ልመና ማጥፋት አይቻልም። የተም ሀገር የጎሳ ብሄርተንኘት አንዴ ከሰፈነ የሚቅንሰው ነገር ፖለቲካዊ ድርድር ሳይሆን የዴሞግራፊያዊ ለውጥ ብቻ ነው። በኢትዮጵያ የሚያስፈልገው የዴሞግራፊ ለውጥ በኦሮሞ እና ሌላው ኢትዮጵያዊ መካከል መቅላቀል እና ውህደት (integration and assimilation) ነው። ህዝቡ ተቀላቅሎ ተጋብቶ ተዋልዶ የቅይጥ ባህል እና ህዝብ መጨመር አለበት። በዚህ መንገድ የጎሳ ብሄርተኛው ጎራ እያነሰ ይሄዳል የፖለቲካ ኃይሉም ይመነምናል። ይህን የሚያስፈጽም አንድ ፖሊሲ ኦሮምኛ የህገር ሙሉ ቋንቋ ማድረግ ነው። ይህ ኦሮሞዎች ከኦሮሚያ ወደ ሌላው ኢትዮጵያ እንዲፈልሱ ይጋብዛል። ለምሳሌ ኦሮምኛ ለማስተማር ወደ አማራ ክልል ይመጣሉ። ይህ ፈልስት መቀላቀልን እና መወሃድን ያመጣል። ከላይ የጠቀስኩት ጽሁፍ ባጭሩ ይህን ነው የሚለው።

በቅርቡ ለማ መገርሳ ስለኦሮሞ ህዝብ ወደ ከተማ መፍለስ እናለበት ያሉት ነገር ከዚህ ጋር አብሮ ይሄዳል። ለምሳሌ አዲስ አበባ ዙርያ የሚኖረው ባብዛኛው ኦሮሞ ነው። አዲስ አበባ ባደገች ቁጥር በሜትሮፖሊታን ከተማው ያለው የኦሮሞ ህዝብ ቁጥር እየጨመረ መሄዱ አይቀርም። ከላይ በጻፍኩት አንጻር ይህ የኦሮሞ ህዝብ በአዲስ አበባ መብዛት አይቀሬም ብቻ ሳይሆን እንደ ጥሩ ነገር ነው መታየት ያለበት። ከተማው ህዝቡን ይቀላቅለዋል እና ያዋህደዋል። ይህ ውህደት የጎሳ ብሄርተኝነትን ይቀንሳል። ስለዚህ ኦሮሞዎችን ወደ አዲስ አበባ እና ሌሎች ከተሞች እንዲፈልሱ ያለው የኦዴፓ እቅድ ጥሩ ነው ማለት ይቻላል።

አሁን ከኛ ከኢትዮጵያ ብሄርተኞች ጎራ የሚጠበቀው ይህ እቅድ በምንፈልገው በአውንታዊ መስመር እንዲካሄድ ነው። «የጎሳ ጌቶዎች» ወይንም የአንድ ጎሳ ሰፈሮች እንዳይፈጠሩ፤ እውነታዊ ውህደት እንዲኖር፤ ሌላው ህብረተሰብ ኦሮምኛ እንዲማር፤ አድሎዋዊነት እንዳይኖር፤ ወዘተ መስራት አለብን። ሌላው ከኛ የሚጠበቀው ነገር የኦሮሞዎች መብት እና ፍላጎት በአዲስ አበባ እንደሚከበረው የሌሎች ዜጎች መብት እና ፍላጎት በኦሮሚያ እንዲከበር መሟገት እና ማስፈጸም ነው። አልፎ ተርፎ ኦሮሙማ (የኦሮሞ ባህል) በአዲስ አበባ እና መላው ኢትዮጵያ እንዲንጸባረቅ በመስማማት in exchange የጎሳ ፌደራሊዝም ሀገ መንግስቱ እንዲቀየር መሟገት እና መደራደር አለብን። ይህን ለማድረግ ታላቅ አቅም እና መደራጀት ይጠበቅብናል።

ነገሮችን ሁሉ በአውንታዊ መልኩ እንደ opportunity ማየት የአሸናፊነት ምልክት ነው። ኦዴፓ ኦሮሞን ወደ አዲስ አበባ እንዲሄድ እናበረታታለን ሲል እኛ እሰየው ብለን በሂደቱ ተሳትፈን እኛ የምንፈልገው መልክ እንዲይዝ ማድረግ አለብን። ከውጭ እያየን በፍርሃት ከማልቀስ ጉዳይ ውስጥ ገብተን መምራት ነው ያለብን።

ስለዚህ ለማ መገርሳ ልክ ነው፤ የዴሞግራፊ ለውጥ ግድ ነው። በዚህ መንገግድ ብቻ ነው መቀላቀል እና መዋሃድ የሚመጣው። በዚህ መንገድ ብቻ ነው አሁን በህብረተሰባችን የሰፈነው ጎሰኝነት ከረዥም ዓመታት በኋላ እንዲቀንስ እና እንዲጠፋ ማድረግ የሚቻለው።

Catalonia - Another Lesson for Ethiopia

The first lesson, Ladies and Gentlemen, is that ethnic politics is not particular to Ethiopia. I make this obvious point because it seems that a lot of my fellow Ethiopianists - those of us who are wary of ethnic politics - continue to think that only Ethiopia is 'plagued' by ethnic politics. No, ethnicity is universal, nation-states have been for the past two hundred years at least universal, and therefore ethnic politics exists in all states to some extent or another, depending on their ethnic demographics and history.

The second is that the root of ethnic politics is ethnic identity, which has existed for the most part of the existence of this world! People naturally have and are fond of their ethnic or national identity, which, by the way, are fundamentally equivalent. If you ask someone who identifies as Spanish what it means to be Spanish, and if you ask someone who identifies as Catalan what it means to be Catalan, the answer will be the same. My language, my culture, my geography, my ancestry, etc.

What about exclusivism - that is, what about an ethnic or state identity that excludes others? Today's clever Catalan secessionist will say that anyone can be Catalan as long as they identify as Catalan and speak or want to speak the language. Quebec separatists have said the same for decades. Secessionists often adopt this position to ensure that they are not attacked as exclusivists or 'racists'. Anyone can become Catalan or Quebecois, as long as... At the end of the day, ethnicity (and nationalism) are fundamentally exclusivist of course. It is a particular language or culture or geography or way of thinking that one has to adopt. So an Ethiopian nationalist can also say that anyone who adopts Ethiopian language, culture, etc., can be an Ethiopian.

A fourth point is that although ethnic identity is natural and the root of ethnic nationalism, ethnic nationalism itself, that is, the need to politically assert ethnicity, can be manufactured. Latent ethnic sentiments can be stoked by clever politics on the part of ethnic nationalist politicians, and stupid politics by those opposing, and this is what we have seen in Spain. Catalans who only a few years ago would oppose secession today are all for it not because anything substantive has changed in Spanish politics, but because of clever and poor marketing.

The fifth lesson - another very important one - is that wealth, 'development', modernity, etc. do not mitigate ethnic identity. In fact they may amplify it. Catalonia, compared to Oromia, is quite rich. And 'educated'. And modern. Yet it is rife with ethnic politics driven by the need to assert ethnic identity. So the assumption by some in Ethiopia that with development ethnic nationalism, especially 'narrow nationalism', will decrease is a false and dangerous one.

The sixth lesson is nothing except demographics can stem the tide of ethnic nationalism. The problem in Catalonia, as was the problem in Quebec until 25 years ago, is that there are too many people who are today or are potential Catalan nationalists. So secession via referendum is always a threat and ethnic nationalism is always the main political issue. This situation exists because there has not been enough Spanish-Catalan assimilation to create a 'mixed-identity' population in Catalonia and, very imporantly, in the rest of Spain. If there were a sizeable mixed-identity population, then Catalan nationalism would be much weaker. So without sufficient assimilation, the threat of ethnic nationalism always exists, and the solution will end up being ethnic strife or, if possible, secession.

This last lesson is what, I believe, the policy of the Government of Ethiopia should be based on. It is what we Ethiopian nationalists have to advocate for. Assimilation is the key to reducing ethnic nationalism and tension in Ethiopia. Note here that assimilation is not one way - it does not mean everyone should assimilate towards one particular ethnicity - for example, 'Amhara'. It means that there should be assimilation towards some merged and mixed ethnicity. In Ethiopia, for example, if there were significant intermigration and intermarriage between Oromos and other Ethiopians, with Oromiffa being spoken in most parts of Ethiopia along with Amharic and a significant mixed population, such demographics would greatly reduce the power of ethnic nationalism and tension such as exists today. In my view, the Ethiopian government (and state governments) must seriously study and implement policies that promote such assimilation, such as for example teaching Afan Oromo in schools in Amhara State and promoting inter-state migration. Such policies will bring about the necessary assimilation that will mitigate ethnic tension.

Our Radical Politicians - Land to the Ruler!

Teshome Guebremariam, the recently departed former legal advisor to Emperor Haile Selassie’s government, once said something to the effect of ‘we said “land for the tiller,” but we ended up with land for the ruler (the government)’. Land to the tiller – a policy of giving tenant farmers land title to the land they rent from large landowners – although a morally, politically, and technically difficult policy, seemed a reasonable and moderate response to the land exploitation situation during the Emperor’s time. Land to the ruler – transferring ownership of all land to the government – nationalizing all land – was a radical and extreme response. Unfortunately, our political elite at the time chose the radical and extreme response. Indeed, at critical junctures during Ethiopia’s modern history, our political elite, especially ‘Haile Selassie’s children’ – those educated from the 1950’s onwards – have too often taken radical and extreme political decisions which have resulted in long term disaster for the nation. This has resulted in repeated disasters and unanticipated and unintended consequences for the nation.

In this article, let us consider that fateful decision to nationalize land, a decision that the Ethiopian people have paid for and continue to pay for dearly. In brief, this policy has resulted in:

1. Artificially high national population and birth rate
2. The recent explosion of rural-urban migration that is chocking our cities
3. Low levels of human capital in rural areas, particularly in the area of farming expertise
4. Low agricultural productivity
5. Extremely high food prices and inflation
6. Food insecurity

How did all this come about? First, the nationalization of land, which included forbidding farmers to sell and buy land, essentially imprisoned our rural population. It meant farmers and their families could no longer move to the city. Let me explain by an example – an example farmer – call him ‘Amde’. In 1975, Amde had seven hectares of land – quite a decent sized holding. If Amde wanted to move to the city, he would need some money – some ‘start-up money’ – to live on until he settled down, found a source of income, etc. Normally, this money would come from selling all or even part of his land – his biggest asset. After all, most Ethiopian farmers in the past and today do not have other assets of significant value. However, thanks to the nationalization of land, the farmer was no longer allowed to sell or trade his land, or even mortgage it. Moreover, if he moved to the city, he most cases he would forego all rights to his piece of land! So not only could he not sell his land for money to live on in the city, but if he moved to the city and then for some reason changed his mind after some time and wanted to return to the farm, he could not do so – his farm would have been taken. Knowing this, farmers in general did not move to the city in numbers that they otherwise would have done. Indeed, the statistics show (I discuss this below) that there was minimal rural to urban migration from 1975 until very recently.

So, what was life like for Amde on the farm? Well, like all rural dwellers, he had many children, let’s say seven children (6.5 was the rural average birth rate around 2007 – keep in mind the Addis Ababa average was 2.2 – a big difference). As his children grew older, he divided his seven hectares into seven pieces – his children got one hectare each. And then his children too had seven children each. His land started getting crowded. As the years went by, country-wide, the average plot size of farmers started approaching one hectare and rural areas started getting congested.

Note that at the time of the 1975 land proclamation, about 85% of Ethiopia’s population, about 28 million people, lived in rural areas. In 2015, 40 years later, about 80% of Ethiopia’s population, or about 80 million people, lived in rural areas! In 40 years, the rural share of the population changed only 5%, but given the naturally high rural birth rates, the absolute rural population skyrocketed. Why? Because for 40 years, farmers, not being allowed to sell their land, did not move to urban areas. If the natural, controlled, and steady rural to urban migration that has occurred and continues everywhere around the world were allowed to happen in Ethiopia, then perhaps by 2015 the percentage of population rural areas would have fallen to 70% or lower. This would have meant more people in urban areas where the birth rate is low, and less people in rural areas where the birth rate is high, and this would have resulted in the overall population in Ethiopia being somewhat lower as well. However, because this natural rural-urban migration was artificially restricted in Ethiopia, the population of the rural ‘prison’ grew and grew, in 40 years from 28 million to 80 million. So this continued high rural-urban population ratio is a major cause of the artificially high national population today.

So what happened to Amde’s family? Recall that his children have one hectare each and seven children each. They cannot divide that one hectare into seven pieces for each of their children – the resulting plots would be too small to sustain a household. So they leave their land to only one of their children, with the remaining six children, having received a high school education thanks to the massive increase in rural public education, forced to try and make their living in the city. This is what is happening today in Ethiopia. The inevitable land deficit that we all expected by that the government ignored is now occurring. Today, millions of farmers have only enough land for one child to inherit – the rest of their children are all migrating to the city.

Hence the explosion in rural to urban migration we see today. Plot sizes have shrunk so much so as to be unsustainable. Most rural children are no longer inheriting land from their parents the plot sizes are too small to be divided. And, even though food prices are extremely high and there has never been a better time to be a farmer, if you have enough land, young people are flooding into urban areas. What we are seeing today is 40 years’ worth of pent up, accumulated, and multiplied rural-urban migration happening virtually at once. And this great rural-urban migration explosion is just starting.

But there’s more to this story – let’s go back to Amde. Amde was not a very productive farmer – he was just did not have the skills nor the desire to farm but farmed only to make a living. But his neighour Gemechu was an excellent farmer who made the most of his plot of land and wished to expand. He was, like any other business person, eager to expand is operations, could not. But, given the government land policy, he could not buy land. Amde would have been willing to sell his land to him and Gemechu would have bought it – they would have agreed on a price, but this was not allowed. So the best Gemechu could do was rent land from Amde on a seasonal basis. Gemechu wished to dig a well, plant trees, and make other long term investments, but he could not since the land was only his for a season and he could not know what would happen in the long term. He also dreamed of a time when he could buy other neighbours’ plots and expand to a level where he could learn mechanized farming, learn about growing fruit seedlings, etc. But his dreams never materialized.

Note that Gemechu was producing 20 quintals of teff per hectare, while the not very productive Amde was producing 10. If Gemechu had bought Amde’s seven hectares and planted teff, the seven hectares would have gone from producing 70 quintals to 140 quintals. Overall agricultural productivity would have increased significantly. Gemechu, with his increased income and taking advantage of economies of scale, would have gone on to greater agricultural exploits. Amde would have been able to buy cheaper teff.

What happened to Gemechu was a travesty that the government(s) of Ethiopia brought on the country’s farmers. By not allowing farmers to be entrepreneurial and to expand, the government stifled farmers’ human capital. This has had not only an economic but also psychological, political, and social impact on farmers. Unlike those in all other commercial sectors, farmers uniquely were restricted from freedom in their business – they were not allowed to expand. As a result, they were indirectly restricted from improving their agricultural skills and education and essentially forced to remain as they were, and to give up hope. Imagine if a mechanic was by law prevented from having a garage bigger than a one-car garage. He would not come close to achieving his potential. If a professor were told that he could never look for another job and he could never conduct research on anything but one subject, he too would never achieve his potential. In fact, he soon stop trying and just mindlessly do his job. Same for farmers. The system made it communism for the farmers, capitalism for the rest.

To add insult to injury, successive governments and NGO’s continued to regard farmers as almost daft – as ignorant and incapable and in need of all forms of paternalism and assistance. It is true that the agricultural sector – that farmers – have not been able to increase their human capital – their knowledge and capacity – but this was and is only because they have been restricted from being able to expand their business. In true communist fashion, the governments’ plan was to hold the most important factor – land – constant, and increase inputs such as improved seeds, fertilizer, agricultural education, etc., with the hope that this would result in greater productivity. Of course it has not worked.

Today, in Ethiopia, agricultural productivity per unit of land is low. Food prices are some of the highest in developing countries. Milk, eggs, butter, meat, and honey are more expensive in Ethiopia than in many Western countries! The agricultural sector has been unable respond to the even the high demand and high prices in today’s Ethiopia that should have resulted in greater investment and productivity. Hence the food inflation – the leading source of inflation in the country – something the government continues to battle.

Back to Amde… The once a decade drought arrived and Amde’s children suffered a tiny harvest. In the old days, when Amde had his seven hectares, he was able to withstand drought because the grain he harvested from his seven hectares was enough for more than one year. But today, Amde’s children have one hectare each with which to provide for their families, and the harvest from one hectare is barely enough for one year. So with this drought, Amde’s children’s families end up all receiving food aid for a year.

So there we have it: An artificially high national population and birth rate, an explosion of rural-urban migration that is chocking our cities, low agricultural human capital in rural areas, low agricultural productivity, high food prices and inflation, and food insecurity. All consequences of the radical land proclamation of 1975. This is one example of the dangers and risks of radical and untried policies being implemented by desperate and immature new political elites. Today’s rulers would do well to learn from this and reconsider the other radical and immoderate policy that is haunting Ethiopia – ethnic federalism.

Curbing Ethnic Nationalism via Integration and Demography

2009/1/15 (Ethiopian calendar)

2016/9/25 (European calendar)

[Note: An Amharic version of this post will appear shortly!]

In a recent post on the dangers of ethnic nationalism in Ethiopia, I explained why I agree with the idea now fashionable among followers of Ethiopian politics to establish Afaan Oromo as a federal language equal to Amharic. This policy will have two 'effects' – an integrative effect – it will help increase inter-ethnic integration – and a 'placating' effect – it will have a psychologically soothing effect on ethnic nationalists and reduce their zeal, so to speak. In this article, I'll explain that the integrative effect is the strongest and most effective and that the placating effect will be minimal. In addition, unless accompanied by other policies that advance inter-ethnic integration and policies that ensure demographics do not favour ethnic nationalism, the policy step of making Afaan Oromo a federal language, by itself, will not have much effect..

Before going further, let me review why ethnic nationalism is dangerous for Ethiopia as a whole. First, what is ethnic nationalism? We know there are different kinds of it – soft nationalism, hard nationalism, opportunistic nationalism, ideological nationalism, etc. For our purposes here, let's define an ethnic nationalist as one who places his ethnicity ahead of his country. The type of person who says, for example, I'm Tigrean first, then Ethiopian. We all know what this means at the gut level, but let's try and spell it out with an example.

Let's say that in a given province the language of the ethnic group that is a large majority is not an official language. If members of this ethnicity campaign to have their language made the official language, it would benefit them but be a disadvantage (depending on how they take it) to those who belong to other ethnicities as they would have to learn this new language. For the province as a whole, though, the benefits are greater than the costs because a large majority have their wishes respected. Let's consider a similar example, except that the ethnic group requesting that its language be the official language is a small minority in the province. Obviously having their language be the official language would benefit the small minorty, but it would place the vast majority at a disadvantage. Yet, the minority insist. They put their ethnic demands ahead of the greater good, they put their ethnicity ahead of their province. This is what I call ethnic nationalism.

The costs of such ethnic nationalism to a nation are, again, at a gut level, quite clear. The theory is obvious as well. Christopher Clapham put it succinctly in an article just after the 2005 election – to paraphrase: When in a multi-ethnic country such as Ethiopia centrifugal forces begin to exceed centripetal forces the nation begins to pull apart. This is what is being tangibly proven in Ethiopia today, so much so that even the ethnic nationalist EPRDF is worried about it. They've always been worried about it to some extent, identifying 'narrow nationalists' as a threat to the nation. But now they're realizing that even their kind of ethnic nationalism is causing dangers that might require significant reform, such as even changing their 'front' from a group of ethnic based parties to a single non-ethnic entity! (They've seen that political oppression and ethnic identity is a dangerous mix. People are much less tolerant of a small amount of oppression that they perceive is ethnic-based than worse oppression that is not ethnic-based!)

While insisting on the dangers of ethnic nationalism to Ethiopia, I in no way deny that ethnic sentiments and identity and are part of Man's nature, or to use a modern term, a human right. As far as I am concerned, ethnic nationalism too is a human right. As such I think it is futile and even dangerous to repress ethnic identity and ethnic nationalism. If an Oromo wants Afaan Oromo to be the federal language, or if he wants Addis Ababa to be devolved into Oromia, or even if he wants to have Oromia secede from Ethiopia, he has a right to these views and to exercise them politically. Of course, like any other right, the rub lies in the extent to which these conflict with others' rights.

Again, though ethnic identity arises from Man's natural desires, it is, when it crosses the line I mentioned above, a danger to the society at large. One clearly cannot have a country where in every sphere everyone favours their own ethnic group at the expense of the country as a whole. It is for this reason that we Ethiopian nationalists must do our share to reduce ethnic nationalism in Ethiopia.

That was a long review! On to a discussion of integration as a tool to reduce ethnic nationalism and increase civic nationalism... Integration is the social and political mixing of ethnic groups so as to create new groups whose loyalty is to the mixture – the nation. We all know it as an age old formula for creating new kinship, and kinship is what we are really talking about here. The reason that Ethiopia as a nation still stands today is the result of thousands of years of integration.

In today's Ethiopia, integration promoting policies are things like promoting inter-regional migration, business, infrastructure such as transportation, etc. Assuming the ethnic-based regions stay as they are, the best way to promote migration is to have people learn languages of other regions so that they can migrate there, and so that people of the other region can also come here, so to speak. So for example if Afaan Oromo is taught in school in Amhara region and is made a priority, teachers from Oromia would have to be brought to Amhara, and they would probably settle there if properly welcomed. And of course the main goal – Amharas having learnt Afaan Oromo will find it easier to emigrate to Oromia.

At the start of the article, I mentioned making Afaan Oromo a federal language equal to Amharic. This makes sense for various reasons, including integrating the vast number of Oromo youth who for the past 25 years, thanks to ethnic nationalism, have not been taught Amharic or in fact have been taught that speaking Amharic is not a good thing. It also makes sense in the context of the Oromo being the largest or close to the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia. And as I described above, this policy will have an effective integrative effect, it will increase kinship and identity at the national level, reducing ethnic nationalism, in this case Oromo nationalism.

I will note here that I'm afraid many who advocate this policy also, mistakenly, think that the placating effect will be high. That is, they think that making Afaan Oromo a federal language will be seen as a gesture of goodwill by the Oromo public and result in a major reduction in Oromo ethnic nationalism. This, I think, is a very wrong assumption. We can see throughout the world examples of cases where concessions to ethnic nationalism had no such effect. From Canada to Spain to Belgium to Scotland etc., we see the central government making concessions to ethnic nationalists, and these concessions end up reducing only the rate of acceleration of ethnic nationalism!

In the case of Ethiopia and Oromia, there's no reason to think the same won't happen. As soon as Afaan Oromo is made a federal language, Oromo ethnic nationalists will demand that Addis Ababa be absorbed into Oromia State. Against democracy, so to speak, since the majority of Addis Ababans would not want this. This demand is driven purely by grievance and history and is exactly the type of demand that prioritizes the desires of an ethnic group over that of the population at large. And after this demand, others will follow.

However, if the central government and the governments of the other states follow policies of integration and demographic balancing in concert, then Oromo ethnic nationalism will be curbed. Again, if we look world wide, the 'success' stories of reducing ethnic nationalism involve either integration or demographics. Consider Quebec... Its geographical setting is on the edge of most of Canada, sort of like Eritrea to Ethiopia. For this and other reasons, even with official bilingualism (English and French), integration with the rest of Canada remained minimal. However, demographics did the job of burying Quebec ethnic nationalism. Like all of the West, Quebec has brought in lots of immigrants (it has tried to focus on French speaking immigrants) to augment the labour force, pay taxes, etc. These immigrants are very much anti-Quebec nationalism, and their numbers have increased so much that they have tilted the balance in Quebec. If a referendum for secession were called today, a small majority of White French Quebecers would vote to secede, but their majority would be easily overcome by the immigrant vote. Where all sorts of policies failed, the reality of demographics did the job.

So too in Ethiopia civic nationalists have to ensure that the proportion of civic nationalists to ethnic nationalists in the population does not get too low. Encouraging population growth in urban centres, which tend to be civic nationalist, is one such policy. Amhara State, being a non-ethnic nationalist state, also has to ensure that its population does not decline relative to other states in the country. And so on.

In summary, ethnic nationalism is a right which citizens must be allowed to exercise politically. However, too much ethnic nationalism, such as what we've had for the past 25 years, destabilizes the nation and is dangerous enough to result in a failed state. Therefore ethnic nationalism must be curbed, and the force that will curb it, through thoroughly democratic means, is the Ethiopian or civic nationalist constituency. The policy instruments to curb ethnic nationalism is the promotion of policies that advance inter-ethnic integration and keeping a healthy balance between the ethnic and civic nationalist constituencies.