A Prudent Strategy for the Ethiopian Centre

I write this now because soon the TPLF will be history, and we will have to proceed with building a peaceful and stable Ethiopian political environment... Before the TPLF's recent acts of terrorism, many Ethiopia politicans and pundits that consider themselves centrists were attacking Prime Minister Abiy's administration for its inability to deal with ever increasing instances of ethnic cleansing, especially anti-Amhara ethnic cleansing, taking place throughout the country. Many of these politicians and pundits are now fully on side with Abiy on the issue of the TPLF insurrection.

A year and a half ago, I tried to makes sense of the (incessant) criticism of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and his government. Much of the criticism has to do with two points:

1. The federal and Addis Ababa government's real or perceived bias in favour of Oromos in handing out services and entitlements such as land, employment, etc.

2. The federal government's not preventing repeated instances of ethnic murder and ethnic cleansing of mostly Amharas but also others in Oromia, Benishangul, and SNNP regions.

Before I continue, I ask you to keep in mind the following quote: “When people realize things are going wrong, there are two questions they can ask. One is, ‘What did we do wrong?’ and the other is, ‘Who did this to us?’ The latter leads to conspiracy theories and paranoia. The first question leads to another line of thinking: ‘How do we put it right?’” Bernard Lewis

Of course, criticism has its place and is sometimes necessary. But the context has to be right. In today's Ethiopian political context, virulent criticism of Abiy to the point of advocating for his ouster (along with ethnic nationalists and the TPLF) simply does not make sense. Let me explain.

Fanning anti-Abiy sentiment can have one of two goals:

1. Creating a situation where Abiy steps down or is ousted from power.

2. Putting Abiy under pressure to do more to get rid of Oromo bias and stop ethnic cleansing.

Let's address the first goal. In a scenario where Abiy is ousted from power, it's of course important to consider who or what will step into the vacuum! Does the centre have any political organization or structure that is ready to take over power? The answer is clearly no. The centre has no party, no organization, no civic society, no deep state network that is ready to take over leadership of the country. In fact, in terms of organization and structure, the ethnic nationalists are much more organized than the centre. Thus, if Abiy is ousted from power, we will have a power vacuum which will be filled with chaos, and the ethnic nationalists will have the advantage over the centre. Clearly Abiy being forced from power goes against the interests of the centre. Those politicians and pundits who don't like his policies or execution of policies must first establish a viable alternative organization and power structure before advocating for Abiy's ouster. Otherwise it will be 1991 again.

The second goal seems more realistic, but it isn't... Undoubtedly, criticism from centre politicians and pundits puts pressure on Abiy. Along with the criticism from the public at large, which feels more and more vulnerable with the increasing incidents of ethnic cleansing. The question is how can he respond to this pressure. Is the pressure enough for Abiy to start doing more about Oromo bias and tackling ethnic cleansing? My answer is no. For two reasons. First, the ethnic extremism embedded in the OPDO has been passed on to the Prosperity Party's Oromia branch. From municipal mayors to police chiefs to rank and file civil servants all the way up to top party officials, there are various degrees of ethnic extremism. If one takes a town like Shashemene, the mayor, police chief, kebele and woreda officials, etc., are all some some shade or another of ethnic extremists. In a situation like this, Abiy cannot simply replace all of these officials. That would be politically dangerous. He has to make due with what he has. The second reason is that the ethnic extremists have organizations that are powerful and capable of troubling the government. They can inflict terror, ethnic cleansing, produce protests, sabotage, etc. Because of this, Abiy's government has to tread carefully in managing ethnic extremism, especially Oromo ethnic extremism. Expecting the government to be able to simply purge all ethnic extremists is unrealistic. For these two reasons, pressure from the centre on the Abiy government to put an end to Oromo bias and ethnic cleansing, though somewhat useful, cannot fix the problem. He simply cannot respond fully to such pressure.

So, if Abiy's ouster from power is not good for the centre, and if putting pressure on him is not that helpful, what can centre politicians and pundits do to bring about the desirable result of ending ethnic cleansing and reducing Oromo bias (the latter is not for me a very big issue - we should accept Oromo bias for the near future)? What centre politicians and pundits can do is start and focus on the difficult work of creating organizations, parties, lobbies, civil societies, and deep state networks that can exert real power in the country and counteract ethnic nationalism. This includes joining current institutions, including the government and the ruling party, and exerting influence from within. This is a critical aspect to the struggle.

It is only via a critical mass of organization that ethnic nationalism and radicalism can be tackled in a prudent and effective way, by the use of overwhelming and targetted soft power. The federal government alone cannot do this because ethnic nationalism is too embedded in government institutions and amongst the public. So I would expect our politicians and pundits to remove their focus from complaining about Abiy and his government, to building a centrist political and civic force that is able to peacefully, prudently, and effectively combat ethnic radicalism

«መፈንቀለ መንግስት»

ፌደራል መንግስት «መፈንቀለ መንግስት» ያለው ጉዳዩን ለማካበድ እና የሚያደርገውን ኃይል እርምጃዎችን ሽፋን ለመስጠት ነው። ተገቢ ይመስለኛል።

የኢትዮጵያ ፌደራል መንግስት አቅሙን እጅግ ውስን ነው። የክልሎች መንግስታትም እንዲሁም። ኦነግ ባንክ ሲዘርፍ የቆየው መንግስት «ሆደ ሰፊ» ሆኖ ሳይሆን ለማስቆም አቅም ስለሌለው ነው። እርምጃ ከወሰደ ከውስጡ አቢዮት ሊነሳል ስለሚችል ብዙ የፖለቲካ ስራ በመስራት ቆይቷል። ሆኖም የሰመኑ ግድያዎች መንግስት ምን ያህል ደካማ እንደሆነ ያሳያል።

ለዚህ አይነት የደከመ መንግስት «መፈንቀለ መንግስት» የሚመጣው በdeath by a thousand cuts ነው። አሳምነው አማራ ክልልን ይቆጣጠራል። የመንግስት ደካማነት ያሳያል። መንግስት ውስጥ ያሉት ለምክዳት ዳር ያሉት ድፍረት ያገኛሉ። በሌሎች ቦታዎች አመጽ ይነሳል። ሁከት ይበዛል። እንዲህ እያለ መንግስት ይፈራርሳል። እንሆ መፈንቀለ መንግስት።

መንግስት ታላቅ የሰው ኃይል እጥረት አለው፤ ይህ ሁላችን የምናውቀው ነው። የህ የ50 ዓመት ውጤት ነው። የዓቢይ ፍላጎት ወደታች በደምብ አይደርስም። መሰረታዊ ችግር ነው። በዚህ ውክት ሁሉም ብሶተኛ ይህን ድክመት ተጠቅሞ ሁከት ማስነሳት ይሞክራል። ይህ ነው ያለፈው ዓመት ታሪክ። አሁንም ይቀጥላል።

መንግስት አሁን ስልቱን ገምግሞ ወደ ይበልጥ ኃይል እርምጃ እየገባ ይሆን ይሆናል። የአቢዮት እና ሁከት ምንጮችን አሳዶ ማስቆም ሂደቱ ሰባዊ ጉዳት ቢኖረውም። ማህበራዊ ሚዲያን ማገድ፤ ኢንተርኔትን ሳይሆን ማህበራዊ ሚዲያን። ይህ ስልት ይሰራ አይሰራ አላውቅም፤ ጉዳይ መሃል ውስጥ እና መረጃ ያላቸው እነ ዓቢይ ነው የሚያውቁት።

ግን ኢግዚአብሔር በሰላም መንግስት ሁከተኞችን ለሞቆጣጠር ይርዳቸው። መንግስት የ«ሁከተኞችን» ችግር እና ብሶት ደግሞ dismiss ከማድረግ ማዳመጥ እና ፍትህ መስጠት እንዲችል ይርዳው።

Understanding Ethnic 'Soft Nationalism' for Ethiopian Nationalists

I find in our discussions of the "ethnic question" - of Ethiopian vs ethnic nationalism and the various shades in between - a lack of understanding of the various shades between, which we normally call 'soft nationalism'.

For Ethiopian nationalists, there are three spots on the Ethiopian - ethnic nationalist spectrum. These are 1) radical ethnic nationalists who want nothing but secession, 2) those who like the radicals consider Ethiopia a prison of nations but consent stay within Ethiopia so long as Ethiopian satisfies their demands, and 3) Ethiopian nationalists.

But the situation is of course far more complex - the spectrum is not discrete with three spots - it is continuous - various shades, like I said above. And, more importantly, individuals and even groups shift often from one position on the spectrum to another. Their opinions are not fixed in stone - they change depending on various factors.

I will use an example from Quebec 'ethnic' nationalism in Canada, which I've previously discussed here (http://asfawdarguemeshal.blogspot.com/2017/05/using-canada-to-understand-ethiopian.html). Before having given up on their dream of secession, which has become impossible due to demographic changes, Quebec nationalists used to monitor public opinion polls in order to time when to call a referendum on secession. Generally speaking, when the economy was good, polls would indicate relatively low support for secession, say 35%. This would not be a good a time to call a referendum. But when the economy dipped, support for secession would pass the 50% mark, reaching 60% or so. In this situation, if the timing was right, the Quebec nationalist party would win the provincial election and soon hold a referendum. This was the political pattern in Quebec from the early to mid 1970's to a few years ago.

The interesting point here for us Ethiopian nationalists is why the support for secession would range from 35% to 60%. Who are these people that change their minds? Are they ethnic nationalists? Or ethnic nationalists one day and Canadian nationalists the next? What makes them change their minds? Is it just the economy or are there other factors.

This group of people is what I call here the soft nationalists. And you can imagine that they were the primary target of politicians on both sides of the Quebec secession debate since the hardcore ethnic nationalists and hardcore Canadian nationalists were pretty much reliable in their opinions. But whoever managed to get the soft nationalist 'swing vote' would win. You can see that the soft nationalist constituency is extremely important in the struggle between country and ethnic nationalism.

Though we have had no polls taken in Ethiopia, anecdotally we have seen the same kind of thing happen in Ethiopia in the Abiy Ahmed era. Some Oromos who only some months ago were ethnic nationalists, because of the ascendancy of Oromos such as Abiy and Lemma Megersa to political prominence, and because of their positive and empowering rhetoric, have changed positions from ethnic nationalism and moved towards Ethiopian nationalism. However, if circumstances change, these people could swing back to ethnic nationalism.

What is the mindset of soft nationalists? They like all of us identify to some degree with their ethnicity and to some degree with Ethiopianism. Various circumstances can change which identification they lean towards. For example, if the economy is good - if they are happy - they tend to prefer the status quo. If their is some sort of ethnic conflict, this will push them to identify more towards their ethnicity. If some prominent Ethiopians start spewing anti-Oromo rhetoric they will get insulted and move towards their ethnicity. If they see Oromos in positions of leadership, or if they see Afan Oromo and other aspects of their identity prominently featured in our politics and culture, they will move towards Ethiopian nationalism. This is basically how soft nationalism works - it is fluid based on various factors.

Here I will add another example from recent Ethiopian history - that of Eritrea. When Eritrea was confederated with Ethiopia, a vast majority of Eritreans happily supported this move and considered themselves Ethiopia. As various factors changed negatively, including the ending of the confederation, but most importantly the terror of the Dergue regime, the huge support for Ethiopia turned towards support for secession! What a turnaround and what a lesson, if we would learn from it.

It's clear that this soft nationalist constituency group is very important for Ethiopian nationalists in our struggle against radical ethnic nationalism and the conflict that it generates. It is important that in we focus on soft nationalists in our political discourse to ensure that they come to and remain on the side of Ethiopian nationalism and to ensure that we don't push them into the arms of ethnic nationalists. How do we do this?

1. Ensure good governance and a decent economy. The Dergue basically pushed Eritreans out by making Ethiopia an unlivable country for all. While Ethiopian nationalists react to this via civic protest, soft nationalists react to such stress by becoming more ethnic nationalist.

2. Ensure the ethnic demands of soft nationalists are addressed. Some might call this 'appeasement', I would call it political realism. For example, given at least 35% of Ethiopia's population is Oromo-speaking, making Afan Oromo an official federal language makes sense not just as appeasement but to strengthen Ethiopia.

3. Ensure diplomatic rhetoric around the issue of ethnic nationalism and avoid statements that ethnic nationalists can use to swing soft nationalists their way. For example, if someone insults or says something considered insulting about Oromos, this will be eagerly used as political fodder by the ethnic nationalists to illustrate that Ethiopian nationalists are racists and elitists. So this must be avoided at all costs. I should add here that I have found certain officials of Patriotic Ginbot 7 especially adroit at this tactic (see this article: http://asfawdarguemeshal.blogspot.com/2016/11/some-basics-on-interacting-with-ethnic.html). As an aside, during the two Quebec referendum campaigns, the ethnic nationalist side would careful monitor all statements by Canadian nationalists looking for some sort of insult or slight that they could use in their campaign. At the same time, the Canadian nationalist side would expend significant resources trying to prevent this!

So, to sum up, there is such a political phenomenon as soft nationalism. For the Ethiopian nationalist constituency and leadership, it is important to understand this and address soft nationalists concerns in order to bring them towards Ethiopian nationalism. This strategy is in my opinion a must in keeping radical ethnic nationalism at bay in Ethiopia.

Alternative Political Elite?

When the Dergue collapsed in 1991 and the EPLF, TPLF, and OLF rode into power, we feared the worst. After all, the EPLF, TPLF, and OLF were nothing but ethnic nationalist rebels – shiftas – as far as we were concerned, bent on destroying or breaking apart Ethiopia.

Now, 26 years later, Ethiopia is still alive – yes, with a lot of problems – but still alive. Even though Eritrea separated and an unadvised ethnicist constitution was enacted, Ethiopia has survived. It has survived in large part because its population, in aggregate, was and remains nationalist and patriotic enough to resist the extremes of ethnic nationalism advocated by the TPLF. The TPLF tried, like Ataturk in Turkey, to drag the population kicking and screaming towards something it did not believe in, in this case, ethnic nationalism, but this only worked somewhat. To a large extent, Ethiopianism is alive and well.

Indeed, we can say that the Ethiopian people have moderated the TPLF. Recall that in the early 1990’s, there was no such thing as a ‘narrow nationalist’ – only ‘chauvinists’. Let alone Oromos, even Tigreans were encouraged by the TPLF to identify as ‘Tigrean first and Ethiopian second’. Today there is no such thing. Much of the TPLF now sees the extreme ethnic nationalism it once espoused as an albatross around its neck.

If commendation were possible, the Ethiopian people ought to be commended for this. It is only their strong nationalism and patriotism that has averted disaster and kept the country alive. But what is remarkable is that they did all this without an elite – it was all at the grassroots level. As I said above, in 1991, the EPLF, TPLF, and OLF were the political parties with power. There was no Ethiopian nationalist or Ethiopianist elite to speak of. After all, this elite had committed a long suicide – from 1960 when Haile Selassie’s elite first began to develop suicidal impulses – to the culmination in 1991. Thus when the EPLF, TPLF, and OLF in 1991 began to discuss their future in power, there was no nationalist elite – political or military – to stand up for Ethiopia. It was left to the people – the grassroots – to keep the country alive, and this they did.

Today, still, an Ethiopianist elite is largely absent. This is not surprising – political elites cannot appear overnight – it takes years, maybe generations. Having completed its suicide by 1991, and then having been prevented from rising up since then by the EPRDF, the Ethiopian nationalist elite remains a small, sick, disabled child which has lost all connection to its ancestors.

Is this a result solely of the EPRDF repression of the opposition which we all know about? Certainly not. Were it so, the elite would have strongly manifested itself in the diaspora, outside of the reach of the EPRDF. It has not. Another piece of evidence is the Kinijit fiasco of 2007, which was caused mainly because of elite immaturity and resulting infighting within Kinijit, which was that period’s manifestation of the Ethiopianist elite.

This for me is clear evidence that it is the Ethiopian nationalist political suicide of 1960-1991 that has resulted in its demise. Therefore the idea that many have that EPRDF repression is the cause of the poor state of the Ethiopianist elite, and that if the repression would end all would be fine, is wrongheaded. It was a long and complicated demise and it will take a long and complicated course to resurrect this elite. In the meantime, much of the Ethiopian population remains hungry for nationalist leadership.

So where does this leave those of us Ethiopianists who would like positive change in Ethiopian politics? Those of us who would like a reduction in ethnic nationalism, a reduction in repression, corruption, immorality, and injustice, a platform for safely and constructively discussing and competing policies. Those of us who would like Ethiopia to, at the minimum, be governed by a government that is actually liked by the people. At least a nationalist or populist government. Where does this leave those of us who would like this?

Well, obviously the straightforward path of organizing movements and parties is out of the question. This would result in swift imprisonment and torture, and maybe even death. Since the opposition elite is weak from 50 years of suicide, it cannot hope to directly struggle its way through such repression. This is what the past 26 years of experience shows.

The only possible path is the one that is not direct – the one that involves joining the current political system – joining the EPRDF in other words – and struggling from within. Making the EPRDF itself the vehicle for change since the EPRDF is the only political institution today with the capacity to bring about change and with an experienced elite.

Impossible, the cynics say! The TPLF, representing 8% of the population, will never allow that. Actually, it is quite possible, precisely because if the 92% is only slightly competent, even the superb 8% cannot dominate it. Like Putin worked on the inside and rose all the way to President and changed Russia 180 degrees, those who want change in Ethiopia can do the same. Of course, it will require those who are as wise as serpents and innocent as doves. One has to go along with the party, slowly accumulating political capital and power along the way, not rocking the boat, so to speak, until reaching a level of power which allows him the freedom to enforce his will. At the same time, someone with a good conscience can, while obeying broad party directives, avoid perpetrating injustice and repression, and indeed even rescuing those who might be ill affected by cruel and immoral party cadres. This requires a high level of political maturity and skill – it’s a difficult task. But it remains the only way forward now. Simply waiting for divine intervention or some kind of revolt is akin to doing nothing. Or worse than that – it is waiting for a disaster that we cannot cope with.

So, in my opinion, for those who are interested in bringing positive change to Ethiopian politics, today, there is no other vehicle but the EPRDF. The alternative political elite still hasn’t recovered from 50 years of suicide – it doesn’t exist in Ethiopia nor in the diaspora nor anywhere else. Therefore, rather than beating our heads against a wall trying to do the impossible, trying to mobilize international pressure or trying to build yet another failing opposition movement, let us get in the inside and begin a slow movement of taking over the EPRDF.

The ANDM Disconnect

During and after the 2016 protests, we often heard various ANDM officials claim that one of the main causes of unrest in Amhara State was the ‘disconnect’ between ANDM the party and the people of Amhara State. The people do not consider ANDM as having come from them, as being part of them, as wanting the same things that they want, as representing them, as standing up for their interests, etc. To put it simply, ANDM and the people of Amhara State are not of one mind nor of one heart.

This diagnosis of the unrest is, in my opinion is, not only correct, but perfect – it strikes at the very heart of the matter. Politics is best when a people are, among themselves, of one mind and heart, and when a people and its leadership are of one mind and one heart. Politics is at its worst when a people are divided amongst themselves and divided from their leadership. Division is the single biggest enemy of peaceful and prosperous politics and civil life.

Note that by division I don’t mean that there should not be differences. Differing ideologies, opinions, or even interests, to some extent, are natural. There almost ought to be differing ideologies, opinions, and interests. However, a people and leadership of one mind and one heart have a level of trust and understanding that allows them to handle these differences in an agreed upon peaceful and effective manner. So the differences do not end up resulting in division! The people and their leadership realize that at the end of the day, they have to live together and that therefore their basic interests are intertwined. They have to cooperate on basic issues and must not cross certain lines that lead to division. This is what being of one heart and mind is about.

So, yes, in Amhara State, there is division between the people and their leadership. ANDM is disconnected (was never really connected in the first place) from the people of Amhara State. What’s the consequence of this disconnect? Well, in general, it’s poor governance – ineffective government, corruption, injustice, etc. But specific to Ethiopia’s current political problems, the consequence is a disproportionately weak ANDM and Amhara State, and a disproportionately weak Ethiopian nationalism.

Is this a problem for the EPRDF as a whole? What’s wrong if ANDM is weak, if Amhara State is politically weak, and if Ethiopian nationalism is weak? There are those diehard fundamentalists in the EPRDF who do not see it as a problem. Their answer to every problem and situation is to stay the course because they have been in power for 26 years and they know what they are doing! For them, the 2016 protests are just another temporary setback which will be soon forgotten. But for forward thinking members of the EPRDF, who are well aware that the EPRDF has made numerous changes over its history, the 2016 protests indicate that significant changes are required for the EPRDF to continue in power. And one of these changes is that parties other than the TPLF – such as ANDM – have to shoulder their proper share of responsibility and exercise their proper share of power.

Why can’t the TPLF go it alone, so to speak, as it has for a quarter decade so far? The reason is that it is now clear that the vanguard party developmental state (10 years old) – which today is the EPRDF’s main policy and instrument of survival – and ethnic federalism (23 years old) and are incompatible. Not only incompatible, but a combustible combination – combustible enough to blow up the EPRDF’s hold on power. The EPRDF being a TPLF-led vanguard party, in other words with the TPLF holding most of the power and the other parties such as ANDM being junior partners, cannot sustain the developmental state because the resulting ethnic resentment will be too much handle. Therefore, ANDM (and OPDO and SEPDM etc.) need to have more weight in the EPRDF, so that the EPRDF is no longer a TPLF-led front, and thereby anti-TPLF and anti-Tigrean resentment will be slowly reduced. If ANDM and the others continue to be weak and estranged from its people, anti-TPLF resentment will continue increasing and the EPRDF’s hold on power will be weakened.

In order for ANDM to carry its weight in the EPRDF, it must be reconciled with the people of Amhara State. How can this be done? The first step would be for ANDM leadership to understand and accept that their political survival requires such reconciliation. The second is to bring about reconciliation via good governance and so make good governance the focus of their (perpetual!) mandate. Wait a minute – how is this possible? Corruption and favouritism are natural to the one party developmental state. All politicians in a developmental state have to have clients and networks and patronage, otherwise they will be unable to survive. As we have seen in Ethiopia, trying to achieve good governance is always a losing battle in a one party developmental state. Actually, let alone in Ethiopia, the Chinese Communist Party has for 40 years found it impossible to deal effectively with poor governance. Given this, how can ANDM bring about good governance?

The answer is that ANDM must first realize that 1) their survival is today very tenuous; 2) reconciling with the people of Amhara State their only hope for survival; and 3) given the current political reality in Ethiopia good governance is ANDM’s only way to bring about reconciliation. ANDM has no choice – in order to survive, it must reconcile with its people, and in order to reconcile, it must bring about good governance – peace, justice, transparency, no corruption, no favouritism, and a focus on aligning policy with the interests of the public.

What will the TPLF say about this? Will it not consider an ANDM united with the people of Amhara State as a threat? Will it not interfere in Amhara State? Let me say it clearly – the TPLF does not have a choice in the matter. If ANDM reconciles with its population – or simply just makes the decision to do so – there is nothing the TPLF can do about it. Unless there are federal issues at stake, the TPLF has to leave the management of Amhara State to ANDM. If it interferes, it is going to have to literally colonize Amhara State with Tigreans, something which it has not done to date and which it will not do, since this will result in a revolt it cannot control. Note that the EPRDF had a hard time controlling the 2016 revolt even though it was as much an anti-ANDM as anti-TPLF revolt. But if ANDM is one with the population, then the EPRDF would have to give in to ANDM’s wishes.

Let me add here that even today, the TPLF is not the direct cause of corruption, favouritism, injustice, etc. in Amhara State. The TPLF’s tentacles do not and more importantly cannot directly reach the local level. To put it simply, if the administrators of, say, Debre Marqos woreda, are corrupt and inefficient and do not represent the will of the people, this is a problem between them and the people, and a problem that can be fixed between them. The administrators are not from the TPLF, neither is their security from the TPLF. In most cases the administrators and the security apparatus are neighbours and relatives of the people of Debre Marqos. I use this example to illustrate that if ANDM and the people of Amhara State have the will, it is possible for ANDM to reconcile with the people of Amhara State. There will be no interference from the TPLF.

What will be the consequence of this reconciliation? It means that ANDM will have a significant increase in its political power. That is, it will be able to mobilize its people much more effectively than it can now, and this ability to mobilize is the basis of political power. This increase in political power will mean that ANDM will no longer be a junior partner in the EPRDF relative to the TPLF. This is the key to its survival. Again, understanding that this is the key to its survival is what should motivate it to change.

Will not the TPLF resist? Of course, there will be parts of the TPLF, the old guard, who will resist, but they will be unable to. Why? The TPLF is a minority whose dominance is solely a result of their unity and the disunity of the majority. Just a slight increase in the level of unity amongst the majority is enough to overcome any resistance some factions in the TPLF may try to put up. If ANDM and the people of Amhara State are reconciled, that is, if there is unity in Amhara State, the TPLF simply can no longer dominate. And many in the TPLF know this very well. In addition, note that, as I mentioned above, there is a part of the TPLF that wants to relinquish their dominance because it understands that this dominance is the biggest source of anti-EPRDF resentment and that if this dominance continues, both the TPLF and its Tigrean constituency will be at great risk. The problem is that they don’t see any political force, include ANDM and the other junior partners in the EPRDF, that is ready to take over the power that the TPLF relinquishes. But if ANDM does its job and becomes hand and glove with the people of Amhara State, then TPLF dominance will decrease in an orderly and stable manner, and in a roundabout way the survival of the EPRDF and TPLF will be reassured.

‘One Heart’ (‘And Lb’) should become the new slogan of ANDM. Everyone at all levels should be required so sign on to this. This is the only way for ANDM to repair the disconnect with the people of Amhara State and to become one with the people. This in turn is the only way ANDM can survive. Most importantly, this is key to the survival of the Ethiopian nation.

Stop Crying About The EPRDF And Fix Ethiopia's Main Problem – The Opposition

2009/2/3 (Ethiopian calendar)

2016/10/13 (European calendar)

[Note: An Amharic version of this post will appear sometime!]

(pdf)

Let's decide once and for all: Is the EPRDF a party that represents a majority of Ethiopians? Or is the EPRDF a minority party, dominated by the TPLF, which represents a minority from the state of Tigray, along with some hangers on from other ethnic groups? Which is it?

Before answering, think about the question carefully. If we say that the EPRDF represents a majority of Ethiopians, then why do we claim that there is lack of pluralism and democracy, and that power and resources are controlled by a few? This is a contradiction. We cannot at the same time say that the EPRDF represents a majority and at the same time claim there is no democracy.

How about the second answer – if we answer that yes, the EPRDF is indeed a minority party – a tiny minority party at that? Then we are admitting that we are being ruled and have been ruled by a tiny minority for 25 years. But this again raises a contradiction – a contradiction with the usual opposition (by opposition I mean not only political parties but media, organizations, individuals, etc.) rhetoric. After all a tiny minority cannot rule without the consent of the large majority it's ruling. This is even more the case when the minority rule is primarily ethnic based. It is this consent that keeps the EPRDF in power – absent this consent, the EPRDF would fall. So whose responsibility is it that the EPRDF rules Ethiopia – the minority rulers or the majority consentors? And who is it that can end EPRDF rule? The answer is obvious – it is the majority. Yet opposition rhetoric is solely focused on the evils of the minority EPRDF! This is the contradiction. The problem is with the majority, yet we talk about the minority.

So the fact is that yes, the EPRDF is a minority party, and yes, responsibility for its rule lies fully in the hands of the majority which has agreed to be ruled by it. To put it bluntly, Ethiopia's problems today are not the fault of the EPRDF, but the fault of the Ethiopian people and elites which have enabled the EPRDF's rule. And if we are seeking a solution to the problems, our focus should be on what we can change – the attitudes and abilities of the majority – rather than what we cannot change – the EPRDF.

I understand that this fact, even after 25 years, remains difficult for those of us who oppose the EPRDF to accept, let alone discuss. Only a few have talked about it in the past and a few make mention of it today, if only in passing. And it is precisely because we refuse to address it, instead spending all our ink, time, and airtime on the EPRDF's evils, that the EPRDF still rules.

At this point, let me digress... I am afraid that there are still many who still believe that somehow it is the awesome might, cruelty, and ingenuity of the EPRDF that has led to majority consent. How the might, cruelty, and ingenuity of 6% or even 10% beats 90% is beyond me, but let me remind them of the following brief facts. In all government institutions, members of the TPLF are a small minority. Outside Tigray, almost all the governing is done by non-TPLF members, and even the TPLF 'minders' are few in number. The EPRDF is majority non-TPLF. Even the military and federal police, and this is a fact, is composed of a large majority of non-Tigreans. To put it simply, the ones with the guns are not Tigreans, only the leadership is overwhelmingly TPLF. Note that if only rank and file soldiers decided to stop following orders, the EPRDF would lose power instantly. Even the security apparatus, which we assume has proportionately many more TPLF members, would not be able to do anything once the military ceases to be an EPRDF tool.

A second digression, to address those who are still stuck in the thinking that the opposition elites are weak because of EPRDF oppression. Is the diaspora opposition also weak because of EPRDF oppression?! Are the historical problems with the AAPO/AEUP, Kinijit, Andinet, Medrek, not to mention various Oromo ethno-nationalist groups. because of EPRDF pressure? Everyone knows the answer is no. That opposition elites have been weak for the last 25 years and remain weak is of our own doing. We and only we are responsible, and the solution for the weakness can come only from us.

So I propose that those of us who are really interested in bringing an end to EPRDF rule as it is rather than just venting their anger start spending more of our time, dare I say all our time, focusing on the problem of majority consent to EPRDF rule and what can be done about it.

I understand this is a complicated problem. A lot of issues, not least of which the ethnic divide, have to be frankly discussed. There has to be investment in raising social and political awareness. Given the EPRDF's zero political space policy, this work has to be done in various non-political contexts, in various institutions, and in a clandestine or seamless manner. It's long, slow, and non-glamourous work. It's not as easy as simply heaping blame on the EPRDF and looking for the next protest on which to hang our hopes. But it's the only way to go.

I would like to end with a note of urgency. As many commentators have noted, we have a grassroots uprising today with little coordination and little elite input. Frankly speaking, given the absence of a solid opposition elite, the political situation a few years ago, with the EPRDF in firm control, was far less risky for the country than what we have today. Today, there is a chance that the protests could result in upheaval and anarchy, and this in the absence of a solid opposition elite. The consequences of such anarchy would be terrible. For this reason, I urge all of us to get our act together, focus on the right problem, and work on the solution.

የአማራ የፖለቲካ ንቅናቄ ለኢትዮጵያ ህልውና እጅግ አስፈላጊ ነው

2009/1/12 ዓ.ም. (2016/9/22)

ከተለያዩ ጽሁፎች እንደጠቀስኩት ለላእፉት 25 ዓመታት የኢትዮጵያ ፖለቲካ ኢሚዛናዊ ሆኗል። በ1983 ኢህአዴግ ስልጣን ሲይዝ የኢትዮጵያ ብሄርተኛ (Ethiopian nationalist) የፖለቲካ መሪዎች ለ40 ዓመታት እርስበርስ በመፋጀት እራሳቸውን ጦራቸውንም አጥፍተው ነበር። ስለዚህ የሀገሪቷ ህገ መንግስት የተቋቋመው ሀገሪቷም የተስተዳደረችው በጎሳ ብሄርተኛ (ethnic nationalist) የሆኑ ፖለቲከኞች ነው። የፖለቲካ ኃይል በጠቅላላ በጎሳ ብሄርተኝነት እጅ ነው።

በዚህ ምክንያት በርካታ የሆነው የሀገር ብሄርተኛ ህብረተሰብ በፖለቲካ ዙርያ አልተወከለም። ለዚህ ነው የኢትዮጵያ ፖለቲካ ኢሚዛናዊ ነው ማለት የሚቻለው፤ የጎሳ ብሄርተኞች ከመጠን በላይ ውክልናና ድምጽ አላቸው ርዓዮት ዓለማቸውንም ያራምዳሉ፤ የኢትዮጵያ ብሄርተኞች ግን አልተወከሉምም ድምጻቸውም የሚገባው ያህል አይሰማም። ይህ ሁኔታ ነው ዛሬ በኢትዮጵያ የሚታየውን ከፍተኛ ጎሰኝነትና ዘረኝነት ያመጣው።

ጎሰኝነቱ ለሀገሪቷ ህልውና እጅግ አደገኛ መሆኑ ዛሬ ግልጽ ሆኗል። ለዚህ ያለን አንዱ ከባድ መረጃ የጎሳ ብሄርተኛው ፓርቲ ኢህአዴግን ምን ያህል በሁኔታው መስጋቱ ነው። ከኢህአዴግ አመራር መካከል ጎሰኝነት በሀገሪቷ ፖለቲካ በዝቶ ለስልጣናችንም አስጊ ስለሆነ ፓርቲያችንን ወደ አንድ የሆነ በጎሳ ያልተከፋፈለ ፓርቲ (ብአዴን ህውሃት ኦህዴድ ቅርቶ ማለት ነው) እንቀይር እያሉ ይገኛሉ። ሀገሪቷን ከዚህ አደጋ ለማውጣት የኢትዮጵያ ብሄርተኛ ጎራ የፖለቲካ ድርሻውን በድፍረት (ከ25 ዓመታት እንቅልፍ በኋላ) መውሰድ አለበት።

እሺ ማን ናቸው የኢትዮጵያ ብሄርተኞቹ? ባሁኑ ዘመን ከበየ ክልሉ ቢገኙም በርካታዎቹ ከጎሳዊ ውህደት ያለበት ስፍራዎች እንደ አዲስ አበባና ሌሎች ትላልቅ ከተማዎች ይገኛሉ። በክልል ደረጃ ደግሞ ጠቅላላው የአማራ ክልል የሀገር ብሄርተኛ ነው። ይህንን እውነታ በምርጫ 1997 ቅንጅት ያሸነፈበት ቦታዎች መረዳት እንችላለን። ለማስተዋስ ያህል ኢህአዴግና ህብረት የጎሳ ብሄርተኝነት የሚበዛበት ቦታዎችን አሸነፉ፤ ቅንጅት ደግሞ የኢትዮጵያ ብሄርተኝነት የሚበዛበትን ቦታዎች አሸነፈ።

የሚቀጥለው ጥያቄ እንዴንት ነው ይህ ከሀገር ፖለቲካ የጠፋው የሀገር ብሄርተኛ ጎራ የሚገባውን ፖለቲካዊ ድርሻ መያዝ የሚችለው። በመጀመርያ ከታች ከመላው ህብረተሰብ (grassroots) ጀምሮ የአንድነትና የአንድ አላማ መንፈስ ልያድርበት ይገባል። ይህ ለማንኛውም ስኬት ቀድመ ሁኔታ ነው! ሰውው እንደዚህ «አንድ ልብ» ሲሆን ነው የፖለቲካ እርምጃዎች መውሰድ የሚችለው። በዛሬው የኢትዮጵያ የፖለቲካ ሁኔታ ህብረተሰቡ ማድረግ የሚችለው እንደነዚህ አይነት ነገሮች ነው፤ በተለያዩ መዋቅሮች (የመንግስት መስሪያቤቶች፤ የሰራተኛ መሐበራት፤ የገበያ መሐበራት፤ የተቃራኒ የፖለቲካ ፓርቲዎች እንደ ኢህአዴግ፤ ወዘተ) ስርጎ መግባትና መቆጣጠር፤ የእምቢተኝነት እንቅስቃሴዎች፤ ሰላማዊ ሰልፎች፤ ወዘተ።

የኢትዮጵያ ብሄርተኞች እነዚህን እርምጃዎች ማካሄድ ይችላሉ ወይ? እንደ አዲስ አበባና ሌሎች ከተማዎች የተለያዩ አይነት ሰዎች ስለሚኖሩባቸው፤ ከተማ በመሆኑ የመሐበራዊ ኑሮ ውስን ስለሆነ፤ ሰውዉ በደምብ ስለማይተዋወቅ፤ የመንግስት ደህንነት አትኩሮ ስለሚከታተላቸው፤ ወዘተ እንድዚህ አይነት ስራዎች ለማኮናሆን ከባድ ነው።

በአማራ ክልል ግን እነዚህ ችግሮች የሉም ወይም ያንሳሉ። ህዝቡ ባብዛኛው ለትውልድ የሚተዋወቅ ነው፤ አብዛኛውም ከገጠር ነው የሚኖረው። በደህንነት በኩልም መንግስት ብዙ አማራጭ የለውም። ኢህአዴግ በሀገሩ በአማራ ደህንነቶች ልቆጣጠር ካለ ይከዱታል። አንድ ልብ ማለት ይህ ነው፤ የገዛ ወንድሙንና ዘመዱን አያጠቃም። ከማጥቃት ፋንታ ለአዲስ አበባ ላሉት አዛዦቹ እያስመሰለም ቢሆን ከሀገሩ ህብረተሰብ ዘመዱ ጋር ይቆማል። ደህንነት አስፈጻሚዎቹን ከውጭ ክልሎች ላምጣ ከለ ደግሞ መንግስትን የሚያናጋ ጠባሳ የሚያመጣ የጎሳ ጦርነትን ይጋበዛል። ስለዚህ ህዝቡ ከተባበረ ከተማመነም «አንድ ልብ» ከሆነም ከሃዲዎቹም ውስን ከሆኑ የመንግስት ደህንነት ምንም ማድረግ አይችልም። በዚህ ምክንያቶች የአማራ ንቅናቄ ስኬታማ መሆን እድሉ ከፍ ያለ ነው።

የአማራ ንቅናቄ ተሳካ ማለት ደግሞ የኢትዮጵያ ብሄርተኞች የፖለቲካ ኃይል በሚገባው ጨመረ ማለት ነው። ከሀገሪቷ ሁለቱ ትላልቅ ክልሎች አንዱ ከጎሳ ብሄርተኛው ኢህአዴግ እጅ ወጣ ማለት ነው። ስኬቱም እንደ አዲስ አበባ አይነቱን የኢትዮጵያ ብሄርተኛ የሚበዛበት ቦታዎች እንዲነሱ ይገፋፋል። ቅድም እንደጠቀስኩት ደግሞ ይህ የሀገር ብሄርተኛ ኃይል ሲጨምር የሀገሪቷን እሚዛናዊ የሆነውን የፖለቲካ ሁኔታ ወደ መስተካከል ይመራዋል። የጎሳ ፖለቲካ ያስፋፋውን ለሀገሪቷ አስጊ የሆኑትን ጎሰኝነትና ዘረኝነትንም እንድንቆጣጠርና እንድንቅንስ በሩን ይከፍታል። ባጭሩ ቢዝህ ምክንያት ነው የአማራ የፖለቲካ ንቅናቄ ለኢትዮጵያ ህልውና እጅግ አስፈላጊ የሆነው።

የአማራ የፖለቲካ ንቅናቄ ለኢትዮጵያ ህልውና እጅግ አስፈላጊ ነው (pdf)

«ወያኔ» እኛው የወለድነው ልጅ እንደሆነ አንካድ!

2009/1/11 ዓ.ም. (2016/9/21)

የጽሁፎቼ ሁሉ ዋና አላማ ለኢትዮጵያ ችግሮች ከኢትዮጵያዊ ብሄርተኝነት አኳያ መፍትሄ ለማጋኘት ነው። ስሜት ለማተንፈስ፤ ለመሳደብ፤ በባዶ ቤት ለመዛት ወይም ለመለመን አይደለም። መፍትሄ መፍትሄ መፍትሄ ነው አላማዬ። የአንድ ችግር መፍትሄ ለማግኘት ደግሞ ምንጩን ማወቅ ግድ ነው። ምንጩን ካወቅን መፍትሄው ይመጣል።

«ወያኔ» እኛው ሀገር ወዳድ ነን የምንለው ኢትዮጵያዊ ብሄርተኞች የወለድነው ልጅ እንደሆነ ከገባን ምን ስህተሀቶች አድርገን ልጃችን እንደዚህ እንደሆነም እነዚህንም ስህተቶች እንዴት በመአረም የኢትዮጵያ ጠክላላ የፖለቲካና መሐበራዊ ችግሮችን እንዴት መፍታት እንደምንችል እንረዳለን።

የኢትዮጵያ ዋና የፖለቲካ ችግርን በቀላሉ ማስቀመጥ ይቻላል፤ ያለው መንግስት በቂ ኢትዮጵያዊያንን አይወክልምም መላው ህብረተሰቡም በአንድ ሀገራዊ ውል (የሀገሪቷ ፖለቲካ ምን መምሰል እንዳለበት – social contract) አልተስማማምም።

ሁላችንም እንደምናውቀው ኢህአዴግ በህወሃት ትጽዕኖ የሚገዛ ድርጅት ነው። ርዓዮት ዓለሙም በጎሳ ብሄርተኝነት የተመሰረተ ነው። ከዚህ «ስዕል» ማን ነው የሚጎለው? ወይም ከሀገራችን ፖለቲካ የትኛው በርካታ ህዝብ የሚወክል ጎራ ነው የጠፋው? ኢትዮጵያዊ ብሄርተኛ ነኝ የሚለው ጎራ ነው የጠፋው። እንዴት እንደዚህ አይነት አገዛዝ በኢትዮጵያ ሊሰፍን ቻለ?! ከሌሎች ጽሁፎች እንደጠቀስኩት የኢትዮጵያ ብሄርተኞች በኃይለ ስላሴም በደርግም ዘመን የራስ ማጥፋት ዘመቻ ስላካሄዱ ነው። የኃይለ ስላሴ መንግስት እንደ መሬት ለአራሹ አይነት አስፈላጊ ለውጦች ባለማድረግና በኢትዮጵያዊነት ፋንታ ዘመናዊነትን እከተላለሁ ብሎ ሀገር አፍራሽ የሆነ የተማሪ ንቅናቄ የሚባል ትውለድ አፈራ። ደርግን ሻእብያን ህወሃያትን ኦነግን ኢህአፓ ወዘተ አፈራ። 1983 ሲደርስ እራሱን በደምብ አጥፍቶ የኢትዮጵያ ፖለቲካ የገዢ ወገን በጎሳ ብሄርተኛ ብቻ ሞልቶ ቀረ። ለዚህ ነው ዛሬ ያለነው ሁኔታ የተፈጠረው እንደዚህም ነው ህወሃት ተፈጥሮ ያደገው።

ላለን ችግር ታድያ ምክንያቱ በመጀመርያ ህወሃት ነው? በፍጹም። ህወሃትም ኢህአዴግም እኛ በቀደድንላቸው ግዙፍ ቀዳዳ ባላቸው የመንፈስና የጭንቅላት አቅም የሚችሉትን እያደረጉ ነው። ከነሱ እስከ ዛሬ ያደረጉት በላይ መጠየቁ አግባብ አይደለም።

እስቲ ስሜታዊ ሳንሆን ተረጋግተን እናስበው፤ ኢህአዴግ ኢትዮጵያን እገዘዋለሁ ብሎ በፍጹም አስቦ አያውቅም። ኃይላችን ውስን ነው፤ የመኻል ሀገር መንግስቱ በርካታ ኃይልና አቅም አለው፤ ብሎ እንኳን ህወሃት ከሱ ጠንካራውም ሸአብያ ደርግን ከማሸነፍ ድርድርን በበር የሚያስበው። ህወሃት አሸንፎ ሙሉ ሀገሪቷን ሲገዙ ዱብዳ ነው የሆነባቸው።

በተፈጥሮ ትዕቢትን ይጨምራል። ኢህአዴግ ደግሞ እንደ ዳዊት ታላቁን ኃይለኛ ጎሊያድን ያሸነፈ ስለመሰለው ይበልጥ ኩራትና በራስ መተማመን አደረበት። ይህን ግብ መምታት መቻሌ ድርጊቴ በሙሉ ትክክል ነው ማለት ነው ብሎ ማሰብ ጀመረ። እራሱንም ከሌሎች ድርጅቶች በሙሉ ልዩ ጎበዝና የበላይ አድርጎ ማሰብ ጀመረ። ህወሃት በዚህ መንፈስ ነው በ1983 ስልጣን የያዘው።

ከዛ ቀጥሎ ስልጣኑን በሚያረጋግጥበት ሰሞን ተቀናቃኞቹ አንድ በአንድ ሲፈርሱ አየ። ኦነግን በቀላሉ አሸነፈ። ኢህአፓም ሌሎችም እንደዚሁ። የኢትዮጵያዊ ብሄርተኛ የፖለቲካ ጎራ ደግሞ ጭራሽ ምንም ኃይል ስላልነበረው ኢህአዴግ ምንም ማድረግ አላስፈለገውም።

በተዘዋዋሪ የኢትዮጵያዊ ብሄርተኝነት የፖለቲካ ጎራ በዛን ጊዜ ኃይል ማጣቱ ኢህአዴግን እጅግ የተሳሳተ ድምዳሜ ላይ እንዲደርስ አድርጎታል። ኃይል ስላጣ ከጥቂት የሆኑ የተማሩ ወገኖች በስተቀር ይህ ጎራ ከህብረተሰቡ ምንም ድጋፍ የለውም ብሎ ኢህአዴግ ገመተ። የቀዝቃዛ ጦርነት፤ የደርግ የኮሙኒስት አቋም፤ የኤኮኖሜው መበላሸት፤ ወዘተ እንደ ምክንያት ሳይቆጠር ደርግ መሸነፉ ኢትዮጵያ ብሄርተኝነት እንደተሸነፈም ብሀገሪቷም እንደማይፈለግ ተቆጠረ። ይህ ታልቅ ስህተት መሆኑን ኢህአዴግ በየጊዜው እየገባው ሄዷል።

ዞሮ ዞሮ ኢህአዴግ ሀገሪቷን ተቆጣጠረ። ማንም አልተፎካከረውም። ትዕቢቱም እየጨመረ ሄደ!

ኢህአዴግ ስልጣኑን ካረጋገጠ በኋላ ህዝቡ አልፎ አልፎ መንግስት ላይ መነሳት ጀመረ። ኢህአዴግ ሁሉንም አይነት አመጽ (ለምሳሌ የ1986ና የ1993) በቀላሉ ተቆጣጠረ። ትዕቢቱ መጨመሩ ቀጠለ።

በዚህ ጊዜም አንዳንድ ተቃዋሚ ድርጅቶች ቢያንስ መንግስትን ለመተቸት ያህል ይበቁ ነበር። ግን እርስ በርስ ሲጣሉና በትንሽ ግፊት ሲፈርሱ ሲያይ የኢህአዴግ ትዕቢት ማየል ቀጠለ።

ከዛ ቀጥሎ የኤርትራ ጦርነት ተነሳ። ኢህአዴግ ይሄንንም ፈተና እንደ ድርጅት ቆስሎም ቢሆን 70,000 በላይ ወታደር ሞቶም ቢሆን አሸነፈ። የሚፈራውን ታላቅ ወንድሙን በማሸነፉ የዝቅተኛ መንፈሳቸውን አስወገዱ። ኢትዮጵያንም ለብቻው ተቆጣጠረ! ትዕቢቱም ጨመረ። እኛ ኢትዮጵያዊ ብሄርተኞች ከዳር ሆነን አጨበጨብን።

አምስት ዓመት በኋላ ኢህአዴግ የምርጫ 1997 ፈተና አጋጠመው። ፈተናው እጅግ ከባድ ቢሆንም በመጨረሻ ኢህአዴግ ያለውን የተቃዋሚ ጎር ድራሹን አጥፍቶም የሀገሪቷን ኤኮኖሚ ክፍ አድርጎ ተቃውሞን ገደለው። ለዚህ ሁሉ ድል እራሱን ለመሸለም ያህል የ2007 ምርጫን መቶ በመቶ እንዲያሸንፍ አደረገ። ትዕቢቱ ናረ!

ይህንን ታሪክ ስንመለከት እኛ የኢትዮጵያ ብሄርተኞች ህወሃትን እንደፈጠርነው፤ አጣመን እንዳሳደግነው፤ ጥሩ ምሳሌ ባለመሆናችን እንዲክደን ያደረግነው፤ እራሳችንን በማጥፋት ልቅ እንዳደረግነው ሁሉ ማመን አለብን። ኢትዮጵያ በኛ እጅ ሆና ደጋግመን ተሳሳትን አጠፋን ጨኮንንም አበላሸንም። ለእነ ህወሃት መንገዱን ጨርቅ አደረግንላቸው።

ስልጣን ከያዙም በሗል ጠፋንባቸው። እርስ በርስ ያለመተባበርም የመጠራጠርም ብሽታ ይዞን እነሱን የሚፎካከር የፖለቲካና ህዝባዊ ኃይል መዋቀር አልቻልንም። ይህም ኢህአዴግ የተሳሳተ መንገዱን እንዲቀጥል ረዳው ብቻ ሳይሆን አስገደደውምም ማለት ይቻላል። አንድ ድርጅት እራሱን ለማስተካከል ሃሳብ ብቻ ሳይሆን ተግባራው ምክንያት (incentive) ያስፈልገዋ። ኢህአዴግም የሚቀናቀነው ኃይል ፊቱ ቢቆም ኖሮ የተሻለ ሃሳብን እንዲያሰላስል ይገደድ ነበር። እኛ የኢትዮጵያዊ ብሄርተኞች ግን ይሄንን ትንሽ ግዴታችንንም አላሟላንም።

ታድያ ሀገራችን የፖለቲካ ችግር ምንጭ ዬት ነው? ከኛ ከኢትዮጵያዊ ብሄርተኞች ነው። መፍትሄውም ከኛ ነው። ኢህአዴግን መክሰስም መፍትሄ ከሱ መጠበቅም ዋጋ ዬለውም። እኛ ነን ችግሩን ያመጣነው እኛም ነን የምንፈታው። ከፈታነው በኋላ ልጆችንን «ወያኔን» ይቅርጣ እንጠይቀዋለንም።

«ወያኔ እኛው የወለድነው ልጅ እንደሆነ አንካድ! (pdf)

ፑቲኖቻችን የት አሉ?

2008/12/6 ዓ.ም. (2016/8/12)

የሶቪዬት ህብረት ከወደቀ ብኋላ ምእራቡ ዓለም በተለይ አሜሪካ ሩሲያኖችን እንረዳችኋለን፤ ኤኮኖሚአችሁ እንዲታደስና እንዲያድግ እንረዳችኋለን፤ ወደ ዓለም ኤኮኖሚ በቀላሉ እንድትቀላቀሉ እናደርጋለን፤ የቀዝቃዛ ጦርንነትን ለማፍረስ ስለተባበራችሁን ሩሲያ በጠቅላላ እንድትበለጽግ እናደርጋለን ብለው ቃላቸውን ሰጡ። ነገር ግን ቃላቸውን አጥፈው በሩሲያ ሀገር አፍራሽና ህዝብ ጎጂ የሆነ አመራርና መርህ በሀገሪቷ እንዲሰፍን ገፋፉ። በዚህ ምክንያት የሩሲያ ህዝብ የአስር ዓመት በላይ የስቃይ ዘመን አሳለፈ። ስቃይ ስል ህዝቡ ደህይቶ የሚበላውን ያጣበት፤ ወንጀልና ሽብርተኝነት የሰፈነበት፤ ህዝቡ ጤና አጥቶ የአማካኝ የህይወት እድሜ ከ70 ወደ60 የወረደበት፤ ሙስናና የማፊያ (ትብብር ወንጀል) ሥረዓት የሞላበት ሀገር ሆና ነበር ሩሲያ።

በዚህ የሩሲያ ስቃይ ዘመን የሀገሪቷ መሪ ፕሬዚደንት ቦሪስ ዬልትሲን ነበሩ። በ1991ዓ.ም. ከስልጣን በፈቃዳቸው ወረዱና ምክትላቸውን ቨላዲሚር ፑቲንን ፕሬዚደንት እንዲሆን ወከሉ። የዬልትሲን ደጋፊዎች የሆኑት በመንግስት አመራር ውስጥ የነበሩት ትላልቅ ባለ ሀብቶች የውጭ ሀገር «ንጂኦ» አንቀሳቃሾች የምዕራብ ሀገር መንግስታት ሁሉም ፑቲን በአስተሳብም በርዕዮት ዓለምም በእምነትም የዬልትሲን ተቃራኒ እንደሆነ ዓገር ወዳጅ እንደሆነ አልጠረጠሩም ነበር! በኢትዮጵያ ሁናቴ ለማምሳሰል ያህል መለስ ዜናዊ ይልቃል ጌትነትን ወይም ሌላ ተቃዋሚ ሾሙ እንደማለት ነው!

ይህ እንዴት ሊሆን ቻለ? እንዴት ዬልትሲንና ዙሪያቸው ያሉት መሪዎች ደጋፊዎች ባለሟሎችና የውጭ ሀገር መንግስታት የፑቲንን የእውነት ባህሪና አቋም አላወቁም? ምክንያቱ ቀላል ነው፤ ፑቲን እራሱን አላገለጠም። ማንነቱን በሚያስፈልገው መጠን ሰውሮ ነበር። ይልቁኑ በዬልትሲን መንግስት በተለያየ ቦታዎች ሲያገለግል ጎልማሳው ፑቲን በታታሪነትና በዓለቃን ማክበርና በተለይ ለዓለቃ ያለው ታማኝነት ነበር የሚታወቀው። ከአመራር ወስጥ ያሉትና ከየሀገሩ ገዥ የነበሩት ባለሃብቶች («የሩሲያ ቢሊዮኔሮች» የተባሉት) በደምብ ይግባባ ነበር። ከመጠን በላይ ብልጥም ፖሊቲካ የገባውም ነበር። በፍጹም አልተጠረጠረም!

ቨላዲሚር ፑቲን ፕሬዚደንትም ሲሆኑ የእውነት አቋሞቻቸውን ወድያው አላሳዩም። በመጀመርያ ስልጣናቸውን ቀስ በቀስ አጠናከሩ። ጓደኛ እንጂ ጠላት የማያፈራ መርህዎችን አራመዱ። አሸባሪዮችን አጠቁና የጦርሰራዊት የፖሊስና የጸጥታ ኃይሎችን ድጋፍ አረጋገጡ። ከምዕራብ ሀገሮች ጋር በጸረ ሽብርተኝነት ሩሲያ በደምብ እንድትተባር አደረጉና የምዕራብ መንግስታትንም ድጋፍ አገኙ። ከዚያ ቆይተው ፑቲን ስልጣናቸውን ካረጋገጡ በኋላ በዬልትሲን ዘመን በዝርፍያና በሙስና ያደጉት ባለሀብቶችን በማሳሰር በማሳመን ስልጣናቸውን ነጠቁ አጠፉ። እነዚህ እርምጃዎች የፑቲንን የህዝብ ድጋፍ መጠን በጣም እንዲልቅ አደረጉ (ስልጣን ከያዙ ጅምሮ ከ65 እስቀ 80 በመቶ ድጋር አላቸው)።

ከዬልትሲን ወደ ፑቲን የተካሄደው የሩሲያ ለውጥ ከሞላ ጎደል ሰላማዊ ነበር። እንዲሁም በኢትዮጵያ የሚፈለገው ሰላማዊ፤ ማንም የማይጠቃበት፤ ሀገር የማይረበሽበት፤ ጥላቻ የማይሰፍንበት፤ ቅራኔ የምያሳንስና መግባባት ለዘብተኝነት መቻቻል የምያጠቃልል ለውጥ ነው።

እንደዚህ አይነት ለውጥ የሚመጣው ከዓብዮት ሳይሆን ከውስጣዊ ቀስ በቀስ የሚመጣ ለውጥ ነው። ለንደዚህ አይነት ለውት የነባር መንግስት ውስጥ በርካታ የለውጥ አጋሮች ያስፈልጋሉ፦ ፑቲኖች ያስፈልጋሉ! ሥርዓቱ ሲናጋ ውግያና ሁከት ለማምጣት ወደኋላ የማይሉ አክራሪዮች ስልጣን እንድይዙ ውይም በውሳኔ ላይ እንዲያመዝኑ ያደርጋል። ይህ እንዳይከሰት እነዚህ የውስጥ ለውጥ የሚፈልጉ ለዘብተኛ የሆኑት አስፈላጊ ናቸው። አክራሪውም በለዘብተኛው እንደተከበበ ሲያይ ግድ ይመለሳል።

ነገር ግን እንደዚህ ሰርጎ ገብተው የሚያገለግሉ ሰዎች የራሳቸውን ህልውና ለመጠበቅና ይበልጥ ረጅም አላማቸው እንዳይከሽፍ ብለው እራሳቸውን መደበቅ አለባቸው። እዚህ ላይ ብልጠት ያስፈልጋል። መሪዎቻቸውን መምሰል አለባቸው። አለጊዘው ስልጣናቸውና የስልጣን ድራቸውን በቂ ሳያስፋፉ ሳያጠነክሩ ጠንካራ አቋም መውሰድ የለባቸውም። እንደ ፑቲን ስያስፈልግ አንገታቸውን ደፍተው መኖር አለእባቸው። «እንደ እባብ ብልዖች እንደ ርግብ የዋሃን ሁኑ» ውይም «ዛሬ ህይወትን ካጡ ወደፊት መታግል አይቻልም» እንደሚባለው።

በዚህ ጊዜ ብዙሐናም «ተቃዋሚዎች»ም ብልህ መሆን አለባቸው። ከውስጥ የስውር ጠቃዎሚዎች በይፋ እየተሟገቱ በስውር መተባበር አለባቸው። አንድ ነገር ማስታወስ አለብን፤ ዋናው የኢትዮጵያ ፖሊቲካ ችግር የተሳትፎ ጉዳይ ነው። ህዝቡ መሪውን ሲጠላ ከመንግስት ወስጥ ከመሳተፍ ይርቃል። «ፖለቲካና ኮሬንቲ» የሚባለው ስሜት ያመዝናል። ይህ ማለት በርካታ የኢትዮጵያ ህዝብ ወገኑን ውይም የሃሳብ አጋሩን ከመንግስት ወስጥ የለም። በታችኞቹ የመንግስት አካሎችም እንደ ቀበሌና ወረዳ ለመሳትፍ አይፈልግም ቤተሰቡም ዘመዱም እንዲሳተፍ አይፈልግም። መንግስትን «ለሌሎች» ትቶት በብአድ እየተገዛ ነው። ይህ አስተሳሰብ ተገቢ የሆነ የታሪክ ምክንያት ቢኖረውም ትክክል አይደለምም እጅግ ጎጂም ነው። አለመሳተፍ አክራሪነትንና ዓብዮትን የሚጋብዝ ለዘብትኘትና ትብብርን ቦታ የሚያሳጣ አስተሳሰብ ነው።

«እንዴት ኢህአዴግ ውስጥ መስራት ይቻላል፤ ሕሊናን መሸጥ ወይም ጥቃትን መቀበል ያስፈልጋል» ሊባል ይችላል። ታድያ በሰሞኑን የጎንደር ተቃውሞ ላይ የኃይል እርምጃ እንዳይወሰድ ያደረጉት ማን ናቸው? አልፎ ተርፎ በኢትዮጵያ ጦር ሰራዊት ወስጥ ያሉት በዝቅተኛ የስልጣን ደረጃ ያሉት ወታደሮች በአብዛኛው ማናቸው ከየት ናቸውም? በየቀበለውና ወረዳ የሚያስተዳደሩት (ከትግራይ ክልል በስተቀር) ማናቸው? የታወቀው ኢህአዴግን ለቆ የወጣው ኤርሚያስ ለገሰ ማን ነው? አምባሳደር ሆኖ በግዞት ወደ ቱርኪ የተላኩት አቶ አያሌው ጎበዜ ማን ናቸው? ለነገሩ ኃይለ ማርያም ደሳለኝ ማናቸው? እነዚህ በሙሉ የለውጥ አጋሮች ወይም ሁኔታዎች ሲፈቅዱ የለውጥ አጋሮች ሊሆኑ የሚችሉ ናቸው!

መርሳት የለለብን የኢህአዴግ መንግስት የአናሳ መንግስት እንደሆነ ነው (በዚህ ካልተስማማን የህዝበ ድጋፍ አላቸው ብለን አመንን ማለት ነው!)። ኢህአዴግ መላ የኢትዮጵያን ህዝብን እንወክላለን ባይ ነው ግን ተቃዋሚዎችና በርካታ ህዝብ የትግራይ መንግስት ነው ብሎ ይከሰዋል። አናሳ ነው ብለን ከተቀበልን ማውቅ ያለብን አናሳ መንግስት ሀገርን መግዛት የሚችለው ሌላው ህዝብ ከፈቀደለትና በደምብ ከተባበረው ብቻ ነው! ኢህአዴግ እንደ ደርግ አለብልሃት በመጭፍለቅ ብቻ መግዛት አይችልም። ኢህአዴግ የሌላው አለመተባበር ውይም ከፖሊቲካ መራቅ ውይም በፈቃደኝነት መገዛት ያስፈልገዋል። ይህ ውነታን በግልፅ የሚያንጸባርቀው ኢህአዴግ ፓርቲውም ጦርሰራዊቱም በቁጥር ደረጃ በአብዛኛው የትግርኛ ተናጋሪ አለመሆኑ ነው።

ስለዚህ ኢህአዴግ ውስጥ ገብቶ ወዲያው ሳይሆን ከስ ብሎ ልውጥ ማምጣት ካልሆነም የለውጥ አጋር መሆን እንደሚቻል ግልፅ ነው። ህዝቡ ይግባ፤ ይሳተፍ፤ ሲያስፈልግ አንገቱን ደፍቶ እሺ ይበል፤ ቀስ ብሎ በስልጥ አብዛኛነትን ያረጋግጥና ጊዘው ሲደርስ ለውጥ ያመጣል።

ከፑቲን የምንማረው ትምህርት የህ ነው። ፑቲን ለዬልትሲን መንግስት ሲያገለግል ብቸኛ የውስጥ ተቃዋሚ አልነበሩም ሊሆኑም አይችሉም ነበር። ፕሪዚደንት ፑቲን ሲሾሙ እንድርሱ አንገታቸውን ደፍተው የመትፎ አገዛዙን ውስጥ ለውስጥ የሚሸረሽሩ ሀገር ወዳድ ይሆኑ ትናንሽ ፑቲኖች አብረው ተነሱና ፑቲንን ደግፈው አላማቸውን አራመዱ። ፑቲን ብቻቸውን ቢሆኑና የሳቸውን አላማ የሚደግፍ ከሥርዓቱ ውስጥ ባይኖሩ የትም አይደርስም ነበር።

በተዘዋዋሪ በሰሞኑ በአማራ ክልል በተካሄደው ተቃውሞ ሰልፎች ምክንያት አንዳንድ የህወሓት ተንታኒዎች ብአዴን በሰላይዎችና በከሃዲውች የተሞላ ነውና ጽዳት (በሌላ ቃል እስራና ግድያ) ያስፈልገዋል ብለው ይተቻሉ! ውነት ነው ህወሓት ለ26 ዓመት በመግዛቱ በፖሊቲካ ስልጥ ከሌላው ልቋልና እንደዚህ አይነት ነገር ቶሎ ነው የሚገባው። ሌላውም ሊገባው ይገባል።

መጀመርያ የታተመው ከዚህ