Overtures to the TPLF

Some Amhara nationalists, in the wake of a perceived rise in the power of Oromo nationalism, are making overtures to the TPLF or 'Tigray' for a possible alliance to combat Oromo nationalism. I'm sorry, but this is the height of silliness! It simply repeats our decades long practice of negative-sum politics, as disastrous in the long-term as it is appealing in the short.

First, those who support citizenship federalism should not need the TPLF or anyone else to combat ethnic nationalism. The very fact that some think they need the help illustrates the fundamental problem - the lack of a large and powerful citizenship politics organization. If we had a coherent movement concomitant to our grassroots support, then we would have easily come to a favourable agreement with ethnic nationalists. But our lack of tangible political power makes us flail around looking for help anywhere we can get it, thereby repeatedly building our political house on sand. Inevitably our temporary alliances and escapes end and we're back at throats of former allies.

Second, the TPLF and, dare I say, a significant portion of the Tigrean elite is in the midst of an identity crisis imposed upon them by unfortunate historical circumstances. The advent of Communism, the 1974 revolution, the Dergue's terrible misgovernance, etc., led to the birth of a TPLF with an outlook that stood firmly against the long term interests of Tigreans. Tigray, being a small, industrious, region, stands to benefit from a citizenship based federalism, a multicultural and decentralized federalism but one in which the citizen is primary. Ethnic federalism is completely against the interests of Tigray, because that would result, more or less, in Tigreans not being able to freely live and work outside their region. Yet the TPLF and most Tigrean intellectuals still support ethnic federalism! This is the problem that the rest of us Ethiopians, Ethiopian nationalists and even Amhara nationalists have to tackle, through persuasion and discussion, of course. This will be a long process. However, we should not abort this process by allying with the TPLF in an artificial power play.

የአዲስ አበባ ህዝብ መደራጀት፤ እንደ እባብ ልባሞች እንደ ርግብም የዋሆች ሁኑ

ትላንት ሁለት የአዲስ አበባ ሰዎች በማይሆን ክስ ታስረዋል። ከሱም እንደገባኝ ከሆነ ወጣቶችን በ«አዲስ አበባ በከተማው ተወላጅ ነው መመራት ያለበት» መፈክር ዙርያ ማደራጀት ነው። ለዚህም አደረጃጀት ከፍልስቴም ኮንሱሌት ጋር ተባብረዋል ነው ሌላው ክስ። እነዚህ ስራዎች በፍፁም ህገ ወጥ አይደሉም እና መታሰር እንደሌለባቸው ግልጽ ነው። ሆኖም ትላንት እነዚህ እስረኞች በጭለማ ቤት እየተሰቃዩ (torture) ይገኙ ነበር። ዛሬ ደህና ፍርድ ሳያገኙ አይቀርም። መከራ ለነሱ ቢሆንም መሻሻል ነው።

በዚህ ግዳይ በርካቶች አቤቱታ እያቀረቡ ነው። ጥሩ ነው፤ እንደዚህ አይነት የማይሆን እስርን መቃወም አለብን። ግን እንደምናውቀው ፖለቲካችን ከመቃወም ወደ መስራት መሻገር አለበት። Proactive politics beats reactive politics anytime።

መሰራት ያለበት ስልታዊ አደረጃጀት ነው። በመጀመርያ ለምንድነው «ወጣቶችን» የምናደራጀው? ሰራተኛው የት አለ? ወዝ አደሩ የት አለ? የቢሮ ሰራተኛው የት አለ? ወላጆች የት አሉ? ጡረተኞች የት አሉ? መከከለኛ መደቡ የት አለ? ሃብታሙ የት አለ? «የተማረው» የት አለ? ምሁራኑ የት አለ? ልሂቃኑ የት አለ? ለምንድነው «ወጣቱ» (እውነቱን ለመናገር ስራ የሌለው ወጣት) ሸክሙን መሸከም ያለበት?

ይህ «ወጣትን» ማደራጀት ዘላቂነት እንደሌለው ይታወቃል። ሁሉም ህዝብ መሳተፍ አለበት ለእውነተኛ የዜግነት ፖለቲካ ወይንም የሲቪክ አደረጃጀት። ወጣቱ ተሳትፎ ሌላው ከሸሸ ዋጋ የለውም ብቻ ሳይሆን ጎጂም ሊሆን ይችላል። እንደ ሜኪናን በአራተኛ ማርሽ ማስጀመር ማለት ነው።

ሌላው ችግር ገና መደራጀቱ በተገቢው ሁኔታ አይጀምር እራስን ለጥቃት ማጋለጥ ነው። እኔ እንደሚገባኝ የአዲስ አበባ መደራጀት አላማ «የአዲስ አበባ ህዝብ መብቱ እንዲከበር» ነው። ከንቲባው የአዲስ አበባ ትውልድ ይሁን አይሁን አይደለም። የአዲስ አበባ ህዝብ መብት ከተጠበቀ ምርጫ ይኖራል እና ህዝቡ የፈለገውን ይመርጣል። ግቡ እንዲህ ግልጽ ሆኖ ካየነው እና ግቡ ላይ ካተኮርን 1) ስራችንን በትክክሉ እንሰራለን እና ይሳካልናል 2) ለጥቃት እራሳችንን አናጋልጥም!

አካሄዱ እንደሚመስለኝ እንዲህ ነው መሆን ያለበት፤

1) በጣም ሰፊ ተዕልኮ (vision and mission) ያለው ድርጅት ማቋቋም፤ ለምሳሌ «የአዲስ አበባ ህዝብ መብት እና ጥቅም ለማስከበር የሚሰራ» ድርጅት ማለት ነው። ሀ) ሰፊ ተዕልኮ ስለሆነ ለመጠቃት መጋለጡ አነስተኛ ነው የሚሆነው። ለ) ብዙ ሰዎችን በተለይም «መደራጀት» ሲባል የማይገባቸው ወይንም የሚፈሩትን ይጋብዛል። እናቶች፤ ወላጆች፤ መካከለኛ መደቡን። ሃብታሙን ወዘተ ይጋብዛል።

2) ከመፈክር በፊት መደራጀት። መጀመርያ በመቶ ሺዎች የሚቆጠሩ ከፋይ አባላት ይኖረው። ከዛ በኋላ ነው መንቀሳቀስ። እንቅስቃሴው ከአቅም ጋር አብሮ መሄድ አለበት! እንቅስቃሴው ከአቅም ጋር አብሮ መሄድ አለበት! አቅም ሳይጎለበት መራመዱ ጥቃትን መጋበዝ ነው። የቅንጅት ታሪክ ይህን ነው የሚያስተምርን። ቅንጅት በመቶ የሚቆጠሩ መሪዎች እና አባላት ነበረው ከዛ ቀጥሎ እስከ ብዙሃኑ ድረስ ከሞላ ጎደል ባዶ መዋቅር ነበር። ጥቂት መሪዎች እና ብዙ ብዙሃን። መሃሉ ባዶ ነው። እነዚህ ጥቂት መሪዎች ሲጠቁ እና እርስ በርስ ሲጣሉ ማን ይተካቸው። መዋቅሩ እስከ ታች ባዶ ነበርና። ስለዚህ መጀመርያ መጠንከር ከዛ ወደ ዋና ስራ መግባት ነው ትክክለኛ አሰራር። ይመስለኛል።

የአዲስ አበባ ህዝብ ወይንም ጠቅላላ የኢትዮጵያ ህዝብ በተለያየ ወኪላዊ ድርጅቶች መደራጀት አለበት (በዜግነት ፖለቲካ ካመንን)። አለበለዛ ያው የጎሳ ፖለቲካ ማለትም የግጭት ፖለቲካ ነው የሚቀረን። ለሀገራችን ህልውና ቅድመ ሁኔታ ነው ማለት ነው። ስለዚህ ይህን ዋና ስራ በሙሉ ተሳትፎ በሰከን ያለ ብልጥ መንገድ እንስራው። ህዝብ በሙሉ እንዲሳተፍ እናድርግ።

«እንደ በጎች በተኵላዎች መካከል እልካችኋለሁ፤ ስለዚህ እንደ እባብ ልባሞች እንደ ርግብም የዋሆች ሁኑ።»

Our Radical Politicians - Land to the Ruler!

Teshome Guebremariam, the recently departed former legal advisor to Emperor Haile Selassie’s government, once said something to the effect of ‘we said “land for the tiller,” but we ended up with land for the ruler (the government)’. Land to the tiller – a policy of giving tenant farmers land title to the land they rent from large landowners – although a morally, politically, and technically difficult policy, seemed a reasonable and moderate response to the land exploitation situation during the Emperor’s time. Land to the ruler – transferring ownership of all land to the government – nationalizing all land – was a radical and extreme response. Unfortunately, our political elite at the time chose the radical and extreme response. Indeed, at critical junctures during Ethiopia’s modern history, our political elite, especially ‘Haile Selassie’s children’ – those educated from the 1950’s onwards – have too often taken radical and extreme political decisions which have resulted in long term disaster for the nation. This has resulted in repeated disasters and unanticipated and unintended consequences for the nation.

In this article, let us consider that fateful decision to nationalize land, a decision that the Ethiopian people have paid for and continue to pay for dearly. In brief, this policy has resulted in:

1. Artificially high national population and birth rate
2. The recent explosion of rural-urban migration that is chocking our cities
3. Low levels of human capital in rural areas, particularly in the area of farming expertise
4. Low agricultural productivity
5. Extremely high food prices and inflation
6. Food insecurity

How did all this come about? First, the nationalization of land, which included forbidding farmers to sell and buy land, essentially imprisoned our rural population. It meant farmers and their families could no longer move to the city. Let me explain by an example – an example farmer – call him ‘Amde’. In 1975, Amde had seven hectares of land – quite a decent sized holding. If Amde wanted to move to the city, he would need some money – some ‘start-up money’ – to live on until he settled down, found a source of income, etc. Normally, this money would come from selling all or even part of his land – his biggest asset. After all, most Ethiopian farmers in the past and today do not have other assets of significant value. However, thanks to the nationalization of land, the farmer was no longer allowed to sell or trade his land, or even mortgage it. Moreover, if he moved to the city, he most cases he would forego all rights to his piece of land! So not only could he not sell his land for money to live on in the city, but if he moved to the city and then for some reason changed his mind after some time and wanted to return to the farm, he could not do so – his farm would have been taken. Knowing this, farmers in general did not move to the city in numbers that they otherwise would have done. Indeed, the statistics show (I discuss this below) that there was minimal rural to urban migration from 1975 until very recently.

So, what was life like for Amde on the farm? Well, like all rural dwellers, he had many children, let’s say seven children (6.5 was the rural average birth rate around 2007 – keep in mind the Addis Ababa average was 2.2 – a big difference). As his children grew older, he divided his seven hectares into seven pieces – his children got one hectare each. And then his children too had seven children each. His land started getting crowded. As the years went by, country-wide, the average plot size of farmers started approaching one hectare and rural areas started getting congested.

Note that at the time of the 1975 land proclamation, about 85% of Ethiopia’s population, about 28 million people, lived in rural areas. In 2015, 40 years later, about 80% of Ethiopia’s population, or about 80 million people, lived in rural areas! In 40 years, the rural share of the population changed only 5%, but given the naturally high rural birth rates, the absolute rural population skyrocketed. Why? Because for 40 years, farmers, not being allowed to sell their land, did not move to urban areas. If the natural, controlled, and steady rural to urban migration that has occurred and continues everywhere around the world were allowed to happen in Ethiopia, then perhaps by 2015 the percentage of population rural areas would have fallen to 70% or lower. This would have meant more people in urban areas where the birth rate is low, and less people in rural areas where the birth rate is high, and this would have resulted in the overall population in Ethiopia being somewhat lower as well. However, because this natural rural-urban migration was artificially restricted in Ethiopia, the population of the rural ‘prison’ grew and grew, in 40 years from 28 million to 80 million. So this continued high rural-urban population ratio is a major cause of the artificially high national population today.

So what happened to Amde’s family? Recall that his children have one hectare each and seven children each. They cannot divide that one hectare into seven pieces for each of their children – the resulting plots would be too small to sustain a household. So they leave their land to only one of their children, with the remaining six children, having received a high school education thanks to the massive increase in rural public education, forced to try and make their living in the city. This is what is happening today in Ethiopia. The inevitable land deficit that we all expected by that the government ignored is now occurring. Today, millions of farmers have only enough land for one child to inherit – the rest of their children are all migrating to the city.

Hence the explosion in rural to urban migration we see today. Plot sizes have shrunk so much so as to be unsustainable. Most rural children are no longer inheriting land from their parents the plot sizes are too small to be divided. And, even though food prices are extremely high and there has never been a better time to be a farmer, if you have enough land, young people are flooding into urban areas. What we are seeing today is 40 years’ worth of pent up, accumulated, and multiplied rural-urban migration happening virtually at once. And this great rural-urban migration explosion is just starting.

But there’s more to this story – let’s go back to Amde. Amde was not a very productive farmer – he was just did not have the skills nor the desire to farm but farmed only to make a living. But his neighour Gemechu was an excellent farmer who made the most of his plot of land and wished to expand. He was, like any other business person, eager to expand is operations, could not. But, given the government land policy, he could not buy land. Amde would have been willing to sell his land to him and Gemechu would have bought it – they would have agreed on a price, but this was not allowed. So the best Gemechu could do was rent land from Amde on a seasonal basis. Gemechu wished to dig a well, plant trees, and make other long term investments, but he could not since the land was only his for a season and he could not know what would happen in the long term. He also dreamed of a time when he could buy other neighbours’ plots and expand to a level where he could learn mechanized farming, learn about growing fruit seedlings, etc. But his dreams never materialized.

Note that Gemechu was producing 20 quintals of teff per hectare, while the not very productive Amde was producing 10. If Gemechu had bought Amde’s seven hectares and planted teff, the seven hectares would have gone from producing 70 quintals to 140 quintals. Overall agricultural productivity would have increased significantly. Gemechu, with his increased income and taking advantage of economies of scale, would have gone on to greater agricultural exploits. Amde would have been able to buy cheaper teff.

What happened to Gemechu was a travesty that the government(s) of Ethiopia brought on the country’s farmers. By not allowing farmers to be entrepreneurial and to expand, the government stifled farmers’ human capital. This has had not only an economic but also psychological, political, and social impact on farmers. Unlike those in all other commercial sectors, farmers uniquely were restricted from freedom in their business – they were not allowed to expand. As a result, they were indirectly restricted from improving their agricultural skills and education and essentially forced to remain as they were, and to give up hope. Imagine if a mechanic was by law prevented from having a garage bigger than a one-car garage. He would not come close to achieving his potential. If a professor were told that he could never look for another job and he could never conduct research on anything but one subject, he too would never achieve his potential. In fact, he soon stop trying and just mindlessly do his job. Same for farmers. The system made it communism for the farmers, capitalism for the rest.

To add insult to injury, successive governments and NGO’s continued to regard farmers as almost daft – as ignorant and incapable and in need of all forms of paternalism and assistance. It is true that the agricultural sector – that farmers – have not been able to increase their human capital – their knowledge and capacity – but this was and is only because they have been restricted from being able to expand their business. In true communist fashion, the governments’ plan was to hold the most important factor – land – constant, and increase inputs such as improved seeds, fertilizer, agricultural education, etc., with the hope that this would result in greater productivity. Of course it has not worked.

Today, in Ethiopia, agricultural productivity per unit of land is low. Food prices are some of the highest in developing countries. Milk, eggs, butter, meat, and honey are more expensive in Ethiopia than in many Western countries! The agricultural sector has been unable respond to the even the high demand and high prices in today’s Ethiopia that should have resulted in greater investment and productivity. Hence the food inflation – the leading source of inflation in the country – something the government continues to battle.

Back to Amde… The once a decade drought arrived and Amde’s children suffered a tiny harvest. In the old days, when Amde had his seven hectares, he was able to withstand drought because the grain he harvested from his seven hectares was enough for more than one year. But today, Amde’s children have one hectare each with which to provide for their families, and the harvest from one hectare is barely enough for one year. So with this drought, Amde’s children’s families end up all receiving food aid for a year.

So there we have it: An artificially high national population and birth rate, an explosion of rural-urban migration that is chocking our cities, low agricultural human capital in rural areas, low agricultural productivity, high food prices and inflation, and food insecurity. All consequences of the radical land proclamation of 1975. This is one example of the dangers and risks of radical and untried policies being implemented by desperate and immature new political elites. Today’s rulers would do well to learn from this and reconsider the other radical and immoderate policy that is haunting Ethiopia – ethnic federalism.

The ANDM Disconnect

During and after the 2016 protests, we often heard various ANDM officials claim that one of the main causes of unrest in Amhara State was the ‘disconnect’ between ANDM the party and the people of Amhara State. The people do not consider ANDM as having come from them, as being part of them, as wanting the same things that they want, as representing them, as standing up for their interests, etc. To put it simply, ANDM and the people of Amhara State are not of one mind nor of one heart.

This diagnosis of the unrest is, in my opinion is, not only correct, but perfect – it strikes at the very heart of the matter. Politics is best when a people are, among themselves, of one mind and heart, and when a people and its leadership are of one mind and one heart. Politics is at its worst when a people are divided amongst themselves and divided from their leadership. Division is the single biggest enemy of peaceful and prosperous politics and civil life.

Note that by division I don’t mean that there should not be differences. Differing ideologies, opinions, or even interests, to some extent, are natural. There almost ought to be differing ideologies, opinions, and interests. However, a people and leadership of one mind and one heart have a level of trust and understanding that allows them to handle these differences in an agreed upon peaceful and effective manner. So the differences do not end up resulting in division! The people and their leadership realize that at the end of the day, they have to live together and that therefore their basic interests are intertwined. They have to cooperate on basic issues and must not cross certain lines that lead to division. This is what being of one heart and mind is about.

So, yes, in Amhara State, there is division between the people and their leadership. ANDM is disconnected (was never really connected in the first place) from the people of Amhara State. What’s the consequence of this disconnect? Well, in general, it’s poor governance – ineffective government, corruption, injustice, etc. But specific to Ethiopia’s current political problems, the consequence is a disproportionately weak ANDM and Amhara State, and a disproportionately weak Ethiopian nationalism.

Is this a problem for the EPRDF as a whole? What’s wrong if ANDM is weak, if Amhara State is politically weak, and if Ethiopian nationalism is weak? There are those diehard fundamentalists in the EPRDF who do not see it as a problem. Their answer to every problem and situation is to stay the course because they have been in power for 26 years and they know what they are doing! For them, the 2016 protests are just another temporary setback which will be soon forgotten. But for forward thinking members of the EPRDF, who are well aware that the EPRDF has made numerous changes over its history, the 2016 protests indicate that significant changes are required for the EPRDF to continue in power. And one of these changes is that parties other than the TPLF – such as ANDM – have to shoulder their proper share of responsibility and exercise their proper share of power.

Why can’t the TPLF go it alone, so to speak, as it has for a quarter decade so far? The reason is that it is now clear that the vanguard party developmental state (10 years old) – which today is the EPRDF’s main policy and instrument of survival – and ethnic federalism (23 years old) and are incompatible. Not only incompatible, but a combustible combination – combustible enough to blow up the EPRDF’s hold on power. The EPRDF being a TPLF-led vanguard party, in other words with the TPLF holding most of the power and the other parties such as ANDM being junior partners, cannot sustain the developmental state because the resulting ethnic resentment will be too much handle. Therefore, ANDM (and OPDO and SEPDM etc.) need to have more weight in the EPRDF, so that the EPRDF is no longer a TPLF-led front, and thereby anti-TPLF and anti-Tigrean resentment will be slowly reduced. If ANDM and the others continue to be weak and estranged from its people, anti-TPLF resentment will continue increasing and the EPRDF’s hold on power will be weakened.

In order for ANDM to carry its weight in the EPRDF, it must be reconciled with the people of Amhara State. How can this be done? The first step would be for ANDM leadership to understand and accept that their political survival requires such reconciliation. The second is to bring about reconciliation via good governance and so make good governance the focus of their (perpetual!) mandate. Wait a minute – how is this possible? Corruption and favouritism are natural to the one party developmental state. All politicians in a developmental state have to have clients and networks and patronage, otherwise they will be unable to survive. As we have seen in Ethiopia, trying to achieve good governance is always a losing battle in a one party developmental state. Actually, let alone in Ethiopia, the Chinese Communist Party has for 40 years found it impossible to deal effectively with poor governance. Given this, how can ANDM bring about good governance?

The answer is that ANDM must first realize that 1) their survival is today very tenuous; 2) reconciling with the people of Amhara State their only hope for survival; and 3) given the current political reality in Ethiopia good governance is ANDM’s only way to bring about reconciliation. ANDM has no choice – in order to survive, it must reconcile with its people, and in order to reconcile, it must bring about good governance – peace, justice, transparency, no corruption, no favouritism, and a focus on aligning policy with the interests of the public.

What will the TPLF say about this? Will it not consider an ANDM united with the people of Amhara State as a threat? Will it not interfere in Amhara State? Let me say it clearly – the TPLF does not have a choice in the matter. If ANDM reconciles with its population – or simply just makes the decision to do so – there is nothing the TPLF can do about it. Unless there are federal issues at stake, the TPLF has to leave the management of Amhara State to ANDM. If it interferes, it is going to have to literally colonize Amhara State with Tigreans, something which it has not done to date and which it will not do, since this will result in a revolt it cannot control. Note that the EPRDF had a hard time controlling the 2016 revolt even though it was as much an anti-ANDM as anti-TPLF revolt. But if ANDM is one with the population, then the EPRDF would have to give in to ANDM’s wishes.

Let me add here that even today, the TPLF is not the direct cause of corruption, favouritism, injustice, etc. in Amhara State. The TPLF’s tentacles do not and more importantly cannot directly reach the local level. To put it simply, if the administrators of, say, Debre Marqos woreda, are corrupt and inefficient and do not represent the will of the people, this is a problem between them and the people, and a problem that can be fixed between them. The administrators are not from the TPLF, neither is their security from the TPLF. In most cases the administrators and the security apparatus are neighbours and relatives of the people of Debre Marqos. I use this example to illustrate that if ANDM and the people of Amhara State have the will, it is possible for ANDM to reconcile with the people of Amhara State. There will be no interference from the TPLF.

What will be the consequence of this reconciliation? It means that ANDM will have a significant increase in its political power. That is, it will be able to mobilize its people much more effectively than it can now, and this ability to mobilize is the basis of political power. This increase in political power will mean that ANDM will no longer be a junior partner in the EPRDF relative to the TPLF. This is the key to its survival. Again, understanding that this is the key to its survival is what should motivate it to change.

Will not the TPLF resist? Of course, there will be parts of the TPLF, the old guard, who will resist, but they will be unable to. Why? The TPLF is a minority whose dominance is solely a result of their unity and the disunity of the majority. Just a slight increase in the level of unity amongst the majority is enough to overcome any resistance some factions in the TPLF may try to put up. If ANDM and the people of Amhara State are reconciled, that is, if there is unity in Amhara State, the TPLF simply can no longer dominate. And many in the TPLF know this very well. In addition, note that, as I mentioned above, there is a part of the TPLF that wants to relinquish their dominance because it understands that this dominance is the biggest source of anti-EPRDF resentment and that if this dominance continues, both the TPLF and its Tigrean constituency will be at great risk. The problem is that they don’t see any political force, include ANDM and the other junior partners in the EPRDF, that is ready to take over the power that the TPLF relinquishes. But if ANDM does its job and becomes hand and glove with the people of Amhara State, then TPLF dominance will decrease in an orderly and stable manner, and in a roundabout way the survival of the EPRDF and TPLF will be reassured.

‘One Heart’ (‘And Lb’) should become the new slogan of ANDM. Everyone at all levels should be required so sign on to this. This is the only way for ANDM to repair the disconnect with the people of Amhara State and to become one with the people. This in turn is the only way ANDM can survive. Most importantly, this is key to the survival of the Ethiopian nation.

Some Basics on Interacting with Ethnic Nationalism

2009/2/24 (Ethiopian calendar)

2016/11/3 (European calendar)

(pdf)

[Note: An Amharic version of this post will appear sometime!]

In his recent interview with ESAT, Ato Abebe Bogale presents us with a text book lesson on how to interact with ethnic nationalism, specifically Oromo nationalism. In this article, I attempt to expand on some of the principles and lessons he presented.

The subject of the interview was a recent conference on Oromo nationalism in London, during which one speaker strongly advocated for the break up of Ethiopia in the name of freeing the imprisoned Oromo nation from Ethiopia. This speech raised a lot of hackle in the media and among Ethiopian nationalists, even though it was just a repetition of a decades old position of not only Oromo nationalists but all those Ethiopians who starting in the 1960's, imbibed with socialist theories, think of Ethiopia as a prison of nationalities which needed to be freed. Somehow this repetition of a well known political position appeared to create panic in a number of people.

This leads me to the first and most important lesson we can learn from Ato Abebe, which is to remain calm and avoid at all costs projecting any kind of fear or panic about ethnic nationalism. When ethnic nationalists, including moderates, perceive the other side as being hysterical, they tend to become offended and are pushed to take a more defensive and radical position. Why are our heartfelt ideas raising such emotion – why don't they even try to understand us – we just can't relate to them – these are the questions and sentiments raised. In the end, this ends up increasing the support for ethnic nationalism, making non-nationalists moderate nationalists and moderates into hardliners.

Every politician in every country that has had to deal with ethnic politics knows this. I will given an example: During the Quebec referendum, when the province of Quebec was voting on the question of seceding from Canada, one of the Quebec nationalist tactics in their campaign was to provoke anti-secessionists in the rest of Canada into saying something insulting about Quebecers. They would then use these incidents and have their media broadcast them repeatedly in order to fan ethnic sentiment and promote their agenda. Knowing this, most Canadian politicians would be very careful to prevent such incidents. Instead, they would organize various events to promote 'friendship propaganda'. One such event was sending via bus, train, and plane hundreds of thousands of Canadians to Quebec to hold a demonstration whose motto was to show how much Canadians love Quebec! This is the politics of dealing with ethnic nationalism.

Ethiopian nationalists must practice the same type of politics. We must avoid not only inflammatory statements, including equating ethnic nationalism with tribalism and other similar sentiments that could be interpreted as derogatory, but also statements that question people's right to choose their identity and deny the existence any sort of ethnic rights. All such statements and positions only serve to actually promote the desires ethnic nationalists, especially hardcore nationalists.

Note how Ato Abebe was careful in this regard during the interview. While the interviewer tried to impress upon him the impending danger of secession, Ato Abebe completely avoided saying anything inflammatory or anything that could be interpreted as being offensive to Oromo nationalism. Instead, he calmly explained that Oromo secession is not a new position at all. Further, he explained that today, even among Oromo nationalists, and even among those who in previous years advocated secession, secession is now the position of a small minority. This is a fact, and though it is a fact, many Ethiopian nationalists tend to forget it, become hysterical, and unintentionally promote the cause of radical ethnic nationalists.

The second, related, lesson is that there is a diversity of opinions on ethnic nationalism in Oromo politics, all the way from Ethiopian nationalism to soft Oromo nationalism to hardline Oromo nationalism. The fact there are multiple Oromo political organizations and that, even in today's charged political atmosphere, these organizations are holding several conferences to reach some kind of consensus shows that they are far from reaching consensus. They are even far from agreeing to disagree, from agreeing to tolerate each others' views. (Doesn't this remind us of Ethiopian nationalist politics!) This is another reason for Ethiopian nationalists to keep our reaction to ethnic politics proportional to its dangers.

Third, Ato Abebe shows us that we have to look all of reality in the face all the time instead of being distracted by the winds of the day. He reminds us that the Ethiopian constitution today supports the idea of secession! Have we forgotten this? It is a radical ethnic nationalist constitution, the most radical in the world, an 'experiment' according to the EPRDF. (Imagine conducting such an experiment in one of the poorest and at risk countries in the world!). This is the reality we have to deal with. Given that this is what we are living with every day, why do the comments of a single Oromo secessionist at a conference take so much of our time? Rather, Ethiopian nationalists should be focusing on getting their own house in order to as to be able to harness the power blunt the edge of this constitution, a constitution which is everyday proving to be more and more dangerous for the country.

The fourth point that Ato Abebe beautifully explains is that despite the constitution, despite the government putting up fences, so to speak, around the ethnic regions so as to minimize integration and assimilation, which is the key to creating any kind of shared destiny, Ethiopia remains to this day. This is perhaps the strongest testimony against the theory of Ethiopia as a prison of nations. Ethiopia is a country, a nation, where significant integration and assimilation has taken place in the past, and a significant portion of the population, from all ethnic groups, is Ethiopian nationalist.

I remind you that in 1991, the only forces with power (guns) in Ethiopia were ethnic liberation forces. The Ethiopian nationalist elite along was completely absent. The ethnic nationalists – EPLF, TPLF, OLF, etc – could have easily carved up the country in pieces, as per their ideologies. Eritrea seceded, but apart from that, the rest found that they could not, collectively, that is, disintegrate the country. Further, as the years went by, the EPRDF found itself discovering more and more the dangers of ethnic nationalism. TPLF members who in the 1990's would insist they were Tigrean first then Ethiopian today claim to be most 'Ethiopian' of all, much more Ethiopian than their 'anti-Ethiopian' opposition! As Ato Abebe pointed out in his interview, Prime Minister Meles, who would never miss an opportunity to belittle Ethiopian nationalism and who once called the Ethiopian flag but a rag, eventually ended up establishing a national holiday commemorating the flag! Thus, despite the decades long failings of the Ethiopian nationalist elite, the country has managed to remain alive. Ailing, but alive.

The final principle that Ato Abebe brought up and that I would like to emphasize is that healthy politics should always be related to reality on the ground, not ideology or fantasy. An example of this was, during the 2005 elections, Kinijit's position regarding the constitution, which was to accept it and if necessary change it only according to its provisions. This was an acknowledgement of changes in Ethiopia's political landscape with regard to ethnic nationalism, especially in Oromia. Kinijit did not adopt an ethnic nationalist position, but rather proposed to promote its Ethiopian nationalism agenda in another way, working within the constitution that many ethnic nationalists loved. This was very much a feasible proposition. Politics is the art of the possible, after all.

In conclusion, I do hope that we Ethiopian nationalists generally learn to become more nuanced in dealing with ethnic nationalism. We are a large constituency, the largest in Ethiopia, and we have a big responsibility to fix our failures over five decades. One of the ways of fixing our failures is to find the right way to interact with a major reality in today's Ethiopia, ethnic nationalism.

ያልተጠበቀው ህዝባዊ ዐመፅ የት ይደርስ ይሆን?

2009/2/16 ዓ.ም. (2016/10/26)

(pdf)

ላለፉት የተወሰኑ ወራት የተካሄደው የህዝባዊ ዐመፅ እንደሚከሰት አውቅ ነበር የሚል ካለ ቀልደኛ ነው። መንግስት አልጠበቀውም፤ ተቃዋሚዎች አልጠበቁትም፤ ሚዲያውም የፖለቲካ ተንታኞችም አልጠበቁትም። እኔም ጭራሽ አልጠበኩትም።

እርግጥ የኢህአዴግን መርህዎች ለሀገሪቷ አደገኛ ናቸው ብለን የምናምነው ሁልጊዜ ችግር ይመጣል ብለን እንዘፍናለን። እንደዚህ ሊቀጥል አይችልም፤ የሰውዉ ብሶት አንድ ቀን ይፈነዳል እንል ነበር... ለ25 ዓመት። ግን አሁን ይህ ዐመፅ ይነሳል ብለን አልጠበቅንም።

ዐመፁ አንዴ ከተነሳ በኋላ ትልቅ ችግር መኖሩን የሚያሳዩ ምልክቶች እንደነበሩ ማየት እንችላለን። ባለፉት ሁለት ዓመታት ጠቅላይ ሚኒስቴሩ ሙስናን ለመቆጣጠር የነበራቸው ጠንካራ ፍላጎት፤ ይህ ባለመሆኑ ብስጭታቸውን በአደባባይ እስከ መግለጽ ያደረጋቸው ሙስናና አድሎ ምን ያህል ያሳሰባቸው እንደነበረ ያሳያል። ህብረተሰብ ውስጥም ስለ ሙስናና በተለይ አድሎ የነበረው ማግሮምሮም በየዓመቱ እጅግ እያየለ እንደሆነ ይታወሳል። ስለ አዲስ አበባ «ማስተር ፕላን» የነበረው አቤቱታ ትልቅ ምልከትም ነበር። ግን ማንም ይህ አይነት ዐመፅ ይከተላል ብሎ የገመተ የለም።

እኔ ያልገመትኩበት ምክንያት እኛ ኢትዮጵያኖች የኢህአዴግን የመንግስት ስረዓት ተቀብለነዋል ብዬ ገምቼ ስለነበር ነው። ይህ እጅግ ያሳዝነኝ ነበር። ልክ እንደ የቻይና ህዝብ ለ «ልማት» (ገንዘብ) ብሎ ለገዥ ፓርቲው ክብሩንና መብቱን እንደሸጠ የኛም ህዝብ ለገንዘብ፤ ለኮንዶሚኒየም፤ ለስራ እድል፤ ልድጎማ፤ ለሞቢለ ስልክ፤ ወዘተ የ«ልማት» ውጤቶች ብሎ ማንነቱን ክብሩንና መብቱን ለኢህአዴግ ሽቷል ብዬ ገምቼ ነበር።

ጎረቤቱ ቤቱንንና መረቱን መንግስት ነጥቆት ከከተመ ውጭ ባዶ መሬት ላይ ሲወረወር መልካም እድል ብሎ ምንም ሳይረዳውም የሚሸኘው አይነት ህዝብ ነው የተገነዘብኩት። በሙስና ምክንያት ፍርድ ሜቱ ለባለንጀራው ትክክለኛ ፍትህ ሲያጎልበት ከማጽናናት ፋንታ ዞር ብሎ የማይጠይቀው ህዝብ። የቀበሌ ሹሞች ለልማት የመጣውን ገንዘብ ሲሰርቁ ለኔም ትንሽ ባካፈሉኝ የሚል ህዝብ። እንደዚህ አይነት ኢሰባዊ ድርጊቶች ቅርም የማይለው ህዝብ። ሙስና ምንም የማይመስለው ህዝብ። እርስ በርስ መተሳሰብ የጠፋበት ህዝብ። እንደ ጥሩ ምሳሌ የሆኑት መሪዎቹ ለገንዘብ ብሎ ምንም የሚያደርግ፤ የገዛ ወንድሙን ጎረቤቱን ዘመዱን የሚሸጥ። ልጁን ለገንዘብ ብሎ እየማቀቀች «ዶላር» እንድትልክ አረብ ሀገር የሚልክ ህዝብ። ስለ እድር የሚያግሮምርም የመሃበራዊ ኑሮ ጥቅም የጠፋበት ህዝብ። ማንነቱን ለማጥፋት የቸኮለ ህዝብ፤ ለፈረንጅ የሚሰግድ፤ ልጁን ወደ ውጭ ሀገር ለመላክ የፈለገውን የሚያደርግ፤ ቤት ቁች ብሎ የፈረንጅ ቅኝ ግዛት ማስፈጸምያ የቴሌቪዥን «ድራማ» ሲከታተል የሚውል የደነዘዘ ህዝብ። ወጣቶቹ ስለአርሴናል የሚገዳደሉ ህዝብ። ቤተ ክርስቲያኑ በሙስና የተሞላች፤ መስጊዷ የተከፋፈለች ህዝብ። የኢትዮጵያ ህዝብ በዚህ ሁኔታ ናትና በቅርቡ ምንም አይነት ፖለቲካዊ ለውጥ አይመጣም ብዬ ደምድሜ ነበር።

ግን ይሄው ዐመፅ ተጀመረ። ሆኖም የሚዘልቅ አይመስልም። ይህን የምለው ለመተንበይ አይደለም፤ ትንቢቴ ዋጋ እንደሌለው ታይቷል። ዐመፁ ይቀሽፋል የምለው ዐመፁ ወደ ጥሩ ነገር እንዲመራ፤ ፍሬአማ እንዲሆን ብዙሃኑም የፖለቲካ መሪዎችም በቂ ስራ እንዳልሰሩ ለማሳየት ያህል ብዬ ነው። እስካሁን ማንም የህዝቡን ጥያቄና ፍላጎት በተገቢው ደረጃ ያሰባሰበና ለውይይት ያቀረበ የለም። እስካሁን ብሶትና እሮሮ ብቻ ነው የሚሰማው። ብዙሃኑ ብሶቱንና እሮሮውን መግለጹ ተገቢ ነው ግን ከፖለቲካ መሪዎቹ ማቀናበርና ማወሃድ ከሌለ የትም አይደረስም።

በኔ እምነት ዐመፁን ያስነሳው የመጀመሪያ ደረጃ ምክንያት አድሎ ነው፤ በተለይ በዘር የተመሰረተ አድሎ። ህብረተሰብ ውስጥ ተቀላቅሎ አስተውሎ ለሚመለከት ይህ ሊያመልጠው አይችልም፤ የአብዛኛው ህዝብ እሮሮ ከአድሎና ሙስና ጋር የተያያዘ ነው። የፍትህ ጉድለት፤ የዴሞክራሲ ጉድለት፤ የጎሳ አስተዳደር፤ ወዘተ ሁለተኛ ደረጃ ምክንያቶች ነበሩ። ግን መፍትሄ ከተፈለገ እነዚህ፤ ፍትህ፤ ዴሞክራሲ ወይም ተጠሪነት፤ እኩልነት፤ ናቸው መሰረታዊ ጉዳዮቹ! ሙስናና አድሎ የኔዚህ ርዥራዦች ናቸው። ስለዚህ የህዝቡም የፖለቲካ መሪዎችም የምሁራንም ቱክረት እነዚህ ጉዳዮች ላይ ካልሆነ ትክክለኛ ለውጥ ሊመጣ አይችልም።

ዐመፁ እንደምጠብቀው ከበረደ ቀጥሎ ምን ይደረግ? ከዚህ በፊት እንደጻፍኩት መልካም አስተዳደርና መልካም ህብረተሰብ እንዲሆንልን የምንፈልገው በየ ጎራችን፤ ከምነግስት አስተዳደር ውስጥ ቢሆንም፤ በበኩላችን መልካም ስራ መስራትና ጥሩ ዜጋና ምሳሌ መሆን ነው ማድረግ ያለምን። ለውጥ የምንፈልገው አብዛኛ ከሆንን ሁላችንም ይህን ካረግን የምንፈልገው ህብረተሰባዊና መንግስታዊ ለውጥ ይመጣል።