One Response to the ODF's “Our Common Future: A Proposal”

2009/2/17 (Ethiopian calendar)

2016/10/27 (European calendar)

(pdf)

[Note: An Amharic version of this post will appear sometime!]

It was with great pleasure that I read the Oromo Democratic Front's (ODF) discussion paper “Our Common Future: A Proposal.” It has been a long time since I read a constructive and inviting paper from an Ethiopian political party, a paper inviting us to do work rather than mire ourselves in sloganeering and pity. I commend the ODF for their initiative, and my aim here is to answer their invitation for a response to their proposal. I am but an individual commentator, a mere layman representing no one but myself, but I hope that my comments do the proposal some justice. I shall make my comments on the ideas in the proposal based on the order they were presented in the paper.

I fully agree with the ODF that a “country-wide consensus” on Ethiopia is indeed urgently required, but it has been urgently required for 22 years. The last 'consensus', the 1994 FDRE constitution was in my opinion too radical and not consultative enough, and so we've been waiting for a better one ever since. However, such consensuses are not created overnight, or in a conference or two. It takes years of discussion and deliberation to develop positions, let alone agreements on such a complicated matter as a country's political structure. It is remarkable that the Ethiopian opposition in all its forms has for 25 years hardly made any progress in this matter. We seem to be discussing the same issues over and over again, with the same confrontational zero-sum mindset as in the past. So we would all do well to heed what the ODF recommends and begin work immediately on this “country-wide consensus”.

Next, the proposal frames the current political problem as one between two opposing sides – the current regime as one side and those wanting a “unitary nation” as the other. It implies that “core Oromo demands” have been “sidestepped” or ignored in this debate. This framing is, to put it bluntly, wholly inaccurate. First, though I'm sure there are many that wish for a unitary nation, that is no federal system whatsoever, they form a small minority. To illustrate this, consider the official position of Kinijit and its successor parties in this regard, which was to maintain the current (federal) constitution as it is for the foreseeable future, and past that, amend it as per its own provisions! What kind of amendment it would be was not decided, but there were many proposals, ranging from language-based federalism, which would be almost the same as the current arrangement but simply replacing the concept of ethnicity with language, to federalism with states with redrawn boundaries removing ethnicity entirely. None of this makes for a centralized “unitary nation” -- it is at the very least federalism of some sort. Given Kinijit's large constituency as shown by its electoral victory, this is the majority position, not that of a “unitary nation”.

Second, unless I am mistaken, the main “core Oromo demand” is that the current constitution actually be respected rather than the EPRDF and TPLF in particular using its extrajudicial power to exercise undue influence. This demand is not sidestepped and has not been sidestepped in the debate in any way since all sides that have significant constituencies affirm the current constitution as a political reality, whether they like it or not. I would like to note here that if anything is being sidestepped it is the core demands of the Ethiopian nationalists, since the status quo already fulfils a large portion of the “Oromo demands”, which is a multinational state! The status quo has already brought Ethiopia, constitutionally speaking, from one extreme to the other extreme. There is no possible going further! Thus Oromo demands in this regard have been exceedingly fulfilled, save for the actual implementation portion.

Other demands, such as Oromiffa becoming an official federal language are also supported by all major constituencies. All this to say that talk about the “unitary nation” constituency is a red herring, and therefore presenting the current regime and the “unitary nation” constituency as the poles in the debate is incorrect.

Instead, the debate is multipolar, perhaps too multipolar. If we consider Oromia as one constituency, we have in Oromia a spectrum all the way from Ethiopian nationalists to soft Oromo nationalists to hardline Oromo nationalists. These factions themselves have a lot to sort out in terms of simply agreeing to disagree, let alone being able to unite into one constituency.

Then we have the Ethiopian nationalist constituency, which includes perhaps most of Amhara region, but also that large disenfranchised group of non-Amhara Ethiopians and mixed Ethiopians who consider themselves not to be ethnic nationalists. This constituency is the one that voted for Kinijit, and since its diversity means that it does not have ethnicity as a binding material, so to speak, it is an extremely fractious constituency. The inability of this constituency to “avoid the hair-splitting type of exchanges” and other dysfunctional traits in order to reach a basic consensus has, in my opinion, been the main reason for Ethiopia's current troubles and will end up being the ruin of the nation(s).

Third, there is the EPRDF, which though it has internal divisions is certainly the most united and coherent constituency. As the ODF proposal says, the EPRDF is convinced, or tries to convince itself, that there is no alternative to it. Well, we must admit that there is some truth in this, and the ODF proposal is proof of this in that it clearly outlines divisions in Ethiopian politics that have nothing to do with the EPRDF. We all know that were the EPRDF to vanish today, as the proposal implies, there is no consensus among the rest of us, so there would be anarchy. However, the lack of a consensus amongst the opposition has not stopped the EPRDF from the increasing “social rejection” that the proposal speaks of. Indeed, if we look to the past, both the Haile Selassie and Dergue regimes fell into some sort of anarchy, not into a ready opposition. So a weak opposition is no guarantee of long life for the EPRDF – it is only a guarantee of a hard fall. Thus the EPRDF had better start doing something to actually aid the opposition to develop rather than persecuting it.

Next, I would like to comment on the ODF conviction that the current constitution – Ethiopia as a multinational state – was “unavoidable”, implying that it is Ethiopia's destiny and natural state. Of course, it is the conviction of us Ethiopian nationalists (non ethnic nationalists) that Ethiopia as a multinational state, let alone being its natural state, is an unstable state ripe for conflict. Here we agree to disagree, but as I stated above, as was Kinijit's official position, most Ethiopian nationalists accept political reality and work within the current constitution. I would just like to add that talk of inevitability of the multinational state completely ignores other factors in Ethiopia's recent political past, including pseudo-feudalism, communism, and the Cold War, all of which are not ethnicity and yet have played a significant role in forming today's political reality. Ignoring these factors is I think a misreading of history that affects our perception of current political reality.

Now on to the numbered sections of the ODF proposal. The first, about the benefits of non-violent versus armed struggle is a case well made and there is little to argue about here. We agree to disagree with those who favour armed struggle! I would just like to add a point about 'democracy' however, as the document states that one thing all Ethiopian movements agree on is the goal of democracy. What we laymen think of us democracy is one man one vote, which immediately excludes group rights, especially huge group rights such as ethnic rights. Our problem is precisely that we do not agree with what democracy means and we cannot agree until we come to a general consensus about what our country should look like – in other words its constitution not only as it is formally written, but its spirit. So the term democracy becomes, I believe, a distraction as we work on the “country wide consensus” that this proposal advocates for. If we keep talking about democracy, we'll end up with the same problem as the Egyptian Arab Spring movement, which upon realizing that what it thought was democracy ended up empowering the Muslim Brotherhood a little too much decided it didn't want democracy after all.

The second section, on the divisive role of Ethiopian history, is excellent. I completely agree that short of some sort of miracle, we are going to have to learn to agree to disagree about Ethiopian history. I actually think that reasonable people can agree on a set of unbiased facts about Ethiopian history – that's not the main problem. The problem is that we all interpret these facts with our own political lens. Let's take the simple example of the concept of the Oromo nation. The Oromo in Ethiopia have at various times in history formed various nations, perhaps even a single nation, been an integral part as an ethnic group, not a nation, of the Ethiopian nation as we know it, assimilated into and assimilated other groups, invaded and have been invaded, terrorized and have been terrorized, etc. Most reasonable people would agree on this set of facts. I interpret this history as the Oromo being one of the ethnic groups in Ethiopia while others interpret this as the Oromo nation being distinct from what it calls Ethiopia, as having had various interactions with Ethiopia, but as a nation unto itself. Same facts, different interpretations, but these differences have major implications on building the “country-wide consensus”.

The good thing is that if we “can agree to disagree with different readings” of Ethiopian history, then we can take history out of the Ethiopian nationalism vs ethnic nationalism debate, and this would greatly help unfog the debate. The debate then will simply be about political position rather than history, grievance, etc. This kind of development is would not be new – the example of Canada and Quebec is a case in point. The history of Canada is simple and well-documented – there's not much to argue about its contents. Quebec nationalists interpret the history as that of a Quebec nation invaded and with a right to independence, while others view the history as a competition between two North American colonialists which one party won and is a fait accompli. Same facts, different interpretations. But the only important fact here is that Quebec nationalists want independence today, regardless of history, and the opposite side wants a single Canada, regardless of history. It is current political competition that drives the debate.

The third section on self-determination is also excellent in that it nicely breaks down a large idea – ethnic self determination in the context of Ethiopia – into smaller principles that are much easier to discuss and come to agreement on. I agree with all the premises as they apply in this context. (I disagree with “being an Oromo was officially portrayed as antithetical to being an Ethiopian”, but that's not one of the principles, just an aside.) However, there is more to go – it is a bare minimum, not surprisingly, as this is proposal is just a starting point. One can agree with all the premises, as I do, yet disagree on their political interpretation, as I do with the interpretation of the ODF.

Finally, the fourth and fifth sections dealing with the zero sum attitudes in Ethiopian politics, particularly as it relates to demonizing opponents and lacking empathy. The proposal makes it clear that in order to properly learn from the past, we have to empathize not only with current opponents but with past actors and understand why they did what they did. If we do so, we will realize that there was and in the case of the EPRDF there is some good that they have done, and these should be built upon, rather than everything having to be torn down and built up again.

I completely agree with these thoughts. The zero sum mentality means for a complete absence of introspection, which in turn means continual conflict. With a little bit of empathy and introspection, much of the current conflict would be easily transformed. I think Ethiopians have to start giving the saying 'a people get the government they deserve' much more weight than we currently do. As I am fond of saying, much of the reason Ethiopia today has an ethnic-based constitution that Ethiopian nationalists do not like (but accept!) is because Ethiopian nationalists committed political suicide over the two decades before the new constitution was formed, so that they were unable to be at the table. Yet we Ethiopian nationalists continue to blame the EPRDF for it, as if the EPRDF could suddenly reverse its cherished ideology and take a huge political risk once in power! Unfortunately, it is this focus on continually blaming the EPRDF for everything that has kept us unable to fix our own problems and therefore kept us weak and inept.

In conclusion, I think the ODF proposal is an excellent document that all stakeholders in Ethiopian politics should read, discuss, and build upon. However, let us reflect on why previous such attempts, such as Medrek, for example, have stuttered and failed, and learn from those mistakes. Also, let us ask ourselves where the other stakeholders are while the grassroots, leaderless, is up in arms.