Showing posts with label ድርድር. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ድርድር. Show all posts

Tuesday, 10 July 2018

የብሄር ጥያቄ ዛሬ

ዛሬ የኢትዮጵያ ፖለቲካዊ ሁኔታ ተገለባብጦ ቢሆንም አሁንም «የብሄር ብሄረሰብ ጥያቄ» ዋና ጉዳያችን ነው። በዚህ ዙርያ ያሉት ጥያቄዎች ናቸው ዋና የሀገራችን የክፍፍል እና የግጭት ምንጭ። ይህ አሳዛኝ ሁኔታ በዋናነት የተፈጠረው በጎሳ ብሄርተኞች ሚና ሳይሆን በሀገር ብሄርተኛ ጎራው ነው። እኛ የኢትዮጵያ ሀገራዊ ብሄርተኞች ደጋግመን በሰራናቸው ስህተቶች እና ሀገራችንን በሚገባው ማስተዳደእር ስላልቻልን ነው የብሄር ጥያቄው እንደዚህ የሰፈነው። ለምሳሌ ያህል ጠቅላይ ሚኒስቴር አብይ አህመድ በማያሻማ አገላለጽ አስቀምጠውታል፤ ኢህአዴግ ደርግን አላሸነፍም፤ ደርግ እራሱን አሸነፈ እንጂ። እኛ የሀገር ብሄርተኞች አድሃሪ፤ ተራማጅ፤ ኢህአፓ፤ ምኤሶን ወዘተ እየተባባልን አሳፋሪው ደርግን ፈጠርን ደርግ ሀገሪቷን አጥፍቶ ለኢህአዴግ፤ ኦነግ እና ሻዕብያ ስልጣን አስረከበ።

ለምንድነው ይህ ነጥብ ላይ የማተኩረው? ለምንድነው ለኢትዮጵያ የፖለቲካ ችግሮች እንደ ኢህአዴግ አይነቱ የጎሳ ብሄርተኞችን ጥፋተኛ ከማድረግ የአንድነቱን ጎራ የሀገር ብሄርተኞችን ጥፋተኛ የማደርገው?

1. ሁለት አይነት ሰዎች አሉ። አንዱ ችግር ሲደርስበት ማንነው ይህን ያመጣብኝ ብሎ የሚአማርር
ሌላውን አድራጊ እራሱን ሰለባ በማድረግ እራሱን አቅሜ ቢስ ያደርጋል። ሌላው ሰው ምን አድርጌ ነው ይህ የደረሰብኝ ብሎ እራሱን በመገምገም እና ሃላፊነት በመውሰድ እራሱን አቅም እንዲኖረው ችግሩን መፍታት እንዲችል የሚያደርግ ነው። እኔ በአንድነት የማምን የሀገር ብሄርትኛ ነኝ እና ጥፋቴን ማምን ሃላፊነቴን መቀበል እፈልጋለሁ። ጣቴን በሌሎች ላይ በማተቆር የራሴን ጥፋቶች መካድ አልፈልግም። በተጨማሪ ሃላፊነት በመውሰዴ የችግሩ ምንጭ እኔ ነኝ በማለት የመፍትሄው ምንጭም እኔው ነኝ ማለት ነው። መፍትሄውን ከሌላ ሰው አልጠብቅም። ይህ ተመልካች ሳይሆን አስፈጻሚ ያደርገኛል። ይህ አቅሜን ከመመንመን ያጎለብተዋል።

2. እውነት ነው፤ እኛ የሀገር ብሄርተኞች ነን የኢትጵያ የፖለቲካዊ ችግሮች ያመጣነው። በጃንሆይ አገዛዝ ሀገሪቷን በተቆጣጠርን ጊዜ አስፈላጊ ለውጦች ባለማድረግ የመደብ እና የጎሳ ጥያቄዎችን አስነሳን። የሀገሩን ትውፊት የሚንቅ የተማሪ እንቅስቃሴን ወለድን። ደርግ የኃይለ ሥላሴን መንግስት አልገለበጠም የኃይለ ሥላሴ መንግስት ነው አስፈላጊ ለውጦች ባለማድረግ እራሱን ለአብዮት ያጋለተው። አብዮቱን የአንድነት ጎራውን ለሁለት ለ«አድሃሪ» እና «ተራማጅ» ከፋፈከው ተራማጁ አድሃሪውን አጠፋ። ከዛ ደግሞ ተራማጆቹ እርስ በርስ ተጨራረሱ። አልፎ ተርፎ ደርግ በ«ኢትዮጵያ ብሄርተኝነት» ስም «ነግዶ» ህዝብን ጭቆነ እና ለሀገር ብሄርተኝነት መጥፎ ስም ሰጠ። ይህ መጥፎ ስም የጎሳ ብሄርተኞችን እንቅስቃሴን አበረታታ። ደርግ ሲወድቅ የሀገር ብሄርተኝነት ጎራ እራሱን አጥፍቶ አልቋል። የጎሳ ብሄርተኞቹ ሙሉ በሙሉ ስልጣን ተቆጣጠሩ። በኃይለ ሥላሴ ምንም አቅም ያልነበርው የጎሳ ብሄርትኝነት አሁን ሀገራችንን ገዝቶ ኤርትራን አስገነጠለ። ይህ በአጭሩ እኛ የሀገር ብሄርተኞች ዛሬ ያለብንን የጎሰኝነት ችግር እንዴት እንዳመጣን ይገልጻል።

3. አሁንም ዋናው የሚያሳስበኝ የኢትዮጵያ ፖለቲካ ጎራ የሀገር ብሄርተኛው ነው። በህዝብ ደረጃ ይህ ጎራ ቢንገዳገድም ደህና ነው። እንደ አብይ አህመድ አይነቱን መሪዎች እየወለደ ነው። ገን በልሂቃን (elite) ደረጃ ችግር እንዳለ ነው። አንድ ሆነን ሀገራችንን ማዳን እንችላለን ወይንም እንዳለፉት 50 ዓመት እርስ በርስ ተከፋፍለን እንደገና የጎሳ ብሄርተኝነት እንዲሰፍን እናደርጋለን? ዋና ጥያቄ ነው። የቅርብ ታሪካችን ጥሩ አይደለም። ይሄው ለኢህአዴግ የ27 ዓመት አገዛዝ አንድ ጠንካራ የፖለቲካ ድርጅት ሀገር ውስጥም ውጭም ማቋቋም አልቻልንም። አሁንስ አንድ ሆነን ከ«ለማ ቡድን» ጋር እየሰራን ሀገራችንን ማዳን እንችላከን? ወይንስ እንደልማዳችን እንከፋፈላለን እና ሀገራችንን ለቀውስ እና ግጭት የሚፈጥረው ጎሰኝነት እንደገና አሳልፈን እንሰአለን? ቁም ነገር ከማድረግ አቅሙ አለን ትያቄ የለውም። ግን ፍላጎቱ አለን ወይ ነው ጥያቄው።

በነዚህ ምክንያቶች ነው በዚህ ወቅት ከሁሉም የፖለቲካ ጎራዎች የሀገር ብሄርተኛ ጎራው የሚያሳስበኝ። እንደ ህወሓት ምናልባትም ኦፌኮ አይነቱ የጎሳ ብሄርተኞች ምንም አያሳስቡኝም። የታወቁ ናቸው በልመና ልንቀይራቸው አንችልም። በስልት፤ በዘዴ እና በውይይት ከነሱ ጋር እንደራደራለን። ግን ለመደራደር እና ውጤታማ ለመሆን የአንድነት ጎራው አንድ እና ጠንካራ መሆን አለበት። ድርድር የሚሳካው እራስን መጀመርያ እራስን ጎልብቶ ነው አለበለዛ ደካማ ከሆንን አይሳካልንም። እርግጠኛ ነኝ የአንድነት ጎራው አንደና ተንካራ ከሆንን በነዚህ ድርድሮች እርግጥ ውጤታማ እንሆናለን የጎሳ ብሄርተኞችን በጥሩ መልክ እንይዛቸዋለን። ግን ከተከፋፈልን የበፊቱ 60 ዓመት ችግሮችን እንቀጥላለን።

Friday, 22 June 2018

ኤርትራ

የ1991 ኢትዮ-ኤርትራ ጦርነት ስለ ባድሜ ወይንም ድንበር አልነበረም። ጉዳዩ የስልጣን የበላይነት ነበር ተፎካካሪዎቹ ሻዕብያ እና ህወሓት ነበሩ።

ደርግ ከስልጣን ሲወርድ ጀምሮ ለሰባት ዓመት ህወሓት እና ሻዕብያ ከሞላ ጎደል አብረው ኢትዮጵያን ገዝተዋታል። አዎን የኢትዮጵያ መንግስት በህወሓት ነበር የሚመራው ግን በህውሓት ፈቃድ እና ድጋፍ ሻዕብያ እንደ «ሁለተኛ መንግስት» ይንቀሳቀስ ነበር። የኤርትራ መንግስት አካላት ከነ ደህንነት ክፍሉ ኢትዮጵያ ውስጥ በይፋም በስውርም ይሰራ ነበር ስልጣንም ነበረው። የኤርትራ መንግስት እና ባለ ሃብቶች በኢትዮጵያ መንግስት ፖሊሲዎች ታላቅ ሚና ይጫወቱ ነበር። ኤርትራ ከብሄራዊ ባንክ ገንዘብ ታገኛ ነበር። ኤርትራዊ ባለ ሃብቶች በምስና የባንክ ብድር፤ የምንግስት ኮንትራት፤ የቀረጥ ነጻ መብት ወዘተ ያገኙ ነበር። ኤርትራዊያን ቡና አለቀረጥ ከኢትዮጵያ ገዝተው ወደ ውጭ ሀገር ይሸጡ ነበር። ወዘተ፤ ምሳሌዎቹ ማስረጃዎቹ በርካታ ናቸው ተመዝግበዋል በአዲሱ የመንግስት ግልጽነት አካሄድ ደግሞ ይበልጥ ወደ ይፋ ይወጣሉ። ድምዳሜው ግን ከ1983 እስከ 1991 የኤርትራ መንግስት እና ኤርትራዊያን ባለ ሃብቶች ኢትዮጵያ ውስጥ አግባብ ያልሆነ ተጽኖ እና ስልጣን ነበራቸው።

ግን ይህ ሁኔታ ሊቀጥል አይችልም ነበር። ምክንያቱም የሀገር ገዥ የነበረው ህወሓት ኢትዮጵያን ሙሉ በሙሉ መቆጣጠር ይፈልግ ነበር። የሀገር መንግስት ሆኖ ልምንድነው ሌላው ሁለተኛ ምነግስት የሚያስተናግደው? ህወሓት የኢትዮጵያን ስልጣንን እና ከኢትዮጵያ የሚገኘውን ጥቅም ለራሱ ይፈልግ ነበር። ኢህአዴግ ውስጥ ያሉት አጋር ፓርቲዎችም እንዲሁም ኢትዮጵያ ከኤርትራ ተጽኖ ነጻ መሆን አለበት እራሳችን ሙሉ በሙሉ መግዛት አለብን የሚል አቋም ነበራቸው። በዛው መጠን ሻዕብያ በኢትዮጵያ ያለውን ጥቅም እና ስልጣን መልቀቅ አልፈለገም። በዚህ ጉዳይ መደራደር አልተፈለገም ተፎካካሪዎቹ በጡንቻ መጋጠም ወሰኑ። በአጭሩ ይህ ነበር የህወሓት እና የሻዕብያ ግጭት እና የጦርነቱ ምንጭ።

ከጦርነቱ በኋላ በህወሓት እና ኢህአዴግ ክፍፍል ምክንያት ወደ «ጦርነትም ሰላምም የለም» ("no war no peace") ዘመን ገባን። ለምን እስከ መጨረሻ ሄደን አሰብን አልወሰድንም ሻዕብያን አላፈርሰንም የሚሉ ነበሩ። ስለዚህ የህወሓት የፖለቲካ ስምምነት ያንን ባናደርግም ኤርትራን በማግለል ሻዕብያን እንጎዳለን ሆነ። ሻዕብያ በኢትዮጵያ አሳቦ የሀገራቸውን ኤኮኖሚ እና የህዝብ ሞራል ይገላል እና ቀስ ብሎ ይወድቃል ነበር በኢትዮጵያ መንግስት የነበረው አስተሳሰብ። ከዛ በኋላ ከኢትዮጵያ ጋር በተሻለ መልኩ ለመደራደር ዝግጁ የሆነ መንግስት ኤርትራ ውስጥ ስልጣን ይይዝ እና ከነሱ ጋር እንደራደራለን ነበር የኢህአዴግ አቋም።

ስለዚህ ባጭሩ የ«ጦርነትም ሰላምም የለም» ፖሊሲ ሁለት አላማ ነበረው፤ 1) ሻዕብያን ከስልጣን ማውረድ ለኢትዮጵያ ወይንም ለህወሓት የሚመች መንግስት እንዲመጣ እና 2) ኤርትራ እንደ ሀገር ኃይሏ ከኢትዮያ አንጻር እንዲመነምን እና በዚህ ምክንያት ለኢትዮጵያ አመቺ የሆነ የድርድር ሁኔታ እንዲፈጠር።

ዛሬ አንደኛው ግብ አልተመታም ግን ሁለተኛው ተመቷል ወይንም ከዚህ በላይ ሊመታ አይችልም። ማለተም ካሁን ወድያ ኤርትራን ለማድከም ተብሎ ይህ ፖሊሲ ቢቀጥል ጉዳቱ ከጥቅሙ ይበልጣል። ሻዕብያ እና ኤርትራ የሚማሩት ትምሕርትሮች ከነበሩ ተምረውታል። የኤኮኖሚ ችግር በቂ አይተውታል። ሻዕብያ መሪው ኢሳያስ አፈወርቂ ከህውየት እስኪለዩ መግዛት መቀጠሉ ግልጽ ሆኗል። ከዛ በኋላ ደግሞ ትርምስ የሚመጣ ይመስላል የሻዕብያን የመገንጠል ጦርነትን የማያስታውስ ጭቆና ብቻ የሚያስታውስ አዲስ ትውልድ ወደ ፊት እየመጣ ሲሄድ። ስለዚህ ነው የአብይ አህመድ መንግስት ይበቃል ወደ ሰላም እና ድርድር እንግባ ያለው። ትርምስ ሳይመጣ ጠላት ሀገሮች እጃቸውን አለ ቁጥጥር ኤርትራ ውስጥ መክተት ከሚጀምሩ በፊት ካሁኑኑ የቀረውን የወንድማማቾች ስሜትን ተጠቅመን እንደራደር ነው።

ይህ ጥሩ አካሄድ ይመስለኛል። እንዳልኩት የ «ጦርነትም ሰላምም የለም» ፖሊሲ በቂ ሰርቷል ምቀጠሉ ለኢትዮጵያ አይጠቅማትም። ከዚህ አልፎ ተርፎ የኤርትራ ችግር ብቻ ሳይሆን የኢትዮጵያ የቅርብ የፖለቲካ ለውጦች የሁለቱን ሀገራት የኃይል ሚዛን እጅግ ወደ ኢትዮጵያ አመዝኖታል። በህወሓት ዘመን የኢትዮጵያ ህዝብ የሚጠላው ከፋፋይ መንግስት ስለነበር ሀገሪቷን የተከፋፈለች ከሚገባት ደካማ ኃይል እንዲኖራት አድርጓል። በዛን ጊዜ ኢትዮጵያ ከኤርትራ ጋር ድርድር ብትገጥም ውጤቱ ደካማ ነበር የሚሆነው። አሁን ግን ህዝቡ በሙሉ አንድ ስለሆነ እነ አብይ አህመንድ ወደ ድርድር ሲገቡ ያንን ሁሉ ኃይል ይዘው ስለሚገቡ ታላቅ ድል ማድረስ ይችላሉ። እንደ ድሮ የሻዕብያን ብልጠት መፍራት የለም። እንደ ድሮ ኤርትራ እና ኢትዮጵያ እንደ እኩለኛማቾች አደሉም። ኢትዮጵያ ታላቅ፤ ግዙፍ እና ባለ ኃይል ናት ኤርትራ እንደሚገባት የኢትዮጵያ አንድ አስረኛ ናት። ይህ ለድርድር ጥሩ ሜዳ ነው። በእውነታ የተመሰረተ ትክክል እና ዘላቂ ስምምነት እንዲኖር የሚያደርግ ሜዳ ነው።

ባጭሩ የጠቅላይ ሚኒስቴር አብይ አህመድ የ«ጦርነትም ሰላምም የለም» የሚለውን ፖሊሲ ያቆመው ምክንያት ጥቅሙ ስላለቀ እና ለኢትዮጵያ አሁኑኑ ከኤርትራ ጋር ድርድር መግባት አዋጪ ስለሆነ ነው። እዚህ ላይ ማለት የምፈልገው አንድ ነገር አለ። ለኔ ኤርትራ እና ኢትዮጵያ አንድ ናቸው። የኤርትራ ህዝብ ኢትዮጵያዊ አይደለሁም ለማለት ሙሉ መብት አሉ በዚህ መብት አምናለሁ። ግን ለኔ ኤርትራኖች ሀገሬዎች ወንድሞቼ ናቸው። ከዛም አልፎ ከኢትዮጵያ የተገነጠሉት በኔ በኛ ጥፋት እንጂ በነሱ ክፋት አይደለም ብዬ ነው የማምነው። ስለዚህ ለኔ ይህ ድርድር ስለኤኮኖሚ ብቻ ሳይሆን ስለ ህዝባዊ ግንኙነተና ትሥስር ነው። የመለያየታችን ቁስሎች፤ ትዕቢቶች፤ ውሸቶች፤ ወዘተ የማስወገድ መጀመርያ ነው። እነ አብይ አህመድ ይህንን ለማድረግ እግዚአብሔር ይርዳቸው ይድራን!

Thursday, 27 October 2016

One Response to the ODF's “Our Common Future: A Proposal”

2009/2/17 (Ethiopian calendar)
2016/10/27 (European calendar)

(pdf)

[Note: An Amharic version of this post will appear sometime!]

It was with great pleasure that I read the Oromo Democratic Front's (ODF) discussion paper “Our Common Future: A Proposal.” It has been a long time since I read a constructive and inviting paper from an Ethiopian political party, a paper inviting us to do work rather than mire ourselves in sloganeering and pity. I commend the ODF for their initiative, and my aim here is to answer their invitation for a response to their proposal. I am but an individual commentator, a mere layman representing no one but myself, but I hope that my comments do the proposal some justice. I shall make my comments on the ideas in the proposal based on the order they were presented in the paper.

I fully agree with the ODF that a country-wide consensus” on Ethiopia is indeed urgently required, but it has been urgently required for 22 years. The last 'consensus', the 1994 FDRE constitution was in my opinion too radical and not consultative enough, and so we've been waiting for a better one ever since. However, such consensuses are not created overnight, or in a conference or two. It takes years of discussion and deliberation to develop positions, let alone agreements on such a complicated matter as a country's political structure. It is remarkable that the Ethiopian opposition in all its forms has for 25 years hardly made any progress in this matter. We seem to be discussing the same issues over and over again, with the same confrontational zero-sum mindset as in the past. So we would all do well to heed what the ODF recommends and begin work immediately on this “country-wide consensus”.

Next, the proposal frames the current political problem as one between two opposing sides – the current regime as one side and those wanting a “unitary nation” as the other. It implies that “core Oromo demands” have been “sidestepped” or ignored in this debate. This framing is, to put it bluntly, wholly inaccurate. First, though I'm sure there are many that wish for a unitary nation, that is no federal system whatsoever, they form a small minority. To illustrate this, consider the official position of Kinijit and its successor parties in this regard, which was to maintain the current (federal) constitution as it is for the foreseeable future, and past that, amend it as per its own provisions! What kind of amendment it would be was not decided, but there were many proposals, ranging from language-based federalism, which would be almost the same as the current arrangement but simply replacing the concept of ethnicity with language, to federalism with states with redrawn boundaries removing ethnicity entirely. None of this makes for a centralized “unitary nation” -- it is at the very least federalism of some sort. Given Kinijit's large constituency as shown by its electoral victory, this is the majority position, not that of a “unitary nation”.

Second, unless I am mistaken, the main “core Oromo demand” is that the current constitution actually be respected rather than the EPRDF and TPLF in particular using its extrajudicial power to exercise undue influence. This demand is not sidestepped and has not been sidestepped in the debate in any way since all sides that have significant constituencies affirm the current constitution as a political reality, whether they like it or not. I would like to note here that if anything is being sidestepped it is the core demands of the Ethiopian nationalists, since the status quo already fulfils a large portion of the “Oromo demands”, which is a multinational state! The status quo has already brought Ethiopia, constitutionally speaking, from one extreme to the other extreme. There is no possible going further! Thus Oromo demands in this regard have been exceedingly fulfilled, save for the actual implementation portion.

Other demands, such as Oromiffa becoming an official federal language are also supported by all major constituencies. All this to say that talk about the “unitary nation” constituency is a red herring, and therefore presenting the current regime and the “unitary nation” constituency as the poles in the debate is incorrect.

Instead, the debate is multipolar, perhaps too multipolar. If we consider Oromia as one constituency, we have in Oromia a spectrum all the way from Ethiopian nationalists to soft Oromo nationalists to hardline Oromo nationalists. These factions themselves have a lot to sort out in terms of simply agreeing to disagree, let alone being able to unite into one constituency.

Then we have the Ethiopian nationalist constituency, which includes perhaps most of Amhara region, but also that large disenfranchised group of non-Amhara Ethiopians and mixed Ethiopians who consider themselves not to be ethnic nationalists. This constituency is the one that voted for Kinijit, and since its diversity means that it does not have ethnicity as a binding material, so to speak, it is an extremely fractious constituency. The inability of this constituency to “avoid the hair-splitting type of exchanges” and other dysfunctional traits in order to reach a basic consensus has, in my opinion, been the main reason for Ethiopia's current troubles and will end up being the ruin of the nation(s).

Third, there is the EPRDF, which though it has internal divisions is certainly the most united and coherent constituency. As the ODF proposal says, the EPRDF is convinced, or tries to convince itself, that there is no alternative to it. Well, we must admit that there is some truth in this, and the ODF proposal is proof of this in that it clearly outlines divisions in Ethiopian politics that have nothing to do with the EPRDF. We all know that were the EPRDF to vanish today, as the proposal implies, there is no consensus among the rest of us, so there would be anarchy. However, the lack of a consensus amongst the opposition has not stopped the EPRDF from the increasing “social rejection” that the proposal speaks of. Indeed, if we look to the past, both the Haile Selassie and Dergue regimes fell into some sort of anarchy, not into a ready opposition. So a weak opposition is no guarantee of long life for the EPRDF – it is only a guarantee of a hard fall. Thus the EPRDF had better start doing something to actually aid the opposition to develop rather than persecuting it.

Next, I would like to comment on the ODF conviction that the current constitution – Ethiopia as a multinational state – was “unavoidable”, implying that it is Ethiopia's destiny and natural state. Of course, it is the conviction of us Ethiopian nationalists (non ethnic nationalists) that Ethiopia as a multinational state, let alone being its natural state, is an unstable state ripe for conflict. Here we agree to disagree, but as I stated above, as was Kinijit's official position, most Ethiopian nationalists accept political reality and work within the current constitution. I would just like to add that talk of inevitability of the multinational state completely ignores other factors in Ethiopia's recent political past, including pseudo-feudalism, communism, and the Cold War, all of which are not ethnicity and yet have played a significant role in forming today's political reality. Ignoring these factors is I think a misreading of history that affects our perception of current political reality.

Now on to the numbered sections of the ODF proposal. The first, about the benefits of non-violent versus armed struggle is a case well made and there is little to argue about here. We agree to disagree with those who favour armed struggle! I would just like to add a point about 'democracy' however, as the document states that one thing all Ethiopian movements agree on is the goal of democracy. What we laymen think of us democracy is one man one vote, which immediately excludes group rights, especially huge group rights such as ethnic rights. Our problem is precisely that we do not agree with what democracy means and we cannot agree until we come to a general consensus about what our country should look like – in other words its constitution not only as it is formally written, but its spirit. So the term democracy becomes, I believe, a distraction as we work on the “country wide consensus” that this proposal advocates for. If we keep talking about democracy, we'll end up with the same problem as the Egyptian Arab Spring movement, which upon realizing that what it thought was democracy ended up empowering the Muslim Brotherhood a little too much decided it didn't want democracy after all.

The second section, on the divisive role of Ethiopian history, is excellent. I completely agree that short of some sort of miracle, we are going to have to learn to agree to disagree about Ethiopian history. I actually think that reasonable people can agree on a set of unbiased facts about Ethiopian history – that's not the main problem. The problem is that we all interpret these facts with our own political lens. Let's take the simple example of the concept of the Oromo nation. The Oromo in Ethiopia have at various times in history formed various nations, perhaps even a single nation, been an integral part as an ethnic group, not a nation, of the Ethiopian nation as we know it, assimilated into and assimilated other groups, invaded and have been invaded, terrorized and have been terrorized, etc. Most reasonable people would agree on this set of facts. I interpret this history as the Oromo being one of the ethnic groups in Ethiopia while others interpret this as the Oromo nation being distinct from what it calls Ethiopia, as having had various interactions with Ethiopia, but as a nation unto itself. Same facts, different interpretations, but these differences have major implications on building the “country-wide consensus”.

The good thing is that if we “can agree to disagree with different readings” of Ethiopian history, then we can take history out of the Ethiopian nationalism vs ethnic nationalism debate, and this would greatly help unfog the debate. The debate then will simply be about political position rather than history, grievance, etc. This kind of development is would not be new – the example of Canada and Quebec is a case in point. The history of Canada is simple and well-documented – there's not much to argue about its contents. Quebec nationalists interpret the history as that of a Quebec nation invaded and with a right to independence, while others view the history as a competition between two North American colonialists which one party won and is a fait accompli. Same facts, different interpretations. But the only important fact here is that Quebec nationalists want independence today, regardless of history, and the opposite side wants a single Canada, regardless of history. It is current political competition that drives the debate.

The third section on self-determination is also excellent in that it nicely breaks down a large idea – ethnic self determination in the context of Ethiopia – into smaller principles that are much easier to discuss and come to agreement on. I agree with all the premises as they apply in this context. (I disagree with “being an Oromo was officially portrayed as antithetical to being an Ethiopian”, but that's not one of the principles, just an aside.) However, there is more to go – it is a bare minimum, not surprisingly, as this is proposal is just a starting point. One can agree with all the premises, as I do, yet disagree on their political interpretation, as I do with the interpretation of the ODF.

Finally, the fourth and fifth sections dealing with the zero sum attitudes in Ethiopian politics, particularly as it relates to demonizing opponents and lacking empathy. The proposal makes it clear that in order to properly learn from the past, we have to empathize not only with current opponents but with past actors and understand why they did what they did. If we do so, we will realize that there was and in the case of the EPRDF there is some good that they have done, and these should be built upon, rather than everything having to be torn down and built up again.

I completely agree with these thoughts. The zero sum mentality means for a complete absence of introspection, which in turn means continual conflict. With a little bit of empathy and introspection, much of the current conflict would be easily transformed. I think Ethiopians have to start giving the saying 'a people get the government they deserve' much more weight than we currently do. As I am fond of saying, much of the reason Ethiopia today has an ethnic-based constitution that Ethiopian nationalists do not like (but accept!) is because Ethiopian nationalists committed political suicide over the two decades before the new constitution was formed, so that they were unable to be at the table. Yet we Ethiopian nationalists continue to blame the EPRDF for it, as if the EPRDF could suddenly reverse its cherished ideology and take a huge political risk once in power! Unfortunately, it is this focus on continually blaming the EPRDF for everything that has kept us unable to fix our own problems and therefore kept us weak and inept.

In conclusion, I think the ODF proposal is an excellent document that all stakeholders in Ethiopian politics should read, discuss, and build upon. However, let us reflect on why previous such attempts, such as Medrek, for example, have stuttered and failed, and learn from those mistakes. Also, let us ask ourselves where the other stakeholders are while the grassroots, leaderless, is up in arms.