I believe that, today, the main hurdle facing Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed et al as they work on solving Ethiopia's various political problems is the imbalance between the ethnic nationalist and civic nationalist (Ethiopianist) elites. This imbalance has resulted in a distorted political landscape, a distortion which if left uncorrected, will continue to obstruct any possible progress.
What exactly is this distortion? Today, ethnic nationalist elite power and institutional power adequately reflects the level of support for ethnic nationalism among the masses. On the other hand, civic nationalist elite power and institutional power greatly under represents the level of support for civic nationalism among the masses. In simple terms, let us assume half the general population supports civic nationalism and the other half ethnic nationalism. The problem is that 80% of the political elite, in terms of political parties, power, organized influence, and institutional power, is composed of ethnic nationalists. The
civic nationalist elite is running at 20%. That is, our political elite is overwhelmingly dominated by ethnic nationalists, while the general population is at worst evenly split between ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism. This political distortion is, in my opinion, the overarching problem in Ethiopian politics that continues to prevent any kind of reality-based, serious negotiations among our political elites.
While the ethnic nationalist elite hopes to use this disproportionate leverage that it has gained from over 27 years of domination to its advantage, the civic nationalist elite are too weak to respond constructively. The under represented civic nationalist masses absolutely refuse to give in to any kind of ethnic nationalist agenda. We have an impasse. Unless the 'elite distortion' is corrected, the impasse will continue and we will never be able to take solid steps towards a robust and long lasting political settlement.
Now, obviously, many would question my premise that there still is today in Ethiopian massive support for civic nationalism. Many would say that no, there is not much support for civic nationalism today in Ethiopia, and the weakness of its elite properly reflects this low support. Well, let me address this briefly. Since we do not have any polls in Ethiopia, we have to take various indicators as evidence when we make our arguments. Let us look at these indicators.
First, there is a good argument to be made that there are reasons for the weakness of the civic nationalist elite that have nothing to do with dwindling support for civic nationalism among the general population. Over the past fifty plus years, the civic nationalist elite has suffered from tremendous internal conflict - two
endogenous revolutions and upheavals - the 1974 revolution and the Red Terror - and then one exogenous revolution, the 1991 revolution. The end effect of all of this was more or less the ousting of civic nationalist elites from Ethiopian political space.
Another external factor that weakened the elite was the rise of Marxism, which not only divided the Ethiopianist elite and infected it with a culture of self-mutilation, but also weakened the country with poor political and economic policies. This weakened not only the country as a whole, but also the elite, as it resulted in the masses becoming alienated from the leadership. And then add to this another factor - the fall of Marxism (Soviet Union), an event which led to the sudden and ungraceful collapse of the Dergue. And to all of this we can add another, underappreciated factor - a political culture of nearly
devoid of conflict resolution. All of these factors contributed to a massive implosion of the civic nationalist elite, an implosion which had little to do with its constituency among the masses. The elite collapsed while its constituency remained more or less intact.
The subsequent 27 years of ethnic nationalist rule by the TPLF, with its sustained anti-civic nationalism propaganda and policies, can be said to have increased overall support for ethnic nationalism among the population. Again, we have no polls, but there is enough anecdotal evidence to make this argument. However, there is also evidence that this increase in ethnic nationalism is often over-estimated. Take, for example, what we can take away from the case of the 2005 elections. The civic nationalist Kinijit won an easy majority of the national vote in this election, and Kinijit together with the Hibret, a coalition of soft ethnic nationalists, won 70% of the total vote (before the rigging started). This result was quite unexpected at the time, and one reason why it was unexpected was that few thought that there remained so much support for civic nationalism. The results of the vote showed that even after 14 years (1991-2005) of TPLF propaganda against civic nationalism, civic nationalism was alive and strong.
Today, after 13 years after the 2005 election, there is more anecdotal evidence of the decline of civic nationalism support; for example, the increase in heretofore unheard of Amhara nationalism. But on the other hand, we have seen overwhelming support nation-wide for Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Oromia President Lemma Megersa, a large part of the support obviously stemming from their Ethiopianist rhetoric and positions. This outpouring of support for PM Abiy et al clearly shows that civic nationalism, among the masses at least, is alive and well in Ethiopia. So yes, all in all, I think it is safe to say that today, at least half of the Ethiopian population firmly support civic nationalism.
But how is this population represented among the political elite and in political and governmental institutions? The civic nationalist populace today has basically two elite representatives - Ginbot 7, and a part of the EPRDF, that represented by Abiy Ahmed, Team Lemma, et al. I argue that this representation is quite inadequate given the level of civic nationalist support among the masses.
Let us start with the EPRDF... The EPRDF was a full fledged ethnic nationalist coalition that is now being transformed from within towards civic nationalism. But transforming this decades old institution will deep rooted tentacles will take time. Ethnic nationalists are, obviously, resisting that transformation with full force. As a result, the EPRDF is yet to make a solid connection with the civic nationalist masses. Instead, it remains focused on this internal battle, the battle we are all familiar with, the battle that Abiy Ahmed and his team is currently engaged in. Now, to ensure that civic nationalism wins this battle, civic nationalists have to do two things. The first is to capture the EPRDF from within by changing minds, and the second is to capture it by, where possible joining the various EPRDF parties and basically outnumbering the ethnic nationalists and changing the power balance. As of yet, this process still at its beginning stages. So the EPRDF today cannot be said in anyway fully represent the civic nationalist population. There is a long way to go.
Ginbot 7, a brave and valiant party, basically the only civic nationalist party of any consequence, remains too small both in terms of membership and resources, to adequately represent the Ethiopianist masses. A clear illustration of this gap between the capacity of Ginbot 7 and the support for civic nationalism is the situation of Addis Ababa, where the vast majority of the city clearly supports civic nationalism, and yet there is not a single group, including Ginbot 7, which has harnessed this support into an organized and powerful political or civic force. Hence we have an Addis Ababa populace that, because it has no organized representation,
feels powerless in the face of what it thinks is encirclement by ethnic nationalism. Easily over 80% of Addis Ababa's population of about five million are firm supporters of civic nationalism. How is it that such a large and resourceful population feels powerless? Because it is not organized - it is insufficiently represented among elites and institutions. Not because it is outnumbered, not because it is a minority, and not because it lacks in raw resources and capacity, but because it is unorganized, unrepresented, and incapable of mobilizing its resources. This example of Addis Ababa clearly illustrates the lack of capacity of Ginbot 7 has today.
Let us look, on the other hand, at the ethnic nationalist end of the scale. Clearly, the ethnic nationalist population has been well represented by its elites for the past 27 years. During this period, the ruling party has been ethnic nationalist, and all institutions, including the educational institutions, have been captured by ethnic nationalists in terms of numbers, propaganda, and policy. Even though today, the EPRDF is reforming towards civic nationalism, the institutional attachment to ethnic nationalism remains. Even today, ethnic nationalists in the party still hold significant power especially in Oromia and among the lower ranks. Given the size and nature of the EPRDF, it will take a long time for it to shed ethnic nationalism and then to connect with the civic nationalist population. Apart from the EPRDF, ethnic nationalist opposition parties, especially Oromo ones, are relatively well organized from top to bottom. In general, I don't think anyone would claim that the ethnic nationalist population lacks for elite representation in any way.
So there we have it, a relatively strong ethnic nationalist elite and a relatively weak civic nationalist elite. And at the same time, the division among the population at large between ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism is at most 50-50. A distorted political reality. Half the population is well represented but the other half is not.
How does this situation prevent Ethiopian politics from proceeding to a reasonable settlement? Well, given the distorted reality, elite negotiation between a strong ethnic nationalist elite and weak civic nationalist elite will result in the ethnic nationalists having the disproportionate upper hand and gaining disproportionate rewards. The result is a disgruntled and fearful civic nationalist populace whose wishes have been ignored. This populace may in the short term acquiesce, but in the long term it will either rebel or itself become ethnic nationalist, increasing the level of ethnicism in the country. In both cases the result will be
catastrophic conflict.
So basically, either the civic nationalist elite organizes into a capable force or the country spirals into conflict and chaos. Yes, this is an existential issue.
Unfortunately, the task of empowering the civic nationalist elite is not an easy one. Civic nationalism cannot rely on ethnic fervor to mobilize itself as ethnic nationalists can. Instead, it will be tough slogging. Perhaps it is the knowledge that this work is tough and difficult that has led many civic nationalist elite members - including political parties and media - to simply avoid facing it, and rather spend their time raising the decibels against ethnic nationalists. Of course, avoiding the necessary tough work is no solution. What must be done must be done, as painful and hard as it must be.
From now on, the one and only priority of civic nationalists must be to strengthen the elite. Time and resources on 'opposition' activities, such as analysing, commentating on, and criticizing others' political activities and events should be minimized. Instead, all energy should be directed towards strengthening existing institutions such as Ginbot 7, creating additional political and civic institutions, mobilizing the civic nationalist population, and capturing the EPRDF.
A last word... A precondition to empowerment of the civic nationalist elite is a certain unity of thought and direction heretofore unseen among them. The culture of conflict mismanagement illustrated, for example, by the Kinijit conflict of 2005-2008, the various party conflicts of the last few years (Andinet, Medrek, etc.), the EDU internal conflicts during and after the Dergue, etc. must be ended!
