Understanding Ethnic 'Soft Nationalism' for Ethiopian Nationalists

I find in our discussions of the "ethnic question" - of Ethiopian vs ethnic nationalism and the various shades in between - a lack of understanding of the various shades between, which we normally call 'soft nationalism'.

For Ethiopian nationalists, there are three spots on the Ethiopian - ethnic nationalist spectrum. These are 1) radical ethnic nationalists who want nothing but secession, 2) those who like the radicals consider Ethiopia a prison of nations but consent stay within Ethiopia so long as Ethiopian satisfies their demands, and 3) Ethiopian nationalists.

But the situation is of course far more complex - the spectrum is not discrete with three spots - it is continuous - various shades, like I said above. And, more importantly, individuals and even groups shift often from one position on the spectrum to another. Their opinions are not fixed in stone - they change depending on various factors.

I will use an example from Quebec 'ethnic' nationalism in Canada, which I've previously discussed here (http://asfawdarguemeshal.blogspot.com/2017/05/using-canada-to-understand-ethiopian.html). Before having given up on their dream of secession, which has become impossible due to demographic changes, Quebec nationalists used to monitor public opinion polls in order to time when to call a referendum on secession. Generally speaking, when the economy was good, polls would indicate relatively low support for secession, say 35%. This would not be a good a time to call a referendum. But when the economy dipped, support for secession would pass the 50% mark, reaching 60% or so. In this situation, if the timing was right, the Quebec nationalist party would win the provincial election and soon hold a referendum. This was the political pattern in Quebec from the early to mid 1970's to a few years ago.

The interesting point here for us Ethiopian nationalists is why the support for secession would range from 35% to 60%. Who are these people that change their minds? Are they ethnic nationalists? Or ethnic nationalists one day and Canadian nationalists the next? What makes them change their minds? Is it just the economy or are there other factors.

This group of people is what I call here the soft nationalists. And you can imagine that they were the primary target of politicians on both sides of the Quebec secession debate since the hardcore ethnic nationalists and hardcore Canadian nationalists were pretty much reliable in their opinions. But whoever managed to get the soft nationalist 'swing vote' would win. You can see that the soft nationalist constituency is extremely important in the struggle between country and ethnic nationalism.

Though we have had no polls taken in Ethiopia, anecdotally we have seen the same kind of thing happen in Ethiopia in the Abiy Ahmed era. Some Oromos who only some months ago were ethnic nationalists, because of the ascendancy of Oromos such as Abiy and Lemma Megersa to political prominence, and because of their positive and empowering rhetoric, have changed positions from ethnic nationalism and moved towards Ethiopian nationalism. However, if circumstances change, these people could swing back to ethnic nationalism.

What is the mindset of soft nationalists? They like all of us identify to some degree with their ethnicity and to some degree with Ethiopianism. Various circumstances can change which identification they lean towards. For example, if the economy is good - if they are happy - they tend to prefer the status quo. If their is some sort of ethnic conflict, this will push them to identify more towards their ethnicity. If some prominent Ethiopians start spewing anti-Oromo rhetoric they will get insulted and move towards their ethnicity. If they see Oromos in positions of leadership, or if they see Afan Oromo and other aspects of their identity prominently featured in our politics and culture, they will move towards Ethiopian nationalism. This is basically how soft nationalism works - it is fluid based on various factors.

Here I will add another example from recent Ethiopian history - that of Eritrea. When Eritrea was confederated with Ethiopia, a vast majority of Eritreans happily supported this move and considered themselves Ethiopia. As various factors changed negatively, including the ending of the confederation, but most importantly the terror of the Dergue regime, the huge support for Ethiopia turned towards support for secession! What a turnaround and what a lesson, if we would learn from it.

It's clear that this soft nationalist constituency group is very important for Ethiopian nationalists in our struggle against radical ethnic nationalism and the conflict that it generates. It is important that in we focus on soft nationalists in our political discourse to ensure that they come to and remain on the side of Ethiopian nationalism and to ensure that we don't push them into the arms of ethnic nationalists. How do we do this?

1. Ensure good governance and a decent economy. The Dergue basically pushed Eritreans out by making Ethiopia an unlivable country for all. While Ethiopian nationalists react to this via civic protest, soft nationalists react to such stress by becoming more ethnic nationalist.

2. Ensure the ethnic demands of soft nationalists are addressed. Some might call this 'appeasement', I would call it political realism. For example, given at least 35% of Ethiopia's population is Oromo-speaking, making Afan Oromo an official federal language makes sense not just as appeasement but to strengthen Ethiopia.

3. Ensure diplomatic rhetoric around the issue of ethnic nationalism and avoid statements that ethnic nationalists can use to swing soft nationalists their way. For example, if someone insults or says something considered insulting about Oromos, this will be eagerly used as political fodder by the ethnic nationalists to illustrate that Ethiopian nationalists are racists and elitists. So this must be avoided at all costs. I should add here that I have found certain officials of Patriotic Ginbot 7 especially adroit at this tactic (see this article: http://asfawdarguemeshal.blogspot.com/2016/11/some-basics-on-interacting-with-ethnic.html). As an aside, during the two Quebec referendum campaigns, the ethnic nationalist side would careful monitor all statements by Canadian nationalists looking for some sort of insult or slight that they could use in their campaign. At the same time, the Canadian nationalist side would expend significant resources trying to prevent this!

So, to sum up, there is such a political phenomenon as soft nationalism. For the Ethiopian nationalist constituency and leadership, it is important to understand this and address soft nationalists concerns in order to bring them towards Ethiopian nationalism. This strategy is in my opinion a must in keeping radical ethnic nationalism at bay in Ethiopia.

Using Canada To Understand Ethiopian Ethnic Federalism Today

I am fortunate to have acquired a somewhat intimate knowledge of Canadian politics and have found that, unlike US politics for example, Canadian politics holds wonderful parallels and lessons for Ethiopia in the area of federalism and ethnic federalism. So in this article I will briefly describe the history and nature of Canadian politics and how it can help us understand the Ethiopian political reality today, especially concerning ethnic federalism.

Here’s the (very) brief history… Canada was settled by English and French colonists beginning in the 1600’s. Soonafter, the English and French began warring for control of Canada (and North America as a whole), and around 1770, the English won decisively. However, in order to avoid problems with the large French population that had already settled in what is today known as the province of Quebec, the English government allowed the French to use their own language, worship in their own religion (Catholic), and to keep their own system of law (civil law). Over the following decades and centuries, the English continued to grant Quebec various such levels of autonomy and self-governance, both official and unofficial. For example, Quebec had its own legislature and French and both provincial and federal government services were provided in French and English. Unofficially, almost every second Canadian Prime Minister from 1867 (the official formation of Canada) onwards was French.

Nevertheless, despite such increasing levels of autonomy and recognition of language rights (note that it was always refered to as ‘language’, not ‘ethnic’ rights), ethnic nationalism in the French province of Quebec did not go away. The idea that Quebec was different from the rest of Canada, to the extent that it should secede and be a different country, actually grew over the decades despite increasing political and economic fortunes. So much so that in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, there was a small armed resistance advocating for the separation of Quebec. This was followed by increasing support for even more autonomy and even secession among both the Quebec population and its French elite.

This resulted in two referendums on secession. In the first referendum of 1980, the ‘yes’ side – the secession side - lost by a significant margin. But, the fact that it was held at all and that it gained 40% support scared enough people that the federal government took even further steps to give Quebec more autonomy, to increase the prominence of French throughout the country, and to unofficially increase the amount of money Quebec got from the federal government. Yet, despite this, a second referendum was held 1995, strategically at a time when the economy was in recession and people were angry. This referendum was again won by the ‘no’ side, but by only one percentage point 50.5% to 49.5%! Significantly, 60% of native French speakers voted for secession, but almost 100% of English and other language speakers voted against secession. Thus, despite being a small minority, non-French speakers were the decisive voters in the referendum.

Today, there is little interest in secession in Quebec – or to put it more accurately, it seems impossible for the 40% of Quebec who still support secession to get enough support from the rest of the population to win a referendum.

What are the lessons to learn from this Canadian example for Ethiopia?

Modernization, rather than reducing ethnic nationalism, can actually increase it. As Quebec modernized, became less religious, more affluent, etc. support for ethnic nationalism, manifested in reduction in English and other (non-French) language rights, secession from Canada, etc. actually increased! Modernization and increased ethnic nationalism go hand in hand.

Canada over the centuries embarked on various policies aimed at accommodating and satisfying the demands of French Quebecers such as the granting of extensive language rights, allowing the suppression of English and other languages in Quebec, making French an official language of the entire country despite only a tiny French population outside Quebec, transfering large amounts of federal money to Quebec despite the wealth of Quebec, etc. The political calculation was that if the demands of French Quebecers were met, they would be less likely to manifest their ethnic nationalism in ways that would cause dramatic damage the rest of Canada, such as secession. This shows that ethnic nationalism cannot be defeated by a stick – it requires plenty of carrot.

However, all over the above policies may have slowed the pace of increasing ethnic nationalism, but did not stop it. The results of the 1995 referendum, which almost initiated a process of secession or at least more separated federal arrangement, shows that accommodating ethnic nationalism, though helpful for some time, will not at the end stop the movement.

Ethnic nationalism does not fundamentally mean secession. It is the desire of a certain group for special rights above the rights of the rest of the population, in recognition that this group is a nation, or a pseudo-nation. For hardline ethnic nationalists, this recognition can only be realized within a politically separate nation. For ‘softer’ nationalists, having asymmetric rights within one nation is enough. Having more autonomy than other provinces, having a French-only province, having the federal language use French equal to English, etc. is enough for them to express their nationhood. The common theme however is that it has to have special rights as a group, even though these rights impinge upon the rights of other citizens.

An immigrant to Quebec cannot send his child to English school. English has not official status as a language in Quebec. Anyone in Quebec who does not speak French is de facto a second class citizen. More so than someone who does not speak English and lives in the English parts of Canada. ‘Native’ Quebecers – those who trace their ancestry to the original French Quebecers – are a privileged class in Quebec, even more so that ‘native’ English are in the rest of Canada. These are the practical consequences of ethnic nationalism – asymmetric rights and privilege that impinge on others’ rights.

Quebec nationalists go out of their way to emphasize that theirs is not an ‘ethnic’ nationalism, but a geographic (Quebec) or language-based (French) nationalism. The reason is that ethnic nationalism is seen within Canadian politics as a whole as primitive and potentially discriminatory. Thus when after the failed 1995 referendum one of the leaders of the Quebec separatist movement (truthfully) said that they lost the vote because of English speakers and immigrants, he was roundly denounced by his own side. What he said was true but not the perception of Quebec separatism that separatists wanted to portray. They wanted to portray their side as open to all, especially immigrants, with the common goal of having an independent Quebec. Ethnic nationalism is in a mature political arena seen as too divisive and dangerous by all sides.

Ethnic nationalism is politically costly. Since its inception, Canada has an extraordinary amount of its political energy on this issue. This energy could have been better spend on the myriad of other matters, such as the economy, trade, government organization, etc. that are everyday political issues in any other nation. The cost has been not only to Canada as a whole, but particularly to Quebec. In Quebec, most issues are sign primarily or at least secondarily through ethnic nationalist implications. Even political parties are organized around this issue, instead of around other ideology or interest groups.

Ethnic nationalist is economically costly. Canada spends significant amounts of money implementing the asymmetrical rights and privileges to Quebec that I mentioned above. The Quebec economy, too, has long been held hostage to the ethnic nationalist movement’s desire to use the economy first and foremost as a tool to promote its ethnic nationalist agenda.

Ethnic nationalism can only be significantly weaked through demographics, including integration and assimilation with the rest of the population. As I said above, though accommodation is often necessary and helpful, at the end of the day, it will only slow the tide of ethnic nationalism, not stop it. If it were not for the changing demographics in Quebec resulting from increasing numbers of immigrants, today Quebec might be a separate country or a very separate province in Canada. Immigrants and their children have increased the population of those whose mother tongue is not French to over 20%, and This group is not only not part of Quebec nationalism, but against it. Whereas accommodation could not defeat ethnic nationalism, demographics has done the job. For now.

These lessons are, as far as I am concerned, very much applicable to today’s Ethiopia. For me, Quebec mirrors Oromia. Oromia, notwithstanding the policies of the EPRDF, is today the one and major Ethiopian state where ethnic nationalism has a significant political impact. Yes, there is ethnic nationalism in other states, but where it is strongest and has to be dealt with ‘specially’ is in Oromia. Oromia, because of history and EPRDF policies, is Ethiopia’s asymmetric state – the one that requires special political attention, the one that is most costly, and the one for whom policies of accommodation, but more importantly integration and assimilation have to  be especially targeted. I will address how I think this should be done in another article.