ተረት ተረት፤ የትግራይ ገዥ መደብ አገዛዝ እና የ«አማራ ገዥ መደብ» አገዛዝ አንድ ናቸው

«የትግራይ ገዥ መደብ አገዛዝ እና የ«አማራ ገዥ መደብ» አገዛዝ አንድ ናቸው»። ይህ ተረት ተረት (myth) በበርካታ ሰዎች ሲደጋገም ወደ እውነታ እያማራ ነው። በቅርቡ ባደረጉት ኑዛዜአቸው የቀድሞ ጠ/ሚ ታምራት ላይኔም ደግመውታል። «የአማራ ገዥ መደብ ብይ አማራ ብዙሃን እንደነገዱት ነው ህወሓት የትግራይ ገዥ መደብ በትግራይ ብዙሃን የነገዱት» ብለዋል። ይህ አስተያየት እጅግ የተሳሳተ ነው።

የሁለቱ አገዛዞች መሰረታዊ ልዩነት ይህ ነው፤ በደርግ እና በንጉሳዊው ስርዓት ጎሳ፤ ዘውግ፤ ብሄር አይነት ጽንሰ ሀሳቦች በህግ ደረጃ አልነበሩም። አገዛዙ በህግ ደረጃ ከጎሳ እና ከጎሰኝነት ውጭ ነበር። በህወሓት አገዛዝ ግን ጎሳ እና ጎሰኝነት በህግ የተደነገገ ነው። ጎሰኝነቱ በልምድ ወይንም በባህል ደረጃ ሳይሆን ህጋዊ ነው። ይህ መሰረታዊ ልዩነት ነው።

በኃይለ ሥላሴ መንግስት ማንኛውም ግለሰብ በጎሳ ምክንያት ከመንግስታዊ ስልጣን እና ሹመት አይከለከልም ነበር። አይከለከልም ብቻ ሳይሆን ጎሳው ጭራሽ እንደ ጉዳይ አይነሳም፤ በህግ እና ስረዓት ደረጃ ጎሳ የሚባል ጸንሰ ሀሳብ የለም። በዚህም ምክንያት በኃይለ ሥላሴ መንግስት በርካታ ከተለያዩ ጎሳ የሆኑ ባለ ስልጣኖች ነበሩ።

ሆኖም የአስተዳደር ቋንቋው አማርኛ ነበር። ይህ ከጅማ ለተወለደው ኦሮሞ መሰናከል ነበር። የገዥ ስረዓቱ ንጉሳዊ ነበር። ይህ ከኮንሶ የተወለዱት ባዕዳዊ ስረዓት ነበር። በነዚህ አይነት ምክንያቶች አማራ ያልሆኑ ወደ ስልጣን ለመቅረብ ከአማራ ይልቅ ይከብዳቸው ነበር ማለት ይቻል ይሆናል። አማራ ቋንቋውን በማወቅ ከሌላው ይበልጥ እድል ነበረው ማለት ይቻላል። እንዲሁም የአዲስ አበባ ተወላጅ ይበልጥ እድል ነበረው ማለት ይቻላል። በዚህ ደረጃ በተለያዩ የጎሳ ተወላጆች የስልጣን እና ሹመት እድል ልዩነት መኖሩን መካድ አይቻልም። ግን ይህ ልዩነት የታሪክ አጋጣሚ ነው እንጂ በህግ የተደነገገ አልነበረም። ስለዚህ አማራ ያልሆነው ቢከብደውም ወደ ስልጣን መምጣት ይችል ነበር። አድሎ ነበር ግን አድሎው ህጋዊ አልነበረም ስለዚህ ሊቀለበስ የሚችል አድሎ ነበር።

የህወሓት አገዛዝ ግን መሰረቱ ጎሰኝነት ነበር። ህወሓት የትግራይ ድርጅት ለትግራይ ህዝብ ነው። አማራው በአማራነቱ ቦታ የለውም። ቋንቋ ባለመቻሉ ወይንም የፖለቲካ ባህሉን ባለማወቁ ሳይሆን በአማራነቱ ምክንያት ስልጣን ሊይዝ አይችልም። በህወሓት ዘመን አድሎ መቀልበስ የማይችል የጎሳ የደም አድሎ ነበር።

ይህን የ«ትግራይ ገዥ መደብ» እና የ«አማራ ገዥ መደብ» አገዛዝ ልዩነት ስንመለከት አንድ ትልቅ ትምሕርት እንማራለን። ይህ ስለ የጎሳ አገዛዝ አደገኝነት ነው። ጎሳ የትውልድ የደም ጉዳይ ስለሆነ በመሰረቱ ህዝብን የሚለይ እና አድሎ (discrimination) የሚያመጣ ነው። በዚህ ምክንያት ነው የጎሳ አገዛዝ የግጭት (conflict) ፋብሪካ የሚሆነው።

የጎሳ መብቶችን ለማስተናገድ የጎሳ አስተዳደርን ከመጠቀም ወይንም የጎሳ መብቶች በህግ ከማወጅ የቋንቋ እና የባህል መብቶችን ማደንገድ ይሻላል። ቋንቋ እና ባህል ማንም መማር መቀየር የሚችለው ስለሆነ መሰረታዊ አድሎ የላቸውም። በዚህ ምክንያት በአድሎ የተነሳ የተጨቋኝ ስሜቶችን አያዳብርም ስለዚህ ግጭትን አያበዛም።

ይህን ተመስርተን ነው የኢትዮጵያ ህገ መንግስት ጸንፈኛ ነው የምንለው። ዓለም ዙርያ ሀገራት የቋንቋ እና ባህል መብቶችን በህጋቸው ያስተናግዳሉ። የጎሳ መብቶችን በዚህ መንገድ ያስተናግዳሉ። ግን የትም ሀገር ጎሳን በህጋቸው አያስተናግዱም። በጎሳ እና በቋንቋና ባህል ያለውን ልዩነት በግጭት መጋበዝ አኳያ በድምብ የታወቀ ስለሆነ ነው እንዲህ የሆነው። ግን ኢትዮጵያ ብቸኛዋ ጎሳን በህግዋ ውስጥ ያካተተች ናት። ለሀገራችን ህልውና ይህን መቀየሩ አስፈላጊ ነው።

Understanding Ethnic 'Soft Nationalism' for Ethiopian Nationalists

I find in our discussions of the "ethnic question" - of Ethiopian vs ethnic nationalism and the various shades in between - a lack of understanding of the various shades between, which we normally call 'soft nationalism'.

For Ethiopian nationalists, there are three spots on the Ethiopian - ethnic nationalist spectrum. These are 1) radical ethnic nationalists who want nothing but secession, 2) those who like the radicals consider Ethiopia a prison of nations but consent stay within Ethiopia so long as Ethiopian satisfies their demands, and 3) Ethiopian nationalists.

But the situation is of course far more complex - the spectrum is not discrete with three spots - it is continuous - various shades, like I said above. And, more importantly, individuals and even groups shift often from one position on the spectrum to another. Their opinions are not fixed in stone - they change depending on various factors.

I will use an example from Quebec 'ethnic' nationalism in Canada, which I've previously discussed here (http://asfawdarguemeshal.blogspot.com/2017/05/using-canada-to-understand-ethiopian.html). Before having given up on their dream of secession, which has become impossible due to demographic changes, Quebec nationalists used to monitor public opinion polls in order to time when to call a referendum on secession. Generally speaking, when the economy was good, polls would indicate relatively low support for secession, say 35%. This would not be a good a time to call a referendum. But when the economy dipped, support for secession would pass the 50% mark, reaching 60% or so. In this situation, if the timing was right, the Quebec nationalist party would win the provincial election and soon hold a referendum. This was the political pattern in Quebec from the early to mid 1970's to a few years ago.

The interesting point here for us Ethiopian nationalists is why the support for secession would range from 35% to 60%. Who are these people that change their minds? Are they ethnic nationalists? Or ethnic nationalists one day and Canadian nationalists the next? What makes them change their minds? Is it just the economy or are there other factors.

This group of people is what I call here the soft nationalists. And you can imagine that they were the primary target of politicians on both sides of the Quebec secession debate since the hardcore ethnic nationalists and hardcore Canadian nationalists were pretty much reliable in their opinions. But whoever managed to get the soft nationalist 'swing vote' would win. You can see that the soft nationalist constituency is extremely important in the struggle between country and ethnic nationalism.

Though we have had no polls taken in Ethiopia, anecdotally we have seen the same kind of thing happen in Ethiopia in the Abiy Ahmed era. Some Oromos who only some months ago were ethnic nationalists, because of the ascendancy of Oromos such as Abiy and Lemma Megersa to political prominence, and because of their positive and empowering rhetoric, have changed positions from ethnic nationalism and moved towards Ethiopian nationalism. However, if circumstances change, these people could swing back to ethnic nationalism.

What is the mindset of soft nationalists? They like all of us identify to some degree with their ethnicity and to some degree with Ethiopianism. Various circumstances can change which identification they lean towards. For example, if the economy is good - if they are happy - they tend to prefer the status quo. If their is some sort of ethnic conflict, this will push them to identify more towards their ethnicity. If some prominent Ethiopians start spewing anti-Oromo rhetoric they will get insulted and move towards their ethnicity. If they see Oromos in positions of leadership, or if they see Afan Oromo and other aspects of their identity prominently featured in our politics and culture, they will move towards Ethiopian nationalism. This is basically how soft nationalism works - it is fluid based on various factors.

Here I will add another example from recent Ethiopian history - that of Eritrea. When Eritrea was confederated with Ethiopia, a vast majority of Eritreans happily supported this move and considered themselves Ethiopia. As various factors changed negatively, including the ending of the confederation, but most importantly the terror of the Dergue regime, the huge support for Ethiopia turned towards support for secession! What a turnaround and what a lesson, if we would learn from it.

It's clear that this soft nationalist constituency group is very important for Ethiopian nationalists in our struggle against radical ethnic nationalism and the conflict that it generates. It is important that in we focus on soft nationalists in our political discourse to ensure that they come to and remain on the side of Ethiopian nationalism and to ensure that we don't push them into the arms of ethnic nationalists. How do we do this?

1. Ensure good governance and a decent economy. The Dergue basically pushed Eritreans out by making Ethiopia an unlivable country for all. While Ethiopian nationalists react to this via civic protest, soft nationalists react to such stress by becoming more ethnic nationalist.

2. Ensure the ethnic demands of soft nationalists are addressed. Some might call this 'appeasement', I would call it political realism. For example, given at least 35% of Ethiopia's population is Oromo-speaking, making Afan Oromo an official federal language makes sense not just as appeasement but to strengthen Ethiopia.

3. Ensure diplomatic rhetoric around the issue of ethnic nationalism and avoid statements that ethnic nationalists can use to swing soft nationalists their way. For example, if someone insults or says something considered insulting about Oromos, this will be eagerly used as political fodder by the ethnic nationalists to illustrate that Ethiopian nationalists are racists and elitists. So this must be avoided at all costs. I should add here that I have found certain officials of Patriotic Ginbot 7 especially adroit at this tactic (see this article: http://asfawdarguemeshal.blogspot.com/2016/11/some-basics-on-interacting-with-ethnic.html). As an aside, during the two Quebec referendum campaigns, the ethnic nationalist side would careful monitor all statements by Canadian nationalists looking for some sort of insult or slight that they could use in their campaign. At the same time, the Canadian nationalist side would expend significant resources trying to prevent this!

So, to sum up, there is such a political phenomenon as soft nationalism. For the Ethiopian nationalist constituency and leadership, it is important to understand this and address soft nationalists concerns in order to bring them towards Ethiopian nationalism. This strategy is in my opinion a must in keeping radical ethnic nationalism at bay in Ethiopia.

Towards an Integrated Ethiopia

Decades ago we used to be presented with a stark choice between a "unitary" state speaking Amharic, assimilating all other ethnic groups, and with nearly everything controlled by the central government, and approximately 85 separate nations, one for each of our ethnic groups! And unfortunately all debate revolved around these caricatures, and we never got anywhere.

Today, thankfully things have changed. We have, fortunately or unfortunately, data from 27 years of the radical experiment called ethnic federalism, where as much as was realistically possible, regions were drawn along ethnic lines and ethnicity ("nations, nationalities, and peoples") became the foundation of the Ethiopian state. I would say that these 27 years have shown us conclusively that this formula is one of ethnic strife, conflict, war, ethnic competition, ethnic-motivated mass dislocations, etc.

Some would say that what we have had is fake or bastardized ethnic federalism in which the TPLF ruled as a dictatorship and never really implemented the constitution in practice. This is certainly true to some extent, but enough was implemented to see the results. Ethnic based regions were created, ethnic based identity cards were encouraged in many regions, and there was some degree of self rule in the regions. Moreover, most of the ethnic conflicts throughout Ethiopia have not been related to TPLF dominance. Instead, they have been occurring between non-Tigrean ethnic groups. Take for example Amharas and other "non-locals" being evicted from various regions, or being hunted down and murdered in the name of retribution for historical injustices. Or conflicts between Gedeo and Guji, or Oromo and Somali, or Qemant and Amhara, or Agew and Amhara, etc. There are plenty of examples. It is clear that the placement of ethnicity at the centre of political life resulted in conflict and ethnic political competition, which is always a recipe for disaster. Despite the fact that the ethnic federalism experiment was not perfectly tried out, we have seen enough to know that it cannot work for Ethiopia.

As I say this, I have to add that the even EPRDF itself recognized a couple of years ago that this was the case. The main catalyst for this recognition was that the ethnic hatred inculcated by ethnic federalism started to target Tigreans more and more. The combination of ethnic federalism and the EPRDF's beloved developmental state was proving untenable. The public's resentment against the ruling class, as represented by the EPRDF, was not only based on politics and class, but on ethnicity - on anti-Tigrean sentiment. The resentment became virulent, and the EPRDF knew that things could not continue as is without full blown ethnic war. Hence the beginning of the opening of the EPRDF, and in particular the TPLF, to changes that eventually brought about Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and his team to power.

So I think today it is clear that the ethnic federalism formula as we have it, even if implemented 'perfectly', is not a good solution for Ethiopia because it brings about conflict. Not because it is inherently unjust, but because we have evidence that it does not work and it results in concrete strife and misery. Why has it not worked? A few reasons... First, there is in many parts of Ethiopia ethnic resentment and historical baggage. Ethnic-based governance only exacerbates this. Second, a significant portion of our incapable political elite wish to use ethnic competition as a way to political power and have no qualms about encouraging ethnic conflict. Third, there has been over hundreds or thousands of years significant integration and even assimilation in Ethiopia, resulting in a large constituency not interested in ethnicity, but nevertheless persecuted by ethnic politics for historical grievance reasons and for not signing on to the ethnic ideology. For these and other reasons, and given the evidence we have, the current ethnic federalism formula should, in time, be abandoned.

Abandoned for what? For many of us, the choice today is between 1) an integrated and synthesized Ethiopianism or 2) an Ethiopia divided on ethnic lines - a nation of disparate nations. 2) is more or less what we have now, the recipe for ethnic strife and conflict. The first choice is, I think, our only choice. What is integrated and synthesized? It means reflecting as much is realistically possible and in keeping with the wants of the population everyone's identity in Ethiopianness. An obvious and often stated example of this: making the Oromo language a national language of Ethiopia, in addition to the current Amharic, integrates into Ethiopianness the use of the Oromo language. It moves it from the periphery, or from a single region, to the national level. Another example: integrating elements of the Gadaa political structure into the nation's political structure. And so on. What about other ethnic groups and their identities? What about the level of regional and local autonomy? These and several other questions can be answered via discussion and evolution. But the point is that integration and unity is the only way to peace and prosperity. A single Ethiopian identity must be cultivated, not to the exclusion of ethnic identity, but to ensure that it always supersedes ethnic identity, thereby reducing the temptation of ethnic politics and ethnic conflict.

What about the transition from ethnic based politics to this new "Ethiopian" politics? It should probably be slow since we have a generation schooled under the ERPDF's ethnic politics and we have a perhaps worse older political class schooled under Marxism and democratic socialism. The first step is to implement integrative policies such as the language policy I mentioned above. One of the goals of this policy is to increase inter-ethnic integration and increase the non-ethnicized population. After some years (or decades) of this, the proportion of non-ethnicized Ethiopians will be such that a transition to non-ethnic politics will be easy.

That is the plan. There are two hindrances that I see. First, the obvious, are the ideological and cynical ethnic politicians who would stand to lose from an abandonment of ethnic federalism. The second is the group against ethnic politics but which does not have the political savvy and empathy needed to relate to and hold discussions with ethnic federalists. The ethnic politicians we will always have with us - I don't think there is anything we can do but marginalize them. But the second group we should work on as if this group - I call it the Ethiopianist group - gets its act together, then we will have a smooth transition from today's combustible ethnic federalism to an integrated and synthesized Ethiopia.