የትግሬ አድሎ

2009/1/29 ዓ.ም. (2016/10/9)

(pdf)

ፖሊሱን ምንድነው የሚያበሳጭህ ብዬ ስጠይቀው እንደዚህ ይለኛል። «አድሎው በዛ፤ እድገት «ለነሱ ሰው» ብቻ ነው፤ ምርጥ ቦታ «ለነሱ»፤ የማይፈለግ ስራ ለሌላው። አይን ያወጣ ነው እኮ! ሰዉ እጅግ መሮታል»

ለመንግስት እቃ የሚያቀርብ ነጋዴ እንደዚሁ ብሎ ይነግረኛል። «ኮንትራቶች አገኛለሁ። ግን ምርጥ ኮንትራቶች «ለነሱ» ብቻ ነው። ጊዜ ቢያሳልፉም ጥራት ቢያጎሉም ምንም አይባሉም። እንደ በፊቱ አይደለም፤ አሁን አይን ያወጣ ሆኗል፤ ሰዉ በጣም ተናዷልና ሁኔታው ያስፈራል»

ባለ ሀብቱም እንደዚሁ አይነት እሮሮ ያሰማኛል። «አዎ ደህና መሬት ማግኘት እችላለሁ ግን ምርጥ ቦታዎቹ «ለነሱ» ሰው ነው። አንድ ቆንጆ ቦታ አግንቼ ከፍተኛውን ብር ተጫርቼ «ለነሱ» ተሰጠ። እጅግ ተበሳጭቻለሁ። አይን ያውጣ አድሎ ነው» ይለኛል። በተዘዋዋሪ ይህ ባለ ሀብት ከገዥ ፓርቲው ጋር በሚያስፈልገው ደረጃ ግንኙነት አለው።

የዩኒቨርሲቲ ተማሪውም ከትንሽ ውይይት በኋላ ወደዚሁ አርእስት የገባል። «የነሱ» ተማሪዎች የሚያገኙትን እርዳታ ብታይ። ትርፍ ትምህርታዊ ምክር፤ ሳምፕል ፈተናዎች፤ ከነሱ አስተማሪዎች በትርፍ ግዜ እርዳታ» ዝምብሎ ከማማረር ለምን እናንተም እንደዚህ አታረጉም ብዬ ጠይቀዋለሁ። ጥያቄዬን ያልፈዋል፤ ስለ «እነሱ» ነው ማውራት የሚፈልገው።

«እነሱ» ማን እንደሆኑ ሁላችንም እናውቃለን። አዎ በትክክሉ ለመናገር የኢህአዴግ አባላትና አደርባዮቻቸው ናቸው። ግን ሰዉ «እነሱ» ሲል ባጭሩ ትግሬዎች ማለቱ ነው፤ አድሎ ሲል የትግሬ አድሎ ማለቱ ነው።

እውነቱን ለመናገር የትግሬ አድሎ ገርሞኝም አያቅም። የመንግስታችን አወቃቀር ይህን አድሎ የሚያስከትል ነው። የአንድ ፓርቲ አገዛዝ ነው ያለን። የፖለቲካ ተቀናቃኝ የለም አይፈቀድምም። እንኳን የነፃ ምርጫ ከፊል የነፃ ምርጫ የለም። በዚህ አይነት የ«አውራ ፓርቲ» አገዛዝ ሁልግዜ ለፓርቲ አባላትና ለአደርባዮቻቸው ከፍተኛ አደሎ ይኖራል። በደርግ ዘመን ለኢሳፓ አባላት አድሎ አልነበረምን? በኃይለ ስላሴ ዘመን ከቤተ መንግስት ግንኙነት ያላቸው የተሻለ ያገኙ አልነበረምን? የዛሬውም እንደዚህ ነው።

ይህን ሃሳብ ስናገር አብዛኛው አዳማጭ ይገረመዋል። «የዛሬው አድሎ ግን በዘር ነው እኮ» ይሉኛል። አዎን የዘር አድሎ ነው ግን ህይ የዘር አድሎ፤ ማለት የትግሬ አድሎ፤ መኖሩንም ልንገረም አይገባም። ሁላችንም የኢህአዴግን ታሪካዊ አመጣጥን እናውቃለን። ከመጀመሪያው ህውሃት ከኢህአዴግ ከፍተኛ ኃይል ያለው ፓርቲ ነበር ዛሬም ነው፤ ቶር ስራዊቱንና በተለይ ደህንነቱን እንደሚቆጣጠር እናውቃለን። ደግሞ በአንድ ግንባር ወይም ፓርቲ አገዛዝ ከዛ ፓርቲ ውስጥ ኃይል ያለው ቡድን ይበልጥ ሙስና አድሎ ይታይበታል! ለምን ቢባል ሙስናና አድሎ ዋና የኃይል ማከማቸትና ማንጸባረቅ መንገድ ናችሀው። ምርጫ ወይም የፖለቲካ ውድድር ሰለሌለ ኃይል በዚህ መልኩ ነው የሚከማቸው። በአውራ ፓርቲ አገዛዝ ሌላ አካሄድ ሊኖር አይችልም።

ይህ ሁሉ እያልኩኝ ሳለ በኔ አመለካከት የትግሬ አድሎ ካሉት የሀገራችን የፖለቲካና ህብረተሰባዊ ችግሮች ትንሹ ነው። ለኢህአዴግ ግን ዋናው ችግሩ ነው! ይህ እንዴት ይሆናል? ለኔ ዋናው ችግር የአንድ ፓርቲ የልማት መንግስት አገዛዙ የህዝቡን የአንድነትና የህብረተሰባዊ መንፈስ እያጠፋ መሆኑ ነው። ከሌሎች ጽሁፎች እንደጠቀስኩት የኢህአዴግ መንግስት ለህዝቡ ያቀረበው ውል እንዲህ ነው፤ ልማት ሰጥሃለሁ፤ አንተ ደግሞ በስልጣኔም ይሁን በሙስናዬ አትምጣብኝ። በዚህ ውል መሰረት ሰዎች ከመሬታቸው ይፈነቀላሉ። መሬታችሁ ለባለ ሀብት ይፈለጋል እየተባለ ሳንቲም ተሰተው ይባረራሉ፤ ክስ ላይ ባለስልጣኑ ወይም አደርባዩ ጥፋተና ቢሆንም ይረታል፤ ሰዎች ትንሽ ጸረ ኢህአዴግ ነበር ቢናገሩ ይታሰራሉ፤ ህዝቡ ከፍርድ ቤት ፍትህ አያገኝም፤ ጉቦ ካልሰጠ ውይም ወዳጅ ከሌለው ንብረቱን፤ ስራውን፤ ወዘተ ሊያጣ ይችላል። ለኔ እነዚህ ችግሮች ከትግሬ አድሎ እጅግ የሚበልጡ ናቸው። ፍትህ፤ ነፃነት፤ ወዘተ አለመኖራቸው ነው ዋናው ችግር። ሁለተኛ ደረጃ ችግር የማንም አድሎ። ሶስተኛ ደረጃ ችገር የትግሬ አድሎ ነው።

በተዘዋዋሪ ባለንጀራችን መሬቱን ሲቀማ፤ አለ አግባብ ሲታሰር፤ ፍትህ ሲያጣ፤ ወዘተ ማንኛችንም ዞር ብለን እንርዳህ አንለውም። አይዞህ ብለን የገንዘብም ወይም ሌላ ድጋፍ አንሰጠውም። የራሳችንን ኑሮ፤ የራሳችንን የ«ልማት» ድርሻ እያሳደድን ባለንጀራችን እየተጎዳ ዝም እንላለን። ምንስት ላይ ጮኸን እንታሰር አደለም። እንርዳው፤ ግን አንረዳውም። ታላቁ ችግር ይህ ነው። እውነቱን ለመናገር ኢህአዴግን በስልጣን እስካሁን የጠበቀውም ይህ መንፈስ ነው።

ግን ይህ መሰረታዊ ችግር እያለ መንግስቱን የሚያናጋው የዘር ችግሩ ነው። ይህ የሰውን አስገራሚ ባህሪ ያሳያ። «ሀገሬን በዚህም በዛም አበላሽ ግን በዘሬ አትምጣብኝ! ጉቦኛና ዘራፊ ሁን ግን በዘር ስም አታድርገው!» እኛ ኢትዮጵያዊያን እንዲህ እንላለን። ያሳዝናል።

ይህን አውቆ ኢህአዴግ የዘራውን ነው የሚያጭደው። ግን ለሀገሪቷ ህልውና አይበጅም። እኛ የ«ትግሬ አድሎ» ሳይሆን ምንም አይነት «አድሎ»ን አንፈልግም ስንል ነው ሀገራችን የሰላም መንገድ የምትጀምረው።

ፖለቲካ ሃይማኖት አይደለም!

2009/1/24 ዓ.ም. (2016/10/4)

(pdf)

ዛሬም ጠንካራ፤ ህዝብን የሚወክል፤ ኢህአዴግን በመጠኑም ቢሆን ሊጋፈጥ የሚችል የተቃዋሚ ድርጅት በኢትዮጵያ የለም። (ደህና የሚባለው የኦሮሞ ፌደራሊስት ኮንግሬስም በምንም ሚዛን እነዚህን መስፈርቶች አያሟላም።) ይህ እውነታ ሁላችንም የምናውቀው ነው፤ የዛሬው የህዝብ እንቅስቃሴ ከቀጠለና ከጨመረ አለመሪነትና ድርጅት እንዴት ይሆናል ብለን እንሰጋለን።

ኢህአዴግ ስልጣን ከያዘ ጀምሮ ለ25 ዓመት ደህና ተቃዋሚ ድርጅት ኖሮ አያውቅም። የነበሩትም ያሉትም ደካማ፤ በቀላሉ የሚፈሩና የሚበታተኑ፤ እርስ በርስ ተጣልተው እራሳቸውን ከጥቅም ውጭ የሚያደርጉ ወዘተ ናቸው።

የዚህ ሁኔታ ያልሆነበትን ምክንያት ተጠንቅቀን እናውቃቸዋልን። ኢህአዴግ ጠንካራ ስለሆነ አይደለም። ተቃዋሚዎች ኢህአዴግ ጥቂት ህዝብ ነው የሚወክለው እያልን በዛው ትንፋሻችን ጠንካራ ነው ማለት አንችልም!! ኢህአዴግ በኃይሉ ሳይሆን በፈቃዳችን እንደሆነ የሚገዛው እናውቃለን፤ እራሳችንን አናታልል።

ታድያ ለምንድነው ተቃዋሚው ለመደራጀትም የሚያቅተው። እንደምናቀው አንዱ ዋና ችግር የተቃዋሚ ፖለቲከኖችም ህብረተሰብም የአለመስማማት፤ እርስ በርስ መጣላት፤ እሩቅ ማሰብ አለመቻል፤ ወዘተ ነው። ስለዚህ ጉዳይ ብዙ ተጽፏል። ሆኖም ከዚህ ጽሁፍ አንድ ሌላ ተቃዋሚን የሚያደክመው ምክንያት ላቀርብ እወዳለሁ፤ ይህ ፖለቲካን እንደ ሃይማኖት ማየትና የሚከተለው ግትርነትና አለመቻቻል።

ሃይማኖት በአንድ እውነት የተመሰረተና የማይቀየር ነው። ለምሳሌ እንደ ኦርቶዶክስ ክርስቲያንነቴ ክርስቶስ ሞተና በሶስተኛው ቀን ተነሳ ብዬ አምናለው ከዚህ እምነትም ዝንፍ አልልም፤ ይህ ፍፁም እውነት ነውና።

ግን ይህንን ዝንፍ አለማለትን ወደ ፖለቲካ ወይም ሌላ የህይወት ዘርፍ ማምጣት የለብኝም። ቅንጅት ፓርላማ ይግባ አይግባ ፍፁም እውነት ያለው የሃይማኖት ጉዳይ አልነበረም፤ ከሁለቱም አቋሞች ጥሩ የሆኑ የሚያስኬዱ ምክንያቶች ነበሩ። የኢትዮጵያ ህገ መንግስት ጎሳን ያካትት አያካትት፤ ይህም የድርድር ጉዳይ ነውንጂ እውነትና ውሸት የለበትም። ወዘተ። በፖለቲካ ወይም በስራ ወይም በቤተሰብ ኑሮ መደራደር፤ የሌላውን አስተያየት መረዳት፤ ለሌላው መቆርቆር፤ ላለመስማማት መስማማት፤ ወዘተ አስፈላጊ ነው።

ለምሳሌ ስንቶቻችን ነን የተለያዩ የፖለቲካ አቋሞቻችንን ቀይረን የማናውቀው? አንዳንዶቻችን የኃይለ ስላሴን መንግስት በግዜው እንደግፍ ነብር ዘሬ ግን ዴሞክራሲአዊ አለመሆኑን አንወድም እንላለን። ስንቶቻችን በኮምዩኒዝም በኢህአፓ ወዘተ እናምን ነበር ዛሬ ግን ተሳስተን ነበር እንላለን። ስንት የደርግ ደጋፊ የነበሩና አሁን ንስሃ የገቡ አሉ። እርግት ኢህአዴግንም በአንድ ወቅት የደገፉ አሉ!

ታድያ ሃሳባችንን ሲያስፈልግ የምንቀይር ከሆነ ለምንድነው ከኛ ፖለቲካዊ ሃሳብ ጋር የማይስማማ ባልደረባ ሲያጋጥመን ከሱ ጋር ጦርነት የምንገባውም የጋራ ፖለቲካ ድርጅታችንንም የምናፈርሰው?! ይህ የሚሆነው ፖለቲካን እንደ እምነት ምንም ድርድር የማይደረግበት ነው ብለን ስለምንቆጥር ነው።

በፖለቲካ ደረጃ መስማማት፤ አለመከፋፈል፤ አንድ መሆን ከፈለግን የሃሳብ ልዩነቶችን በሚገባው በትህትና መቀበልና ማስተናገድ አለብን። የግትርነትና አጉል እረግጠኝነት መንፈሳችንን ማስወገድ አለብን። እንደዚህ ማድረግ ስንችል፤ በተለይ የፖለቲካ ትህትናችንን ማዳበር ስንችል ነው የተቃዋሚ ድርጅቶቻችንን በቂ አቅም እንዲኖራቸው ማድረግ የምንችለው።

ትህትናና ግትር አለመሆን፤ እነዚህን ብቻ እናስታውስ።

Ethnic federalism kills Meles' developmental state

2009/1/23 (Ethiopian calendar)

2016/10/3 (European calendar)

[Note: An Amharic version of this post will appear sometime!]

(pdf version)

In a nutshell, the EPRDF's deal or social contract with the Ethiopian population over the past 15 years or so has been as follows: I will give you development and growth. In exchange, you will not challenge my political power and you will ignore the fact that my membership will have certain economic and other privileges that the rest of you will not have.

This is what a 'developmental state' led by a 'vanguard party' basically is. The classic example is China. We all know that the Chinese people, in aggregate, have prospering for years. People have been getting richer, there's more education, better health care, better infrastructure, etc. Again, this is in aggregate – large sections of the population have suffered for this and continue to suffer, but let's set that aside for the moment. As far as Ethiopians are concerned, when they see China, they see prosperity.

Now, the only political party in China – the Communist Party – has no political competition, which means there is little accountability. Party members can enrich themselves through corruption and other means and the population can do nothing about it because it cannot get rid of the party – that's part of the deal. Now, if this corruption threatens economic development and therefore threatens the Communist Party's deal with the people, which would then lead to revolt and overthrow of the party, then there's a crackdown on corruption. So as we all have seen, every so often, the party campaigns against corruption, arrests a few thousand party members and cronies, and then when it all dies down forgets about it for a while. Corruption goes up again.

Now, why isn't this working in Ethiopia? Development is taking place, economic growth is pretty good, the big projects such as the Nile Dam are still going strong. So why the unrest? Why the revolt?

The answer is ethnic federalism. You see, in China, there is more or less only one ethnicity. The population resents the privileges of the members of the Communist Party. People resent that party members are rich, have preferential treatment in everything, including the legal system, jobs, contracts, etc. However, the resentment is what we might call class resentment. The upper class is the Communist Party and the lower class the rest of the population. The upper class makes sure the lower class does quite well – not as well as the upper class but well enough to keep politically quiet.

In Ethiopia not only do we have many ethnicities, but ethnicity is part of the government! The vanguard party EPRDF is composed of ethnic parties, and the most powerful party as everyone knows and perceives is the TPLF. Just as in China, the population resents the privileges of the members of the EPRDF and their relatives and cronies. But this resentment is much greater and politically dangerous than in China because the resentment is not just class resentment, but ethnic resentment, and ethnic resentment is extremely dangerous.

As I have written before, people are far more tolerant of oppression by their own ethnic group or no ethnic group than by another ethnic group, or by what they perceive to be another ethnic group. When it comes to political oppression, ethnic feelings are strong. This is why the combination of developmental state and ethnic federalism is not working in Ethiopia.

By the way, this understanding of ethnicity as a strong political force is precisely the basis of of ethnic federalism! We need ethnic federalism, ethnic group rights above all else, etc., because ethnicity is the basis our polity, is what Meles and the EPRDF said when creating the constitution. If we do not give ethnicity this primacy, then there will be an ethnic revolt, they said. What irony then, that the ethnic division they laid in place for this reason is precisely that which is is proving their downfall.

Now, how can the EPRDF get out of this quagmire. The band aid solution is to try and severely clamp down on corruption, which it has tried to do repeatedly. But how can the EPRDF do that given the nature of the vanguard party / developmental state model, since party privilege and corruption is an unavoidable consequence of it? The other option is to do something about ethnic federalism. Of course the EPRDF can't touch the constitution, but as we have heard there is a proposal within the party to change it from a multi-ethnic front to a single non-ethnic party, thereby reducing the ethnic glare, so to speak, from the population. But this will alienate the EPRDF's more fervent ethnic nationalists, but at the same time it won't attract civic nationalists. This might have been a good option 20 years ago, but now it's too little too late.

In a later article, I will discuss what I think is a better solution for the EPRDF.

Where the TPLF went wrong

2009/1/23 (Ethiopian calendar)

2016/10/3 (European calendar)

[Note: An Amharic version of this post will appear sometime!]

(pdf version)

A lot has been written about this over the past 25 years, but it doesn't hurt repeating, especially given today's political circumstances in Ethiopia. The TPLF's biggest historical mistake was interpreting its coming to power in 1991 as a full mandate from the vast majority of Ethiopians and assuming it meant a complete rejection of everything that preceded it. This mistaken assumption involved a typically modern Ethiopian exercise in black and white or zero sum thinking.

Basically, this is how the thought process worked... The Haile Selassie government fell, not because it failed to make some sensible reforms, but because it failed to make all the radical changes demanded of it by the students movement. The fall of the Dergue government had nothing to do with the Cold War, a failed Communist economy, or the war with Somalia, but because Ethiopia was a prison of nationalities that had to be liberated. The rise of the TPLF had nothing to do with the end of the Cold War and a bankrupt regime, but because the TPLF and its ethnic ideology best represented the interests of a majority of Ethiopians. The TPLF blinded itself to obvious facts in a bid to convince itself of its monopoly on truth and ability to rule Ethiopia.

Thus, after gaining power, the TPLF, in the form of the EPRDF, began a ruling style that involved continually trying to do the radical and the impossible, its hubris deluding it into believing that it was special enough to do anything politically.

This mindset is what emboldened the EPRDF to saddle Ethiopia (and itself) with perhaps the most radical ethnic based constitution in world history. With a little more maturity, it would have realized that this constitution was not only unpopular and fundamentally at odds with the interests of a large section of the population, but so radical, untested, and risky that there was a good chance it would in the future make governing impossible. For everyone except the EPRDF and other ethnic nationalists, it was clear that a more moderate constitution would have easily satisfied all constituencies, including ethnic nationalists and made governing far easier for the EPRDF.

Building on the constitution, the EPRDF embarked on an ethnic policy that can only be described as playing with fire. It engaged in policies (such as official identification by ethnicity) and rhetoric ('reactionaries' and 'narrow nationalists') that emphasized differences among Ethiopians and diminished commonalities. It thought that it could promote ethnic nationalism and at the same time control ethnic strife, knowing full well that its ethnic political base, Tigray, was composed of a small minority! An impossibly delicate formula if there ever was one. However, thanks to various factors, especially the sad state of the Ethiopian nationalist elite, the EPRDF has managed so far to survive on this knife's edge.

But the fundamentals remain wrong, and this explains today's smoldering dissent. It's a political reality that a people can tolerate far more oppression from their own ethnic group or in a non-ethnic context than they can from another ethnic group. The TPLF knows this quite well, having leveraged the political tool of ethnicity to its fullest during its liberation struggle. Yet, the EPRDF continued a policy of promoting ethnic nationalism while real power and perception of real power, remained in the hands of the TPLF. This has inevitably resulted in widespread resentment against the TPLF and Tigray. This was all predictable from the beginning; there have been ever increasing signs of it in the past two decades, yet hubris has prevented the EPRDF from changing course.

Note that this policy from the beginning was the antithesis of what is best for Tigray. A small minority can flourish in a multi-ethnic society, but not in a society where ethnic division and tension dominate, since the minority is dependent on migration and integration to prosper. The region of Tigray, like all the small ethnicities in Ethiopia, would do best in a country that is more united than divided. Yet, the ideology of the TPLF (and its big brother EPLF) was so ingrained that they basically ignored this danger and continued promoting ethnically divisive policies.

To be fair, the EPRDF did eventually realize the seriousness of the problem. Part of the reasons for the full mobilization of party resources towards the developmental state project ('lemat', for the masses) that begin during the mid part Prime Minister Meles' tenure was to mitigate ethnic division. The rhetoric of economic development was ramped up as a political tool to promote civic nationalism – to give all parts of the country something in common to unite around – and counter the obvious damage of ethnic nationalism. But of course the economy cannot by itself bring down ethnic boundaries and increase civic nationalism. Inter-ethnic integration, which the EPRDF's constitution essentially prevents, is the only way to do so.

The above is just a small list of the radical and reckless policies of the EPRDF over the past 25 years, which aros a consequence of the circumstances around its rise to power, including the absence of an opposing elite power to act as a moderating influence. Now, what does this history teach us about what is happening today? What is happening today?

Well, we continue to hear from hardline EPRDF leaders the same old rhetoric about reactionaries and narrow nationalists – the same old hubris. But there are moderates in the EPRDF and TPLF who have long ago come to realize the folly in their fundamental assumptions. These moderates and hardliners are discussing behind closed doors how to address the current revolt. The moderates are right and sensible, of course, but what has always handicapped them is external leverage. They need a strong Ethiopian nationalist movement and elite, the opposing elite power which I mentioned above, with power on the ground, that they can count on as a foil for the hardliners. They need a political partner on the other side, in other words, so that they can say to the hardliners, “Look, you've tried it your way, and now there is an opposition that your hardline policies cannot dislodge. It's time for you to step aside and let us negotiate a new system of governance.”

Unfortunately, this Ethiopian nationalist movement is not yet there. The soft and hard ethnic nationalists in Oromia who are against TPLF domination have been doing their part for years, but not the Ethiopian nationalists. Now we have the uprisings in Amhara Region, and this is a huge step in the right direction, but there is no organization yet. It is important that these uprisings soon coalesce into a tangible political movement so that it can work with the moderates in EPRDF to find a way out if its quagmire. Failing this, we have to count on the EPRDF reforming by itself. It's a tall order for any organization, especially on with the historical baggage of the TPLF.