Showing posts with label radical. Show all posts
Showing posts with label radical. Show all posts

Friday, 27 November 2020

The TPLF's Long Suicide

 "...the TPLF and, dare I say, a significant portion of the Tigrean elite is in the midst of an identity crisis imposed upon them by unfortunate historical circumstances. The advent of Marxism, the 1974 revolution, the Dergue's terrible misgovernance, etc., led to the birth of a TPLF with an outlook that stood firmly against the long term interests of Tigreans. Tigray, being a small, industrious, out-migratory region, stands to benefit from a citizenship based federalism - a multicultural and decentralized federalism but one in which the citizen, not ethnicity, is primary. Ethnic federalism goes completely against the interests of Tigray, because it results in Tigreans not being able to freely live and work outside their region. Yet the TPLF and many Tigrean intellectuals still support ethnic federalism!"

In 1991, the TPLF, a typically radical and stubborn Ethiopian Marxist party, instead of revising what was clearly a mistaken ideology, doubled down! It hoisted on Ethiopia an extremist and radical constitution, the type of which does not exist anywhere else in the world. But Meles Zenawi and co. had to govern, and to do so, they decided to concoct the impossible 'revolutionary democracy' ideology, which in essence depended solely on the TPLF being the sole power hegemon in Ethiopia.

The TPLF's assumption that it could remain the sole power in Ethiopia was of course completely unrealistic. Ethnic politics inflames ethnic tensions, and eventually the largest ethnic groups assert themselves against minorities, particularly against minorities that are viewed as being dominant or wealthy. This is inevitable. This brings us to the TPLF's second false assumption - that it could hold the Oromo and Amhara at bay by fueling their competition against each other. This was of course a pipe dream. The system set the TPLF up as not just a political target, but an ethnic target. And given the environment of ethnic competition or hate, the nature of the grievance would be deadly. Far deadlier than, say, class grievance. And that's what eventually happened. The "Oromo" and the "Amhara" ousted the "Tigray", as per the TPLF's constitution!

With the advent of the EPRDF's forced reform in 2018, the TPLF got a chance to, again, revise its old suicidal ideology in favour of one that benefitted its Tigray constituency. But it could not overcome its stubborn pride, a pride built upon a perceived military victory over the Dergue, and upon 27 years of ruling Ethiopia as a minority while lording it over all other political competitors. This is understandable. To expect the TPLF, which had its distorted mindset reinforced via political and economic success for decades, to change was and is unrealistic. Modern Ethiopia produces yet another unreformable political prodigal.

There are lessons to be learned from the story of the TPLF, and the most important point is that the lesson learner is not the TPLF but those at the centre of the Ethiopian political spectrum. The most important lesson, I think, is to always err on the side of moderation. The best, that is the most peaceful, politics requires moderation and self reflection, giving the benefit of the doubt to other points of view, and giving primacy to no ideology except peace. Let us at least learn something from the tragic story of the TPLF.

Monday, 10 December 2018

አዴፓ እና የመሬት ይዞታ ፖሊሲ


አቶ ንጉሱ ጥላሁን በዚህ ቃለምልልስ ዛሬ ያለው የመሬት ፖሊሲ አንዱ «ምሶሶአችን» ነው ብለዋል።

ይህን እሳቸውም ድርጅታቸውም ሌሎች አቋሞቻቸውን እንደፈተሹት እንዲፈትሹ እጠይቃለሁ። መሬት የግል ይሁን ይሉ አልልም የፖለቲካ ሁኔታው ለዛ አይነት ድምዳሜ ዛሬ የሚመች አይሆንምና። ግን አቋሙ ምሶሶ ነው አይበሉ። እየፈተሹት እየተዉት ይሄዱ።

የአማራ ገበሬ እራሱን ማሻሻል ያልቻለው እና ዝቅተኛ እስረኛ ሆኖ የቀረው ከጎረቤቱ መሬት ገዝቶ መስፋፋት እና በራሱ ላይ ኢንቬስት ማረግ ባለመቻሉ ነው። በተጨማሪ መሬት የመንግስት ይሁን የሚለው ፖሊሲ ጸንፈኛ የሆነ ዓለም ዙርያ ከአንድ ሁለት ሀገር በቀር የማይታይ ፖሊሲ ነው። አዴፓ ለዘብ ያለውን መካከለኛ መንገድ በዚህም ጉዳይ እንዲከተል እጠይቃለሁ።

https://asfawdarguemeshal.blogspot.com/2018/03/blog-post_47.html

https://asfawdarguemeshal.blogspot.com/2018/10/blog-post_94.html

Monday, 15 October 2018

On NAMA Strategies

One of the National Movement of Amhara's (NAMA) strategies seems to be to out-ghetto Oromo nationalists, so to speak. That is, to demonstrate political positions and attitudes that are as radical or even more radical than Oromo nationalists. Simple examples - NAMA leadership and intellectuals have made statements in support of Article 39 and of maintaining ethnic identification on kebele id cards. And apparently at a recent NAMA meeting, supporters publicly voiced the idea of evicting Oromos living on Oromia zones in Amhara Region.

The idea behind this strategy, it seems to me, is that taking extreme positions, which, by the way, have no acceptance from the Amhara masses, will help neutralize Oromo and other ethnic nationalists by restoring the political balance. The NAMA view is that Oromo nationalists have been 'coddled' for too long and now have too much political power now, and one of the ways for NAMA to counteract that is by showing strength through extremism. Basic tit-for-tat strategy.

The problem with this is that it is based on an erroneous and simplistic understanding of the phenomenon of ethnic nationalism in a multi-ethnic nation. The goal of ethnic nationalism is to tear away at the centre, weaken it, and take power away from it to the periphery, which is various ethnic nationalisms. Adding 'another' ethnic nationalism to this actually further weakens the centre and strengthens all ethnic nationalist movements.

A further factor that NAMA doesn't seem to consider is the asymmetric nature of ethnic relations in Ethiopia. The Amhara live in large numbers in various regions, while the Oromo do not.

Given this, Oromo nationalists would much rather have a weak or empty centre and deal with a strong Amhara nationalist movement. This is their perfect scenario, in which all Oromos, including moderate ones, will congregate to Oromo nationalism, making it the only game in Oromia, so to speak. They will negotiate tit for tat agreements with Amhara nationalism and have their Oromo homeland.

What about issues that Oromo nationalists and Amhara nationalists do not agree on, such as Amharas in Oromia, and the case of Addis Ababa? With all Oromos on board, Oromo nationalists will not give an inch on this, and there will be conflict, either overt or covert. The main victims, given the population distribution I mentioned above, will be Amharas and other ethnic groups in Oromia and in Addis Ababa. And if NAMA has a vision of being able to carry out a TPLF 2.0 and forcing itself on the whole country, well, I think we all realize how realistic that is.

Now, I think we should take a step back and ask ourselves 'why'. Why does NAMA exist and why does it take the positions and attitudes in does? In order to reach any kind of understanding and solution to the issues at hand, this question has to be the focus. As I've written about this in my blog, for me, there are two major reasons: 1) The upheaval and resulting weakness of Ethiopian nationalism (or 'the centre') over the past 50 years, and 2) accumulated resentment for the treatment of the Amhara, including by Amhara 'traitors', over the past 27 years, and the resulting grievance and inferiority complex. NAMA is simply an outgrowth of this. The second factor we can do little about - time will heal wounds. But the first we must work hard with all our might to correct, as fixing that - strengthening the centre tangibly via political parties and institutions - is a sine qua non for the survival of Ethiopia.