ከዚህ በፊት እንደጻፍኩት የጎሳ ብሄርተኝነትን ከፖለቲካችን ለመቀነስ እና ለማጥፋት የዴሞግራፊ ለውጦች ማምጣት ግድ ነው (https://asfawdarguemeshal.blogspot.com/2016/09/curbing-ethnic-nationalism-via_26.html)። ምከንያቱ ባጭሩ እንዲህ ነው...
የጎሳ ብሄርተኝነት ህዝብ ውስጥ በተለይ የኦሮሞ ህዝብ ውስጥ በደምብ እንደገባ ሁላችንም ገብቶናል። በልሂቃን ደረጃ ብቻ ሳይሆን በብዙሃን ደረጃም። ይህን ጎሰኝነት በስብከት እና ልመና ማጥፋት አይቻልም። የተም ሀገር የጎሳ ብሄርተንኘት አንዴ ከሰፈነ የሚቅንሰው ነገር ፖለቲካዊ ድርድር ሳይሆን የዴሞግራፊያዊ ለውጥ ብቻ ነው። በኢትዮጵያ የሚያስፈልገው የዴሞግራፊ ለውጥ በኦሮሞ እና ሌላው ኢትዮጵያዊ መካከል መቅላቀል እና ውህደት (integration and assimilation) ነው። ህዝቡ ተቀላቅሎ ተጋብቶ ተዋልዶ የቅይጥ ባህል እና ህዝብ መጨመር አለበት። በዚህ መንገድ የጎሳ ብሄርተኛው ጎራ እያነሰ ይሄዳል የፖለቲካ ኃይሉም ይመነምናል። ይህን የሚያስፈጽም አንድ ፖሊሲ ኦሮምኛ የህገር ሙሉ ቋንቋ ማድረግ ነው። ይህ ኦሮሞዎች ከኦሮሚያ ወደ ሌላው ኢትዮጵያ እንዲፈልሱ ይጋብዛል። ለምሳሌ ኦሮምኛ ለማስተማር ወደ አማራ ክልል ይመጣሉ። ይህ ፈልስት መቀላቀልን እና መወሃድን ያመጣል። ከላይ የጠቀስኩት ጽሁፍ ባጭሩ ይህን ነው የሚለው።
በቅርቡ ለማ መገርሳ ስለኦሮሞ ህዝብ ወደ ከተማ መፍለስ እናለበት ያሉት ነገር ከዚህ ጋር አብሮ ይሄዳል። ለምሳሌ አዲስ አበባ ዙርያ የሚኖረው ባብዛኛው ኦሮሞ ነው። አዲስ አበባ ባደገች ቁጥር በሜትሮፖሊታን ከተማው ያለው የኦሮሞ ህዝብ ቁጥር እየጨመረ መሄዱ አይቀርም። ከላይ በጻፍኩት አንጻር ይህ የኦሮሞ ህዝብ በአዲስ አበባ መብዛት አይቀሬም ብቻ ሳይሆን እንደ ጥሩ ነገር ነው መታየት ያለበት። ከተማው ህዝቡን ይቀላቅለዋል እና ያዋህደዋል። ይህ ውህደት የጎሳ ብሄርተኝነትን ይቀንሳል። ስለዚህ ኦሮሞዎችን ወደ አዲስ አበባ እና ሌሎች ከተሞች እንዲፈልሱ ያለው የኦዴፓ እቅድ ጥሩ ነው ማለት ይቻላል።
አሁን ከኛ ከኢትዮጵያ ብሄርተኞች ጎራ የሚጠበቀው ይህ እቅድ በምንፈልገው በአውንታዊ መስመር እንዲካሄድ ነው። «የጎሳ ጌቶዎች» ወይንም የአንድ ጎሳ ሰፈሮች እንዳይፈጠሩ፤ እውነታዊ ውህደት እንዲኖር፤ ሌላው ህብረተሰብ ኦሮምኛ እንዲማር፤ አድሎዋዊነት እንዳይኖር፤ ወዘተ መስራት አለብን። ሌላው ከኛ የሚጠበቀው ነገር የኦሮሞዎች መብት እና ፍላጎት በአዲስ አበባ እንደሚከበረው የሌሎች ዜጎች መብት እና ፍላጎት በኦሮሚያ እንዲከበር መሟገት እና ማስፈጸም ነው። አልፎ ተርፎ ኦሮሙማ (የኦሮሞ ባህል) በአዲስ አበባ እና መላው ኢትዮጵያ እንዲንጸባረቅ በመስማማት in exchange የጎሳ ፌደራሊዝም ሀገ መንግስቱ እንዲቀየር መሟገት እና መደራደር አለብን። ይህን ለማድረግ ታላቅ አቅም እና መደራጀት ይጠበቅብናል።
ነገሮችን ሁሉ በአውንታዊ መልኩ እንደ opportunity ማየት የአሸናፊነት ምልክት ነው። ኦዴፓ ኦሮሞን ወደ አዲስ አበባ እንዲሄድ እናበረታታለን ሲል እኛ እሰየው ብለን በሂደቱ ተሳትፈን እኛ የምንፈልገው መልክ እንዲይዝ ማድረግ አለብን። ከውጭ እያየን በፍርሃት ከማልቀስ ጉዳይ ውስጥ ገብተን መምራት ነው ያለብን።
ስለዚህ ለማ መገርሳ ልክ ነው፤ የዴሞግራፊ ለውጥ ግድ ነው። በዚህ መንገግድ ብቻ ነው መቀላቀል እና መዋሃድ የሚመጣው። በዚህ መንገድ ብቻ ነው አሁን በህብረተሰባችን የሰፈነው ጎሰኝነት ከረዥም ዓመታት በኋላ እንዲቀንስ እና እንዲጠፋ ማድረግ የሚቻለው።
Showing posts with label ethnic balance. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ethnic balance. Show all posts
Sunday, 10 March 2019
Monday, 15 October 2018
On NAMA Strategies
One of the National Movement of Amhara's (NAMA) strategies seems to be to out-ghetto Oromo nationalists, so to speak. That is, to demonstrate political positions and attitudes that are as radical or even more radical than Oromo nationalists. Simple examples - NAMA leadership and intellectuals have made statements in support of Article 39 and of maintaining ethnic identification on kebele id cards. And apparently at a recent NAMA meeting, supporters publicly voiced the idea of evicting Oromos living on Oromia zones in Amhara Region.
The idea behind this strategy, it seems to me, is that taking extreme positions, which, by the way, have no acceptance from the Amhara masses, will help neutralize Oromo and other ethnic nationalists by restoring the political balance. The NAMA view is that Oromo nationalists have been 'coddled' for too long and now have too much political power now, and one of the ways for NAMA to counteract that is by showing strength through extremism. Basic tit-for-tat strategy.
The problem with this is that it is based on an erroneous and simplistic understanding of the phenomenon of ethnic nationalism in a multi-ethnic nation. The goal of ethnic nationalism is to tear away at the centre, weaken it, and take power away from it to the periphery, which is various ethnic nationalisms. Adding 'another' ethnic nationalism to this actually further weakens the centre and strengthens all ethnic nationalist movements.
A further factor that NAMA doesn't seem to consider is the asymmetric nature of ethnic relations in Ethiopia. The Amhara live in large numbers in various regions, while the Oromo do not.
Given this, Oromo nationalists would much rather have a weak or empty centre and deal with a strong Amhara nationalist movement. This is their perfect scenario, in which all Oromos, including moderate ones, will congregate to Oromo nationalism, making it the only game in Oromia, so to speak. They will negotiate tit for tat agreements with Amhara nationalism and have their Oromo homeland.
What about issues that Oromo nationalists and Amhara nationalists do not agree on, such as Amharas in Oromia, and the case of Addis Ababa? With all Oromos on board, Oromo nationalists will not give an inch on this, and there will be conflict, either overt or covert. The main victims, given the population distribution I mentioned above, will be Amharas and other ethnic groups in Oromia and in Addis Ababa. And if NAMA has a vision of being able to carry out a TPLF 2.0 and forcing itself on the whole country, well, I think we all realize how realistic that is.
Now, I think we should take a step back and ask ourselves 'why'. Why does NAMA exist and why does it take the positions and attitudes in does? In order to reach any kind of understanding and solution to the issues at hand, this question has to be the focus. As I've written about this in my blog, for me, there are two major reasons: 1) The upheaval and resulting weakness of Ethiopian nationalism (or 'the centre') over the past 50 years, and 2) accumulated resentment for the treatment of the Amhara, including by Amhara 'traitors', over the past 27 years, and the resulting grievance and inferiority complex. NAMA is simply an outgrowth of this. The second factor we can do little about - time will heal wounds. But the first we must work hard with all our might to correct, as fixing that - strengthening the centre tangibly via political parties and institutions - is a sine qua non for the survival of Ethiopia.
The idea behind this strategy, it seems to me, is that taking extreme positions, which, by the way, have no acceptance from the Amhara masses, will help neutralize Oromo and other ethnic nationalists by restoring the political balance. The NAMA view is that Oromo nationalists have been 'coddled' for too long and now have too much political power now, and one of the ways for NAMA to counteract that is by showing strength through extremism. Basic tit-for-tat strategy.
The problem with this is that it is based on an erroneous and simplistic understanding of the phenomenon of ethnic nationalism in a multi-ethnic nation. The goal of ethnic nationalism is to tear away at the centre, weaken it, and take power away from it to the periphery, which is various ethnic nationalisms. Adding 'another' ethnic nationalism to this actually further weakens the centre and strengthens all ethnic nationalist movements.
A further factor that NAMA doesn't seem to consider is the asymmetric nature of ethnic relations in Ethiopia. The Amhara live in large numbers in various regions, while the Oromo do not.
Given this, Oromo nationalists would much rather have a weak or empty centre and deal with a strong Amhara nationalist movement. This is their perfect scenario, in which all Oromos, including moderate ones, will congregate to Oromo nationalism, making it the only game in Oromia, so to speak. They will negotiate tit for tat agreements with Amhara nationalism and have their Oromo homeland.
What about issues that Oromo nationalists and Amhara nationalists do not agree on, such as Amharas in Oromia, and the case of Addis Ababa? With all Oromos on board, Oromo nationalists will not give an inch on this, and there will be conflict, either overt or covert. The main victims, given the population distribution I mentioned above, will be Amharas and other ethnic groups in Oromia and in Addis Ababa. And if NAMA has a vision of being able to carry out a TPLF 2.0 and forcing itself on the whole country, well, I think we all realize how realistic that is.
Now, I think we should take a step back and ask ourselves 'why'. Why does NAMA exist and why does it take the positions and attitudes in does? In order to reach any kind of understanding and solution to the issues at hand, this question has to be the focus. As I've written about this in my blog, for me, there are two major reasons: 1) The upheaval and resulting weakness of Ethiopian nationalism (or 'the centre') over the past 50 years, and 2) accumulated resentment for the treatment of the Amhara, including by Amhara 'traitors', over the past 27 years, and the resulting grievance and inferiority complex. NAMA is simply an outgrowth of this. The second factor we can do little about - time will heal wounds. But the first we must work hard with all our might to correct, as fixing that - strengthening the centre tangibly via political parties and institutions - is a sine qua non for the survival of Ethiopia.
Monday, 17 September 2018
Centre and periphery in Ethiopia
There seems to be a perception among some elements in the Amhara Nationalism movement that if the Amhara manage to mobilize into a force more powerful than the Oromo and other ethnic movements in the country, the current ethnic imbalance (against the Amhara) will be corrected, resulting in a beneficial arrangement for the Amhara as well as all of Ethiopia.
The assumption here is that a nation that consists simply of a political balance between ethnic groups is a viable nation. This is of course a basic error. It is an error, by the way, that has been propagated by ethnic nationalists, as we've seen in Ethiopia for over 40 years, that is is possible to create a nation out of inter-ethnic negotiation.
But this is not possible. Ethnic political movements naturally devolve politics into a zero-sum game. They capture all political, economic, and social competitions and force them into this zero-sum game. The result is perpetual conflict.
We know this not only in theory, but in examples around the world, and most importantly, in Ethiopia over the past 27 years. Issues such as political power, border, citizen and group rights, security, etc. have all been sources of conflict and will continue to be so as long as ethnicity is the main political driver.
Around the world, we see that multi-ethnic nations are careful not to as much as possible institutionalize ethnicity. They institutionalize language, culture, regional rights, etc., sometimes in an effort to indirectly achieve ethnic rights, but they never directly institutionalize ethnicity because the resulting conflicts are well known.
So in the case of Ethiopia today, let us assume that the Amhara create a movement stronger than any ethnic movement in Ethiopia. At the negotiating table or the battlefield, this movement will be capable of overpowering others, but at what cost. Will it be able to regain territories such as Welqait by negotiation or force? Will it be able to protect Addis Ababa from Oromo ethnic nationalism by negotiation or force? Will it be able to protect Amharas outside Amhara Region by negotiation or force?
The answer is obviously no. Why? The answer is simple. All the other ethnic movements will obviously demand the same rights (or more rights) as the Amhara movement. Why would they settle for less? So if the Amhara want the return of Welqait, Tigray will resist. No amount of ethnic to ethnic negotiation will work. So the only path will be force. If the Oromo insist on Amharas in Oromia having second class citizenship, what can the Amhara do but do the same to Oromos in Amhara? Will they both be able to agree to treat each others 'citizens' like their own? No, the Oromo nationalists are interested in nation-building, so they will enforce Oromocization. What can the Amharas do except tit-for-tat? Or else resort to force.
So it is a fallacy to assume that a strong Amhara movement will do well at the negotiating table. It will not. It may do well on the battlefield, however. It might be able to, like the TPLF, exert itself on others by force. But I assume we all know that in the long run this will be against the interests of the Amhara and all of Ethiopia.
These examples illustrate clearly that it is impossible to achieve a decent outcome - a viable nationa- with ethnic-to-ethnic negotiation. What is possible to achieve is a perpetual zero-sum game and perpetual conflict. That is why it is impossible to create a nation out of a political negotiation between ethnic groups.
In order to have a viable nation, one needs a centre. Anyone who has read any Ethiopian history and politics knows the concept of centre and periphery as it applies in Ethiopia. The 'centre' is the political constituency that, to put it simply, identifies as Ethiopian first and foremost. Its other identities, such as ethnicity, are secondary. This centre is an integrated political constituency created by and with a centuries old history of integration and assimilation. The 'peripheries' are those constituencies which have been less integrated and therefore have somewhat separate political identities from the centre. The ethnic nationalisms in Ethiopia are such examples.
There is always a tension between the centre and periphery. Many say that one of the reasons the Haile Selassie government eventually fell was that it 'centralized' too much. In other words, it gave to much power to the centre, which resulted in rebellion from the periphery. The Dergue regime continued this mistake, and the resulting revolution brought about a violent backlash that took Ethiopia to the opposite extreme, where all power, in theory, rests in the periphery, with the centre being nothing but a negotiated settlement by the peripheries.
So what Ethiopia needs today is to restore the balance not between ethnic groups, but between the centre and the periphery, the centre being "Ethiopianism", and the periphery being ethnic nationalism. The centre needs to get stronger so that it can resist the centrifugal force of the peripheries pulling at it. This will result in less conflict as well as more representative government, in the sense that not only ethnic rights but all rights will be respected. Human rights will no longer be steamrolled in favour of ethnic rights.
What does this mean for the Amhara? Well, as most Amhara nationalists acknowledge, the interests of Ethiopianism is for the most part aligned with the interests of the Amhara. For example, a citizen-based instead of ethnicity-based constitution is in the interests of both the centre and of the Amhara. Since the interests of the centre and the Amhara are aligned, if the Amhara line up to strengthen the centre vis a vis the periphery, they will by default have defended the interests of the Amhara.
Let me offer some practical examples. One of the interests of the Amhara is enforcing the right of all Ethiopians to live as equals in any region in Ethiopia. In a nation of peripheries, this will never happen, as I explained above. But if the centre is strong, this will happen. Because not only Amharas, but all others who have this in their interests will together demand equality of citizenship. Thus, not only Amharas, who say, are 30% of the population, but vast numbers from other ethnic groups will together, as Ethiopians, demand this right. This will make it impossible for those peripheries who are against this to resist, because the demand is not being made by other ethnic groups, but by the centre.
Recall that the victims of the recent ethnic cleansing around Addis Ababa were from at least three different ethnic groups. With a weak centre, these three ethnic groups would be separately advocating for the rights of their members. But a strong centre would result in a far more powerful united front.
Another example would be the question of Wolqait. Perhaps the most effective route to liberating Wolqait from being part of ethnic Tigray is to restructure federalism away from ethnic into regional federalism. This restructuring can only be done by a strong centre, since there will be no coalition of ethnic groups willing to do this. So again, the Amhara, by reinforcing the centre, will strengthen it to the extent that it will be able to peacefully negotiate such a change with the peripheries.
The centre is a powerful force. This is why throughout Ethiopian history, as we all know, most political forces, even those which started out as peripheral liberators, wanted as the final prize to get a hold of the centre. From ancient history, to the present, this story has repeated itself. Amhara nationalists would do well to review this history. It does not make sense to retreat to the periphery when ones interests are best served by bolstering the centre and ensuring its interests align with yours.
The assumption here is that a nation that consists simply of a political balance between ethnic groups is a viable nation. This is of course a basic error. It is an error, by the way, that has been propagated by ethnic nationalists, as we've seen in Ethiopia for over 40 years, that is is possible to create a nation out of inter-ethnic negotiation.
But this is not possible. Ethnic political movements naturally devolve politics into a zero-sum game. They capture all political, economic, and social competitions and force them into this zero-sum game. The result is perpetual conflict.
We know this not only in theory, but in examples around the world, and most importantly, in Ethiopia over the past 27 years. Issues such as political power, border, citizen and group rights, security, etc. have all been sources of conflict and will continue to be so as long as ethnicity is the main political driver.
Around the world, we see that multi-ethnic nations are careful not to as much as possible institutionalize ethnicity. They institutionalize language, culture, regional rights, etc., sometimes in an effort to indirectly achieve ethnic rights, but they never directly institutionalize ethnicity because the resulting conflicts are well known.
So in the case of Ethiopia today, let us assume that the Amhara create a movement stronger than any ethnic movement in Ethiopia. At the negotiating table or the battlefield, this movement will be capable of overpowering others, but at what cost. Will it be able to regain territories such as Welqait by negotiation or force? Will it be able to protect Addis Ababa from Oromo ethnic nationalism by negotiation or force? Will it be able to protect Amharas outside Amhara Region by negotiation or force?
The answer is obviously no. Why? The answer is simple. All the other ethnic movements will obviously demand the same rights (or more rights) as the Amhara movement. Why would they settle for less? So if the Amhara want the return of Welqait, Tigray will resist. No amount of ethnic to ethnic negotiation will work. So the only path will be force. If the Oromo insist on Amharas in Oromia having second class citizenship, what can the Amhara do but do the same to Oromos in Amhara? Will they both be able to agree to treat each others 'citizens' like their own? No, the Oromo nationalists are interested in nation-building, so they will enforce Oromocization. What can the Amharas do except tit-for-tat? Or else resort to force.
So it is a fallacy to assume that a strong Amhara movement will do well at the negotiating table. It will not. It may do well on the battlefield, however. It might be able to, like the TPLF, exert itself on others by force. But I assume we all know that in the long run this will be against the interests of the Amhara and all of Ethiopia.
These examples illustrate clearly that it is impossible to achieve a decent outcome - a viable nationa- with ethnic-to-ethnic negotiation. What is possible to achieve is a perpetual zero-sum game and perpetual conflict. That is why it is impossible to create a nation out of a political negotiation between ethnic groups.
In order to have a viable nation, one needs a centre. Anyone who has read any Ethiopian history and politics knows the concept of centre and periphery as it applies in Ethiopia. The 'centre' is the political constituency that, to put it simply, identifies as Ethiopian first and foremost. Its other identities, such as ethnicity, are secondary. This centre is an integrated political constituency created by and with a centuries old history of integration and assimilation. The 'peripheries' are those constituencies which have been less integrated and therefore have somewhat separate political identities from the centre. The ethnic nationalisms in Ethiopia are such examples.
There is always a tension between the centre and periphery. Many say that one of the reasons the Haile Selassie government eventually fell was that it 'centralized' too much. In other words, it gave to much power to the centre, which resulted in rebellion from the periphery. The Dergue regime continued this mistake, and the resulting revolution brought about a violent backlash that took Ethiopia to the opposite extreme, where all power, in theory, rests in the periphery, with the centre being nothing but a negotiated settlement by the peripheries.
So what Ethiopia needs today is to restore the balance not between ethnic groups, but between the centre and the periphery, the centre being "Ethiopianism", and the periphery being ethnic nationalism. The centre needs to get stronger so that it can resist the centrifugal force of the peripheries pulling at it. This will result in less conflict as well as more representative government, in the sense that not only ethnic rights but all rights will be respected. Human rights will no longer be steamrolled in favour of ethnic rights.
What does this mean for the Amhara? Well, as most Amhara nationalists acknowledge, the interests of Ethiopianism is for the most part aligned with the interests of the Amhara. For example, a citizen-based instead of ethnicity-based constitution is in the interests of both the centre and of the Amhara. Since the interests of the centre and the Amhara are aligned, if the Amhara line up to strengthen the centre vis a vis the periphery, they will by default have defended the interests of the Amhara.
Let me offer some practical examples. One of the interests of the Amhara is enforcing the right of all Ethiopians to live as equals in any region in Ethiopia. In a nation of peripheries, this will never happen, as I explained above. But if the centre is strong, this will happen. Because not only Amharas, but all others who have this in their interests will together demand equality of citizenship. Thus, not only Amharas, who say, are 30% of the population, but vast numbers from other ethnic groups will together, as Ethiopians, demand this right. This will make it impossible for those peripheries who are against this to resist, because the demand is not being made by other ethnic groups, but by the centre.
Recall that the victims of the recent ethnic cleansing around Addis Ababa were from at least three different ethnic groups. With a weak centre, these three ethnic groups would be separately advocating for the rights of their members. But a strong centre would result in a far more powerful united front.
Another example would be the question of Wolqait. Perhaps the most effective route to liberating Wolqait from being part of ethnic Tigray is to restructure federalism away from ethnic into regional federalism. This restructuring can only be done by a strong centre, since there will be no coalition of ethnic groups willing to do this. So again, the Amhara, by reinforcing the centre, will strengthen it to the extent that it will be able to peacefully negotiate such a change with the peripheries.
The centre is a powerful force. This is why throughout Ethiopian history, as we all know, most political forces, even those which started out as peripheral liberators, wanted as the final prize to get a hold of the centre. From ancient history, to the present, this story has repeated itself. Amhara nationalists would do well to review this history. It does not make sense to retreat to the periphery when ones interests are best served by bolstering the centre and ensuring its interests align with yours.
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